By Oleg Salimov (07/02/2014 issue of the CACI Analyst)

The fact that free media in Tajikistan is subjected to persecution was once again confirmed earlier this spring by a Tajik court ruling against the local media outlet Asia-Plus. In June 2014, Asia-Plus submitted a supervisory complaint to Tajikistan’s Supreme Court after its appeal was rejected by the city court of Dushanbe. The Supreme Court is the last authority to decide on the Asia-Plus case. There is little hope that the Supreme Court will annul the previous decrees.

The case, which became known as “Intelligentsia vs Asia-Plus,” was initiated by a group of Tajik intellectual organizations in the summer 2013 and was intended to protect them from a supposed insult published in one of Asia-Plus’s articles. In her editorial column, the author, Olga Tutubalina, criticized the country’s public figures of fawning upon President Rakhmon. However, the intelligentsia was insulted not by the accusation of fawning but by Tutubalina’s citation of Vladimir Lenin, who infamously compared the intelligentsia to waste products. Avoiding expressing her disgust for Rakhmon and his entourage directly, Tutubalina veiled her antipathy to the country’s elite with a metaphor borrowed from the Bolshevik leader. Tutubalina’s article denounced the Tajik intelligentsia as serving as a trumpet of authoritarianism. According to her, the Tajik intelligentsia has abandoned its primary mission of constituting an intellectual driving force of democracy in favor of personal gain.

The central theme of Tutubalina’s article discussed the poet Bozor Sobir’s return to Tajikistan from exile in the U.S.. Sobir was one of the founders of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and a member of the now non-existing opposition movement “Rastokhez” (the Renaissance), and was personally invited to return by Rakhmon. Tutubalina was indignant with Sobir’s first public statement after his arrival on the superfluous and harmful number of political parties in Tajikistan, including the largest opposition party Islamic Renaissance. To the surprise of many, Sobir openly attacked his former political companions. Previously a vocal proponent of democracy in Tajikistan, Sobir revived himself as Rakhmon’s personal eulogist, autocracy advocate, and the highest appointed leader of Tajikistan’s intelligentsia. Sobir appealed to the Tajik intelligentsia to unite around Rakhmon and provide him with unreserved support.

Although the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Tajik Constitution allows Tutubalina and Asia-Plus to deliver their interpretation of political realities in the country, the government restricts this right through censorship and control of all published materials. In the Asia-Plus case, Rakhmon, acting through the intelligentsia, signals that negative information with reference to the president or government in Tajikistan is unacceptable.

Notably, on the initiative of Tajik National Communication Council in 2012, the government authorized a special unit within Tajikistan’s security services which censors all information about Tajikistan flowing in and out of the country with the purpose of creating a positive image of the current regime. The unit filters online publications, monitors social networking websites, and controls the national mass media. Tajikistan’s public is fed only materials deemed appropriate. The Asia-Plus case is a clear example of the authorities’ information filtering and image-building activities.

The use of influential public figures is the latest invention designed to reinvigorate Rakhmon’s withering image of the country’s “savior” and the current authoritarian style of governing as the only way to ensuring prosperity and stability for Tajikistan. The intelligentsia, including the representatives of four social, scientific, and professional organizations – though not including Sobir, the only intelligentsia representative directly named and addressed in the article – quickly rebounded with a lawsuit against Asia-Plus and Olga Tutubalina. The intelligentsia refrained from protesting their alleged behavior but instead quoted the crude quotation of Vladimir Lenin as an insult.

In February 2014, the district court ruled in favor of the intelligentsia and obliged Asia-Plus and Tutubalina to publish a disclaimer and pay around US$ 6,000 compensation to the plaintiffs. Later, the city court of Dushanbe contended this decision. Concerns regarding the Asia-Plus and Tutubalina case were expressed by Human Rights Watch, the chairman of the guild of Tajik journalists, Tajik human rights and social activists, and the U.S. embassy in Tajikistan. However, none had any apparent effect on the protection of press freedom and freedom of expression. Instead, Tajikistan’s government works zealously to improve and maintain the “appropriate” image of the country’s president and regime.

