BACKGROUND: This was the U.S. Secretary of Defense’s second visit to Kyrgyzstan since the ouster of the former Akaev regime on March 24. Whereas the first visit in April was in support of the political changes in the country, the second is clearly related to the Pentagon’s disagreement with the SCO’s demands to limit the U.S. military presence in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia. At the meeting with Isakov, Rumsfeld disagreed with the argument that the situation in Afghanistan had stabilized. The same day, U.S. and Afghan forces killed about 50 Taliban militants in a raid in the Uruzgan province. Isakov agreed with his guest. There are about 950 U.S. troops at the Ganci Air Force Base at Bishkek’s Manas International Airport, stationed there since the fall of 2001. Uzbekistan has provided an airport as well and Tajikistan provides refueling facilities for U.S. aircraft. According to Rumsfeld, these airports have been helpful in the U.S.’ war on terrorism and they are now needed for both humanitarian and military missions in Afghanistan. The U.S. use of the airport contributes $50 million to the Kyrgyz budget annually. The base notably contributed to the development of trades and services along the perimeter of Manas.

During the visit, Bishkek seemed to diverge from statements made in the aftermath of the SCO summit, stressing the need for a timetable for the withdrawal of the U.S. base. Rumsfeld was now told that the U.S. could use the base as long as it needed to. Isakov stated that “the air base in Manas will stay as long as the situation in Afghanistan requires”. The U.S. and Kyrgyz Defense Ministers also discussed opportunities for further military collaboration, agreeing that the military base in Manas is at the center of bilateral relations. It was decided that the U.S. will be providing more support to the Kyrgyz National Guard by building better infrastructure for military divisions, supplying ammunition, and training facilities for increasing the professionalism among Kyrgyz troops. This assistance will improve the general capacity of the Kyrgyz armed forces. Aside from Bishkek, Dushanbe and Tashkent also insisted on deadlines following the SCO summit. The Tajik and Uzbek Defense ministries submitted similar demands to the U.S.. Especially Uzbekistan was insisting on limiting Coalition’s troops at Karshi-Khanabad. After Bishkek, Rumsfeld visited Tajikistan. He reached the same approval for continuation of cooperation with Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov. With the Tajik president, Emomali Rakhmonov, Rumsfeld discussed issues of counter-narcotics and enhancing regional trade. Out of the three countries, Rumsfeld did not visit Uzbekistan, perhaps indicative of the tensions in the U.S.-Uzbek relationship. The newly formed Kyrgyz government faces a difficult decision to restore the fragile balance between foreign military presences. Reports that Russia wants to increase military units in Kyrgyzstan got underway already this May, after interim president Kurmanbek Bakiev and Chairman of the State Duma Committee on the Commonwealth of Independent States Andrei Koshokin met in Osh. The rumor raised widespread condemnation among local experts in Kyrgyzstan. To date, besides several regional military trainings, facilitating the escape of ousted president Askar Akaev and his family on March 24 was the only instance when the Russian Air Force base in Kant served a practical function.

IMPLICATIONS: Bishkek’s stance on the U.S. base is far from clear. In particular, Foreign Minister Roza Otunbaeva and the Kyrgyz Ambassador to Moscow Apas Jumagulov in no unclear terms insisted on following the SCO recommendations. However, many Kyrgyz experts have been opposing the government’s rather undiplomatic and abrupt demand for deadlines. The prospective Prime Minister, Felix Kulov, stated his support for the continuance of both American and Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan. The Head of the Kyrgyz Committee on Human Rights Ramazan Dyryldayev says that the Russian military base must face similar requirements as the American one: “In case it will be necessary to draw out foreign forces from Kyrgyzstan, then, simultaneously with the Coalition troops, the Russian military base in Kant must also be closed”. Dyryldayev maintains that the SCO, headed by authoritarian regimes, was directed at supporting Akaev’s increasingly illiberal government. The Kyrgyz government must not follow Moscow’s demands while Russia hosts the ousted president and his family following the March 24 revolution, says Dyryldayev. The leader of Moya Strana party Joomart Otorbaev told the Kabar agency that thanks to the U.S. military presence in Kyrgyzstan, the country received a sense of stability and was able to pay back Japanese loans. At the same time, the U.S. has been the most generous donor in the development of mass media outlets and civil society institutes. The U.S. government extensively finances the local Radio Liberty service and the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society through the National Democratic Institute. The radio channel and the coalition were active participants in the popular protests against the rigged parliamentary elections in February and March this year. The Director of Institute for Regional Studies Atyrkul Alisheva poignantly noted that the issue of the U.S. military base questions the Kyrgyz government’s ability to think in longer and in broader terms. The U.S. base is important not only for the security situation in Kyrgyzstan, but the entire Central Asian region, as any local instability can be used by non-state insurgent or terrorist organizations to capture control. As Alisheva concludes, the Kyrgyz government must not immolate its security because of international competition, but continue to maintain a balance between several external powers. In spite of the reassurances Rumsfeld obtained, it is unlikely that the SCO states’ pressure on Kyrgyzstan will completely come to an end after Rumsfeld’s visit. Russian Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov insisted that Russia must actively resist U.S. military activity in Kyrgyzstan: “This is our geopolitical space, and we are being forced out of there”. Russia and China are Kyrgyzstan’s major trading partners. Dissatisfaction with Kyrgyzstan’s policies and the state of affairs in the Central Asian region will clearly be reflected in Russian and Chinese policies towards transnational trade of goods and services. In particular, interstate relations on security will affect labor migrants and small-scale businessmen, shuttle traders, and seasonal migrants that commute between Russia, China, and Kyrgyzstan on a monthly or yearly basis.

CONCLUSIONS: Rumsfeld’s two-day visit to Kyrgyzstan marked the peak of geo-strategic contest over political influence in the Central Asian region between Russia, China, and the U.S.. As a result of the U.S.-Kyrgyz negotiations, the U.S. is no longer expected to submit deadlines for its presence. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Defense agreed with Rumsfeld’s position that the U.S. base is needed in Kyrgyzstan to fight terrorism and to enhance bilateral relations. Thus the U.S. troops in Manas will continue to operate in Afghanistan, and the U.S. will considerably increase its assistance in Kyrgyzstan, hence becoming a dominating foreign force in the country and perhaps in the region in the coming months. Both of these developments conflict with the SCO’s decisions made earlier this month. Nevertheless, the last round has not been played, and Moscow and Beijing will continue to exploit the suspicions in the region that Washington is seeking to foment colored revolutions in Central Asia. AUTHOR’S BIO: Erica Marat is a PhD Student at the Graduate School of Social Sciences, Germany.