By Emil A. Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev
October 23, 2018, the CACI Analyst
On August 20, a series of attacks by teenagers against policemen took place in Chechnya’s cities of Grozny and Shali. The country’s strongman Ramzan Kadyrov quickly blamed “external actors” seeking to pitch local security enforcement, siloviki, against teenagers, while decrying the inability of the attackers’ parents to oversee their sons. Yet realities on the ground appears to be different. In fact, large part of the Chechen population hold enormous grievances caused by the impunity of local siloviki, particularly kadyrovtsy, and the republican authorities in general. The threat of punishment against the relatives of insurgents and their (prospective) supporters has since the early 2000s stemmed the local insurgency. Yet from time to time, grievances condensed in the Chechen population explode in spontaneous acts of nearly-suicidal violence against republican law enforcement.
By Fuad Shahbazov
October 18, 2018, the CACI Analyst
On August 16, the Azerbaijani MP and head of the Azerbaijan-Russia interparliamentary group Ali Huseynli told local media that “It would be advisable to consider Azerbaijan’s participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization” (CSTO). The sensational statement triggered a public discussion on Azerbaijan’s possible membership in the Russia-led CSTO and its consequences for the region. While some state officials described this prospect as a logical extension of Baku’s cooperation with Moscow, others strictly opposed the idea, stating that it would pose dangerous challenges to the country.
By Rafis Abazov
October 16, 2018, the CACI Analyst
During the Astana Financial Days event in July 2018, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan announced and personally endorsed the opening of the Astana International Financial Center (AIFC). He envisions that the AIFC will provide financial services “not only for Kazakhstan, but also for the whole world.” If successful, the AIFC can contribute to diversifying the financial resources for Kazakhstan’s national and international projects. Through its proper implementation, the government of Kazakhstan can develop a tool for improving collaboration with neighboring countries in Central Asia in the industrial, agricultural and tourism sectors, making the Central Asian section of the Silk Road more attractive for business and financial deals. In addition, the Center can become a real financial hub not only for Kazakhstan and Central Asia but also for the wider Eurasia region if it is capable of attracting enough financial resources from large international players.
By Tristan Kenderdine
October 30, 2018, the CACI Analyst
In the trade war with the U.S., China has clearly shown that it is willing to reject Pacific trade partners based on political over economic considerations. Beijing’s wider policy to develop industrial and agroindustrial capacity in Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East means that these economies can use short-term structural changes in global trade dynamics to their longer term advantage. Ultimately, all states suffer in a trade war. If Central Asian, U.S. and European producers all had open access to China’s markets, all sides would benefit in the long run. In the short term though, a U.S.-China trade war is a huge opportunity for Central Asian economies to soak up China’s heavy industry outward direct investment despite the risk of a China policy bank debt-trap.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.
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