By Sergey Sukhankin

In Kazakhstan’s recent referendum, over 71 percent of voters endorsed building the country’s first nuclear power plant (NPP), marking a significant step toward advancing this major infrastructure project. Strongly supported by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and the national political elite, the NPP is expected to address Kazakhstan’s current and projected electricity needs. Additionally, as the world’s leading uranium producer, Kazakhstan stands to benefit from self-sufficiency in uranium enrichment, reducing its reliance on external suppliers. A key issue now centers on which entity will secure the NPP construction contract, with geopolitical considerations expected to weigh heavily alongside technological and economic factors.

BACKGROUND:  Discussions about constructing a new, modern NPP in Kazakhstan date back to the early 2000s. From 1973 to 1999, the country operated an NPP in Shevchenko (now Aktau), which was closed as part of Kazakhstan’s de-nuclearization policy. However, tangible steps toward this goal only began in 2021, following a severe electricity shortage linked to a spike in cryptocurrency mining and pressures from the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, the European Union’s push for sustainable trade relations led Kazakhstani political leaders to prioritize renewable energy expansion in the national economy. In promoting a public vote for constructing an NPP, the government highlighted four main priorities: averting a potential energy crisis amid rising electricity demand; mitigating environmental risks linked to unsustainable energy sources; reducing Kazakhstan's reliance on electricity imports from Russia; and preserving the competitiveness of Kazakh exports to the EU. Despite compelling arguments supporting the nuclear power plant project, significant concerns have emerged from local experts, civil society, and the public. A primary worry centers on the risk of nuclear accidents, with Chernobyl and Fukushima serving as stark reminders of possible environmental catastrophes. Specific fears include potential harm to the fragile ecosystem of Lake Balkhash, which is already experiencing drying and may face further degradation from plant operations. Moreover, experts emphasize Kazakhstan's current lack of expertise and infrastructure for safely managing nuclear waste, leaving the issue of radioactive waste disposal unresolved. The economic viability of Kazakhstan's nuclear project is also a subject of concern. Critics point to the high construction costs and question the plant’s long-term financial sustainability, especially given the uncertain outlook for future electricity demand. Some experts suggest that the expected surge in demand may not occur as projected. They argue that even if demand does rise, Kazakhstan has alternative options, such as expanding renewable energy sources and improving the efficiency of the current electricity grid, which could address energy needs without relying on nuclear power. Geopolitical concerns further drive opposition to Kazakhstan’s nuclear project. Recent incidents at nuclear facilities, such as Zaporizhzhia and Kursk, illustrate the vulnerability of such infrastructure during conflicts, highlighting risks if similar instability arises in Central Asia. Additionally, Kazakhstan’s limited technical expertise and financial resources mean it would likely depend heavily on foreign partners to build and operate the plant. Critics argue that this reliance could compromise Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, with potential implications for the country’s long-term energy autonomy and geopolitical independence.

IMPLICATIONS:  Four main contenders have emerged to construct Kazakhstan’s NPP: Russia’s Rosatom, China’s National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KEPCO), and France's Électricité de France (EDF). While Kazakhstan has pledged to base its choice on factors such as economic feasibility, technological reliability, and environmental safety, Russia and China realistically lead the race. Although France and South Korea bring significant expertise, high construction costs (potentially exceeding US$ 12 billion) and geopolitical dynamics may limit their competitiveness. Thus, Kazakhstan appears to face three pragmatic options moving forward. One option is for China to assume the role of sole contractor for the project, a scenario with several competitive advantages. China offers relatively lower construction costs compared to French and South Korean alternatives and maintains a robust trade and investment relationship with Kazakhstan, enhancing its influence as an economic partner. However, the feasibility of China proceeding alone is uncertain. Moscow might perceive China’s unilateral role as a diplomatic slight, as Russia has become a key strategic partner and potential Arctic access point for China. Moreover, it remains unclear if China is willing or prepared to undertake this project independently, given its geopolitical sensitivities. A second option is to appoint Russia as the sole contractor, a role Moscow has long pursued. Between 2010 and 2019, President Vladimir Putin personally lobbied Kazakhstan to select Rosatom as its nuclear plant builder. Given Russia’s current geopolitical isolation and diminishing network of allies, Moscow might view any exclusion of Rosatom as a serious diplomatic offense. The recent “grain war” between Russia and Kazakhstan—allegedly sparked by Kazakhstan’s refusal to join BRICS—demonstrates how swiftly Moscow might respond with retaliatory measures if it perceives a breach in loyalty or alignment. An analysis of Russian sources indicates several strategies Russia might use to “encourage” Kazakhstan to prioritize Rosatom’s bid. A primary leverage point is Kazakhstan’s reliance on Russian territory for transporting export-bound oil. Approximately 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil exports pass through Russia, and oil revenue constitutes about two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s national budget. Any disruption in this transit route could precipitate a fiscal crisis for Kazakhstan, with severe implications for the stability of its national budget. A second leverage point is Russia’s role in alleviating Kazakhstan’s energy deficit through electricity exports. Russian experts warn that any abrupt cessation of this supply could lead to severe energy shortages in Kazakhstan, potentially triggering economic and political instability. These pressure points are further highlighted by recent incidents, such as the explosion at Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field, which occurred shortly after President Tokayev discussed with EU officials increasing Kazakh oil exports to compensate for reduced Russian supplies. These events suggest that- Should Kazakhstan consider alternatives to Russia for its NPP construction, it might face similar pressures or retaliatory actions from Moscow. Kazakhstan’s reliance on Russia for both oil export infrastructure and electricity supply exposes the country to significant vulnerabilities. Nearly 80 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil exports pass through Russian territory, and oil revenues account for approximately two-thirds of the national budget. Any disruption to this transport network could result in severe economic consequences, potentially destabilizing Kazakhstan’s fiscal position. Similarly, Kazakhstan’s electricity deficit is largely covered by imports from Russia. Russian experts caution that if Russia were to cut off this supply, Kazakhstan would face a precarious situation, where both political stability and economic restructuring could become unfeasible. These dependencies highlight Kazakhstan’s vulnerability to Russian influence, as demonstrated by the 2022 explosion at the Tengiz oil field, the country’s largest, which occurred shortly after President Tokayev’s discussions with EU officials about increasing Kazakh oil exports to compensate for reduced Russian supply due to the invasion of Ukraine. This incident underscores Russia’s capacity—and potential willingness—to retaliate against Kazakhstan should the country act in ways that conflict with Russian interests. A third option is to form an international consortium to oversee the construction of the NPP. This approach could provide a balanced compromise, allowing Russia to participate without being the sole contractor, thus reducing the risk of secondary economic sanctions. Such an arrangement might appeal to Moscow, as it would obscure Rosatom’s central role while still involving Russian expertise. Notably, President Tokayev has rhetorically supported the idea of an “international consortium,” suggesting that this could be the most feasible solution. However, several uncertainties surround the international consortium option. A significant challenge is that the construction of the nuclear reactor, the core component of the NPP, cannot be easily divided among multiple parties. This raises the critical issue of who would be responsible for sourcing and manufacturing the reactor, as the origin of this essential component remains unclear. Furthermore, the distribution of responsibilities within the consortium could lead to complications. Some members would likely take leadership roles, while others would play secondary, supportive functions. The precise allocation of these roles, and how they align with the interests of the participating companies, remains uncertain, potentially creating tensions within the consortium and complicating cooperation and decision-making.

CONCLUSIONS:  The construction of Kazakhstan’s NPP will provide crucial insight into Russia’s influence in Central Asia, a region where assertions of Russia’s diminishing role may underestimate its true significance. The outcome of this project could offer a clearer picture of Russia’s geopolitical and economic standing in the region. If Kazakhstan ultimately selects Rosatom as the sole bidder—an outcome that seems less probable—or if Russia’s state corporation participates within an international consortium, it will symbolize Russia’s continued strategic presence in Central Asia. Such a scenario would highlight Russia’s ability to retain substantial leverage in the region, despite competing global interests. Whether as the lead contractor or a key consortium member, Rosatom’s involvement would likely reinforce its central role in the region’s energy infrastructure and broader geopolitical affairs.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and the Saratoga Foundation (both Washington DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (Canada). He teaches international business at MacEwan School of Business (Edmonton, Canada). Currently he is a postdoctoral fellow at the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN).

By Fariz Ismailzade

March 11th, 2016, The CACI Analyst

After a decade of transformational economic growth, reduced oil prices forced Azerbaijan to a double devaluation of its national currency, significant reduction of public spending, slowdown of GDP, and most importantly, panic in the domestic market among both the general population and the business community. The government responded with several anti-crisis programs and measures, aimed at stimulating national economy, supporting local production and easing the business climate for the local entrepreneurs. President Ilham Aliyev has called 2016 “a year of deep economic reforms.” It remains to be seen whether the country will be able to shift gears and transform its economy to achieve sustainable growth from non-oil sectors.