By Stephen Blank
May 9, 2024
Russian power is retreating from the Caucasus and Central Asia, most prominently with the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Nagorno-Karabakh and Washington’s concurrent decision to open discussions with Yerevan on military support. The same process is discernible in Central Asia in the lukewarm support for the war in Ukraine and Kazakhstan’s critique of that war. Other harbingers of the trend are the gradual erosion of Russian language use and China’s dominance in regional finance, trade, and investment. Nevertheless, Moscow still deploys substantial leverage over Central Asia and individual states and can conduct purely domestic policies that negatively affect Central Asian governments and citizens. Moreover, recent indicators suggest that Russia is launching a campaign to restore its hegemonic position in Central Asia. Thus, despite the war in Ukraine and the burdens it has imposed, current Russian policies in Central Asia amount to a determined resistance to its equally observable retreat.
Brenda Shaffer
March 27, 2024
In recent years, Türkiye has significantly increased cooperation with the states of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. One of the most important geopolitical developments in recent years in Eurasia is the emerging alliance between Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia. This emerging alliance has given impetus to increased cooperation in the sphere of energy among the states. In addition, the increases in strategic collaboration in the region are also raising the prospects of establishment of cross-Caspian energy projects. Türkiye’s engagement in the energy sphere in Central Asia is likely to grow in 2024 and onward. 2024 is a pivotal year for Türkiye’s energy policies as its main contracts for gas imports from Russia and Iran expire at the end of 2024 and in 2026. Thus, this year Ankara will make decisions on its future natural gas supplier mix. Türkiye’s Sakarya gas field is also ramping up over 2024.
By Stephen Blank
February 9, 2024
Virtually every assessment of trends in Central Asia since Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and many preceding analyses have postulated a decline in most if not all dimensions of Russian influence and capacity. To be sure, Russia’s imperial aspirations and ability to indulge in them remain central to Russian policy. Nevertheless, that capacity and ability to give this area the attention it merits has visibly declined, not least regarding defense policy. That decline has opened and continues to create opportunities for other interested parties to raise their regional profile, including China, Turkey, India, the EU, and the U.S.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.
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