BACKGROUND: At first glance, the recent tragedy in Andijan – a provincial Uzbek town in the Fergana Valley – is an internal affair of Uzbekistan. That is how Uzbekistan responded to demands from the U.S., EU, and OSCE on demands for an international investigation of the tragedy involving the alleged indiscriminate use of force against unarmed population in Andijan on May 12-13, 2005. However, Uzbekistan needed to comply with its international obligations taken, for example, within the OSCE or stemming from the Declaration on Strategic Partnership between Uzbekistan and the United States, signed on March 12, 2002. In this context, the unprecedented scale the Andijan tragedy has an obvious international dimension. The dramatic events in Uzbekistan coincided with the chain of so-called colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Numerous allegations that either such organizations as the Soros Foundation or the American state itself inspired and supported popular uprisings are circulating in the region. Moreover, there is an official consensus on this question within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), whose last summit indicated sharply that the six member-states of the SCO would not tolerate a prolonged American presence in Central Asia. Unfortunately, there was no official rejection from the American side of all these allegations about a Western “democratic plot”. But meanwhile, there has been little evidence advanced by “victims of colored revolutions” that such a plot exists. Against the background of all this drama, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Ministry on July 29 delivered a diplomatic Note to the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, in which it tasked the American military contingent to withdraw from the country within 180 days. Does the United States really deserve such a demarche of Uzbekistan? It should be pointed out that the U.S. attitude with respect to Uzbekistan has been principled from the very beginning of its independence, and has constantly been critical regarding the issue of democratization and protection of human rights. This was the case before the establishment of relations of strategic partnership, it was the same after 2002, and remains the same today. In this sense, nothing has changed in the American position, especially regarding the Andijan event. What is called Western/American pressure on Uzbekistan was not caused by the Andijan case only. So if this type of “pressure” did not obstruct the deployment of American forces on Uzbek soil, why then should it become the reason of withdrawal?

IMPLICATIONS: It is obvious that Uzbekistan’s demand for the base’s withdrawal was stipulated by Tashkent’s reaction to American pressure concerning Andijan, rather than by careful calculation of the country’s national interests. On July 26, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made an urgent trip to Central Asia – to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – to discuss the positions of these two states towards American bases on their territories. The U.S. Defense Secretary was assured about these Central Asian states’ positive attitude towards continued American presence. They were quite supportive of the American view that the military campaign against terrorists in Afghanistan is far from completed. Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s position appeared to be more prudent and balanced than could have been expected. They seemed to embarrass Uzbekistan because these states, which have always been pro-Russian in their foreign policy strategy since independence, demonstrated their loyalty with respect to America’s presence, but, on the other hand, the country that had always looked pro-American turned in reality towards a pro-Russian position. Such strategic confusion in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy in fact leads to strategic failure because Uzbekistan consciously or unconsciously plays into the hands of geopolitical currents, or itself plays off inadequate old-fashioned zero-sum-game geopolitics. Uzbekistan will not overcome the difficulties and challenges of independence if it will regard the states of the geopolitical triangle – the U.S., Russia, and China – as permanent rivals, and worse, regard itself as the victim of geopolitical rivalry, instead of taking all measures toward inviting all sides of the triangle to constructive cooperation in Central Asia. It is worth recalling that in May 2002 – during George W. Bush’s visit to Moscow – Russia and America pledged to pursue policies in Central Asia based on the mutual acceptance of their respective interests and the will to cooperate for the sake of peace, stability and prosperity in the region. Apparently, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy strategy is based on an erroneous threat assessment and a mistaken understanding of its national interests. The real threat to Tashkent was not and is not American goals in Central Asia, but rather war or instability in Afghanistan, which still has not built its full-fledged statehood and nationhood. On the other hand, Uzbekistan’s real national interests dictate to spur the process of democratization. The latter is not so much what America wants for itself, it is rather what countries of the region need for themselves. Here, the new dilemma is whether the U.S. pressure for democratization vis-à-vis Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries is just pressure aiming at gaining geopolitical benefits, or emanates from good will aiming at gaining a more stable, prosperous and friendly nation in this part of the world. Even with this pressure, the U.S. position was in any case as benign as possible because Washington always demonstrated its readiness to talk to the current Uzbek government and to continue cooperation with the current leadership. The American aspiration was not about regime change but rather “regime shake” – to warn that any abuse of law, any potential indiscriminate use of force contradicts Uzbekistan’s international obligations in the field of human rights. From the point of view of Grand Strategy, two dramas – investigation of the Andijan tragedy and the U.S. base withdrawal from Uzbekistan – will have deep and long-term implications for the fate of democracy and regional security in Central Asia.

CONCLUSIONS: It seems that Uzbekistan counts on Russian and Chinese support against “western interference” in its internal affairs. Interestingly and paradoxically, America insists in an international investigation of the Andijan violence and does not fear that its purported involvement in that rebellion stands to be revealed. But Uzbekistan, backed up by Russia and China, insists that America was behind the “revolution” attempt but doesn’t want an investigation, which could uncover such an American “plot”. One side is most likely bluffing. By and large, by rejecting any international call addressed to Uzbekistan about the fair investigation of the Andijan case, the state in fact rejects international assistance based on the good will approach and falls into international isolation. By and large, Andijan and the functioning of the U.S. military contingent on Uzbekistan’s territory are two separate issues, although in a wider sense security and democracy become interrelated in the modern world. Uzbekistan seems to sacrifice its strategic partnership with the United States for the sake of saving the regime’s image. Sooner or later, the world will know all about what happened in Andijan in May. This should better happen before serious damage is made to the Uzbek-American strategic partnership, for which there is now only very small hope.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Farkhod Tolipov, PhD in Political Science, Associate Professor at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.