IMPLICATIONS While it is a definite indicator of China’s growing economic presence in Central Asia, the acquisition of PetroKazakhstan serves as a reminder to the rest of the world, and particularly the United States, that China is not only determined to satisfy its long-term fuel requirements to sustain its economic growth, but it has both options and means to achieve that objective. Although PetroKazakhstan’s assets are significantly smaller than those of UNOCAL, Beijing’s successful purchase of that oil company shortly after its failure to purchase UNOCAL revealed its planning and determination to achieve its objective despite setbacks. Having said this, the importance of PetroKazakhstan for China’s energy requirements, and thus its economic significance, is only one aspect of Beijing’s successful acquisition. In fact, an equally, if not more, important aspect is its political salience. On the one hand, China’s expansion in Central Asia’s strategically important fossil energy industry will inevitably increase its political clout and expand its political and security engagement there. Similarly, energy dependence on Central Asia will make China more concerned about that region’s peace, security and stability only to make Beijing more interested in such active political and security involvement. On the other, China’s growing economic presence and its corresponding political one will be a welcome phenomenon for some in Central Asia. In search of a force to decrease Russia’s role and influence in their region, they have considered the United States as a balancer and thus a welcome power to help them preserve their independence. However, Washington’s growing political, economic and, since 2001, military presence in the region has also become a source of concern. Hence an increasing number of Central Asians are questioning the wisdom of such presence, which, some fear, would likely lead to increasing American domination of Central Asia. More than that, the three colored “revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, credited rightly or wrongly to Washington’s manipulation of their opposition forces, have created a sense of fear of American expansion in Central Asia. Such fear has been evident in Uzbekistan’s implicit and in some cases explicit accusation of U.S. involvement in the May 2005 “uprising” or “terrorist activity” (depending on different accounts of the event) in Andijan and its subsequent demand for the closure of an American air force base in its territory within six months. Within this context, officials in Central Asia may see a merit in China’s growing presence in Central Asia, including in the regional fuel industry, as a large power with a stake in their stability and means to balance the U.S. and Russian influence. Ironically, such a balancing role so far has the blessing of Moscow, which is concerned with expanding American influence in its southern neighborhood.

CONCLUSIONS: China’s growing energy requirements will certainly motivate it to increase its share of the Central Asian fossil energy sector. The large but yet mainly underdeveloped oil and gas resources of its neighboring region is irresistible to China. This is especially the case since Washington’s concern about a rising China will likely make it difficult to secure Chinese access to oil and gas resources owned or controlled by American corporations in various parts of the world. China’s growing dependence on imported fuel will turn Central Asia into an arena for Beijing’s expansion. Russia’s expanding ties with China for economic and military/security considerations are in the short term likely to eliminate its opposition to, and conflict of interests with, China. AUTHOR’S BIO Dr. Hooman Peimani works as a Senior Research Fellow for the Center for International Cooperation and Security (CICS), Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK.