BACKGROUND: It has long been known that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons capability to go with its enhanced missile and conventional programs, particularly naval and air programs. Most analyses of Iran’s policies, both nuclear and conventional have, not surprisingly, emphasized the Gulf as the priority strategic direction but the importance of Central Asia and the Caucasus should not be overlook, as Iran certainly does not. Since the advent of American bases there, Iran has gradually perceived them to be a threat and campaigned resolutely against any further expansion of the U.S. presence in the Caspian basin. It has also joined with Russia and China in an alliance against the United States. Thus Iran opposes the presence of all ‘non-regional’ powers in the area, a formulation also in favor among Russian officials. This formulation also allows it to support the Chinese and Russian presence in the area and this support has been rewarded by its elevation to an observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. That elevation represents an acknowledgment by Moscow and Beijing that Iran has legitimate interests in Central Asia that comport with their own interests and that deserve formal recognition. At the same time, and not by accident, these two states are Iran’s major supporters in the UN and IAEA and their objections to bringing the Iranian violation of the NPT regime to the UN underscore their mutual alliance. China’s motives are quite clear. It depends increasingly on Iran for an unhampered energy source in the Gulf, one that cannot be controlled or blocked by American influence. China also is clearly trying to create a ‘multipolar world order’ with Russia that leverages regional blocs to constrain and reduce Washington\'s scope for action and that obliges it to take their interests into consideration. China, like Russia, also strongly opposes U.S. calls for democratic reform throughout the CIS. Iran fears these calls as well and for the same reasons, seeing them a pretext for U.S. attacks on its own theocratic regime. Both Moscow and China value not only an anti-American Iran that allows them legitimate scope for playing a blocking role in the Gulf, they also value a friendly Iran that does not support Islamic revolution in the CIS and which is a lucrative source for their key lobbies supporting the proliferation of weapons. Those lobbies are their defense industries and arms sellers. In Russia’s case, they are its Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) who are champions of the Iranian connection in Moscow.

IMPLICATIONS: Iran, fearing expanded U.S. presence in Central Asia, has also undertaken a concerted campaign to improve its relations with all the states in the Caspian basin since 2002, offering to improve trade ties, economic assistance, and enhanced political ties so that they will not permit themselves to be staging bases for the U.S. military. Tehran clearly fears that U.S. bases in the CIS could be turned against it as it thought they might be used against Iraq. Iran now also supports Russia’s recent proposal for a permanent Caspian fleet to defend against terrorist or other threats – a thinly veiled program for permanent Russian naval dominance there. In return for such support against Washington, Iran gets reliable support for both its nuclear and conventional buildups from both Moscow and Beijing. Obviously these capitals hope that such weapon transfers will strengthen Iran’s ability to deter American pressures if not attacks against Iran. But Iran has threatened force against Caspian states before as in the summer of 2001 and with a nuclear shield for increased conventional capabilities, it could do so again if necessary. Certainly, these enhanced military capabilities would also allow it to provide more aggressive support to insurgents in any of these states because it would then have a potentially real deterrent with which to counter threats from other CIS actors against those insurgents. Neither can the west, Russia, or China continue to count on domestic support for a less aggressive Iranian policy as the recent presidential elections showed that to be highly unlikely. Nor is Iran facing an economic crisis. In the last three years its average annual rate of economic growth has been 5.5% and it is literally rolling in money from oil and gas sales which it uses adroitly, e.g. with China and India, to advance its strategic interests and ward off reprisals for its nuclear program. Its energy revenues thus constitute not just economic power but power that can be transformed into enduring political leverage as well. Iranian nuclearization would also increase the likelihood that Central Asia’s efforts to establish a nuclear free zone would come under much more pressure whether or not it is formally postulated in a treaty. We might well expect increased attempts by proliferators of all stripes to traverse Central Asia with illicit or contraband materials of relevance to nuclear weapons programs. This could only add to the stresses and strains of regional security in Central Asia. Should Iran become successful in its nuclear quest, then that region will be surrounded by five nuclear powers, Iran, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. That can only add to the militarization and polarization into rival and competing blocs that is already emerging quite clearly.

CONCLUSIONS: Any violation of international treaties and order poses major threats to those directly affected by it, especially if the transgressing state is successful in its activity. This is no less true as concerns Iran’s attempts to defy the international community and build a nuclear weapon in defiance of its previous commitments. Equally dangerous for the Central Asian states is the fact that this violation is being supported by Russia and China who are acting as a bloc against an allied counter-bloc led by Washington. These pressures place Central Asian states exactly where they do not wish to be, i.e. between two rival coalitions, each demanding adherence at the price of their freedom of maneuver. In many ways the prospect of Iran’s nuclearization adds to the risks these states already confront. Certainly it introduces an unprecedented level of dynamism and threat to the regional systems wherein Iran operates, like Central Asia, as well as to global nuclear regimes. Certainly nuclearization not only intensifies the regional polarization among blocs as well as the militarization of the area. By also freeing Iran from external military constraint, it ultimately could allow Tehran to kick away the ladder of support from Russia and China and relate to them as an independent and credible military power in the area with its own agenda. The acquisition of such freedom from external constraint is a classic motive for proliferation and Iran is no exception While Iran’s quest for nuclear power and for this freedom may currently benefit Russia and China in the short or even middle term, it certainly does not benefit Central Asian states and may yet rebound as well upon Russia and China.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government.