By Oleg Salimov (06/18/2014 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rakhmon visited Belarus on May 23-25, 2014. The stated purposes of the visit were to improve socio-economic cooperation and to develop an agrarian-industrial complex in Tajikistan. The secondary agenda of the Tajik president’s visit appeared to be the enlistment of military support from Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko after the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan. Rakhmon’s arrival in Belarus coincided with an unofficial visit by Vladimir Putin to Minsk and a meeting between the three leaders on the sidelines.

Although not widely publicized, the issue of military cooperation appears to have been an important topic in the conversation between the two leaders. Lukashenko and Rakhmon discussed regional security, Afghanistan, coordination between the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Belarusian military assistance to Tajikistan. Lukashenko publicly assured Rakhmon of material-technical military support after the U.S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. Rakhmon is actively seeking military assistance from its partners in the CIS, CSTO, and SCO. The timing of the visit and the unofficial meeting with Putin coincided with several major military events taking place in Belarus and Tajikistan.

First, Russia recently decided to expand its military presence in Belarus through additional provisions of the anti-aircraft and S-300 anti-missile system (NATO-indexed SA-10/20), based on an agreement from September of 2005. In addition to existing systems in Belarus, Russia will deliver additional S-300 units as Lukashenko announced in an official press conference on April 25 this year. Lukashenko pointed out that these systems will protect not only Belarus but also Russian territory in the northwest.

Second, Russia will launch its “Window” space defense monitoring system in Tajikistan into full operational readiness in summer/fall 2014. The system protects Russia’s southern and southeastern boundaries from intercontinental ballistic missiles. The launch takes place alongside the recent 30-year extension of Russian basing permits in Tajikistan. Russia’s military base in Tajikistan is its largest military force abroad with significant authorities and capabilities. The armed and technical capabilities of the military base were reinforced with machinery and drones, among other, soon after the extension. According to Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu, Russia’s military base in Tajikistan will be also enlarged in manpower and rearmed with the latest weaponry by the end of 2014.

At the same time, Rakhmon intended to expand socio-economic and political cooperation with Belarus during his visit. The official statement by Rakhmon and Lukashenko presented highly successful negotiations that resulted in about 20 signed agreements and contracts. Among others, agreements were concluded between the countries’ National Olympic Committees, Belarus’ and Tajikistan’s agrarian universities, Belarus’ Ministry of Architecture and Tajikistan’s Committee on Architecture, Belarus’ State TV and Radio Broadcasting Company and Tajikistan’s Committee on TV and Radio, Belarus’ light industry complex and Tajikistan’s Ministry of Industry and New Technologies. A series of agreements on cooperation in trade and economy, culture, and science and technology were signed between various cities and regions in the two countries. The two sides discussed the possibility of transferring some of Belarus’ industrial capacities to Tajikistan. In particular, they referred to the assembly of Belarus-made agricultural equipment and the organization of centers servicing equipment imported from Belarus.

In their public statements, both presidents stressed the benefits of mutual ties between their countries, which are based on their personal friendship and solidarity in opinions on issues in international politics. They also expressed their long-term commitment to maintaining and expand their existing relationships.

A comparison of the two regimes’ political structure, their systems of governance, and their political associations reveals other aspects of where Tajikistan and Belarus converge. Among the post-Soviet republics, Tajikistan and Belarus are among Russia’s closest and most consistent partners. The two are highly influenced by and dependent on Russia politically, economically, and militarily. Tajikistan and Belarus have entered into various political agreements with Russia; they were among the first post-Soviet republics to sign dual citizenship agreements with Russia and to allow a Russian military presence on their territories. Tajikistan and Belarus also partner with Russia in regional political, economic, and security organizations.

In a number of ways, relations between Belarus and Tajikistan are sustained by Russian involvement and influence, most prominently in their political and military components. While the latest agreements between Belarus and Tajikistan could have been reached on the ministerial level, without presidential involvement, Rakhmon’s official meeting with Lukashenko and the unofficial one with Putin were necessary in order to coordinate military cooperation between the three countries. In this connection, the initiated talks on military cooperation between CSTO and SCO members are likely to move forward in the nearest future.

By Arslan Sabyrbekov (06/18/2014 issue of the CACI Analyst)

On June 2, upon the invitation of his Turkish counterpart, Kyrgyzstan’s President Almazbek Atambayev paid a visit to Ankara to participate in a meeting of the Supreme Kyrgyz-Turkish Interstate Council. The Council was formed after the April 2010 events in Kyrgyzstan and determines the strategy of bilateral relations in a wide range of areas, including in the economic, agriculture and cultural spheres. As part of his Turkey visit, the Kyrgyz President also took part in the fourth meeting of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States along with the presidents of Turkey, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

Since its establishment in 2010, a number of meetings of the Supreme Kyrgyz-Turkish Interstate Council have taken place, where parties reached a joint agreement to increase the trade volume between their countries up to one billion dollars. To reach this goal, Turkey has continuously expressed its readiness to more actively engage its businesses in Kyrgyzstan and invest in the hydropower, tourism, transport and communication sectors. But despite these statements, the volume of bilateral trade remains low at slightly over a quarter billion US$. For comparison, trade between Turkey and Tajikistan has recently reached US$ 600 million, and with Kazakhstan the amount is close to US$ 4 billion.

Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the Russia-led Customs Union was also discussed during the President Atambayev’s meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The head of the Turkish government described Kyrgyzstan’s intention to join the Union as “a positive step that opens up great opportunities for the Kyrgyz Republic.” Kyrgyzstan’s former Minister of Economy Akylbek Dzhaparov described Erdogan’s statement as a symbolic gesture of diplomacy and believes that Ankara is preoccupied with finding ways to maintain its influence in the region despite Russia’s intention to create a larger Eurasian Union. Regarding the volume of bilateral trade, an expert noted that it will decline after Bishkek enters the Customs Union. According to him “because of the law tariffs, goods from Turkey and China arrive first to Kyrgyzstan and are then exported to other countries. The Customs Union will lead to the same rates and therefore it is logical that the goods from these countries will be delivered directly to Russia through seaports.” To further discuss Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the Union and escape the possible negative consequences for Kyrgyz-Turkish economic relations, the Turkish Minister of Economy will visit Bishkek on June 20. 

Atambayev’s visit to Ankara immediately received various comments from local experts. According to political analyst Mars Sariev, Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the Russia-led Customs Union will have a negative impact on Kyrgyz-Turkish relations and on the country’s foreign policymaking in general. In his words, “the Customs Union is foremost Moscow’s geopolitical project and smaller countries that are heavily dependent on Russia, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, will feel pressured and will not be in a position to carry out a multi-vector foreign policy, unlike Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. In that geopolitical situation, Kyrgyzstan will not have any other option but to cooperate and seek agreement on its foreign policy actions from Moscow.”

In Ankara, the fate of Manas International Airport was also discussed. Turkey once again expressed its plans to participate in the transformation of the airport into a civilian hub. In turn, President Atambayev stated that “American soldiers have almost left Manas and soon it will be a truly civilian airport. Which country will come to the airport, we do not know, but we would welcome the participation of investors from our partners and work out joint projects.” Russian media has also featured speculation that Turkey will purchase the Kyrgyz airport assets and then rent it to the United States. In light of those developments, the Russian state owned company Rosneft reached a preliminary agreement with the Kyrgyz authorities to purchase shares in the airport, but Kyrgyzstan has refused to continue the talks due to its internal political instability and demonstrations by the National Opposition Movement. Thus, the airport’s fate after the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops remains unclear.

During his visit to Turkey, along with his other counterparts, President Atambayev also participated in the fourth meeting of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States. As a result of the summit, the participating states adopted the “Bodrum Declaration,” calling for more cooperation in developing the tourism sector.

The author wrote this article in his personal capacity. The views expressed are his own and do not represent the views of the organization for which the author works.