BACKGROUND: The parliamentary elections held in Chechnya late last year were dismissed in advance by numerous human rights organizations as little more than a specious exercise in quasi-democracy. Conversely, the Kremlin and its minions in Chechnya have been eager to portray the elections as a seminal part of ‘normalization’ - a process which both claim is well underway within the republic. However, it is widely believed that the chief purpose of the November 27 elections was to consolidate the political authority of the administration’s undoubted power broker, first deputy prime minister Ramzan Kadyrov. Kadyrov’s influence arises from the sizable paramilitary support he enjoys. Known colloquially as the Kadyrovsty, his forces are routinely accused of serious human rights violations. Nevertheless, the Kremlin has quite clearly identified him as an individual worthy of its patronage. Late last year President Putin honored Kadyrov with the ‘hero of Russia’ award. Soon afterwards, he was awarded a degree in higher education from a university in neighboring Daghestan. This bestowal of power and privilege is arguably a contemporary variant of the so-called ‘Chingizid syndrome’, which has traditionally characterised Moscow’s policies toward the Muslim south. The ‘Chingizid syndrome’ (a designation first used by Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay) refers to a system of vassalage established by the prince of Moscow, grand prince Vasili II, during the fifteenth century. This system subordinated a number of Muslim Tatar leaders to the prince and therein guaranteed their loyalty. The tendency to sponsor favored clients – be they families, clans, local ‘strong men’, or a combination of all three – persisted throughout the Tsarist era, the Soviet interregnum, and reached a crescendo amidst the institutional disharmony that pervaded Russian foreign and regional policy under Boris Yeltsin. While it would be churlish to categorize Kadyrov as a mere pawn in the Kremlin’s strategic machinations, he certainly owes his current political and economic status – at least in part – to the continued prevalence of this particular syndrome in Russia’s policies toward the North Caucasus and the ‘near abroad’ generally.

IMPLICATIONS: Is Kadyrov capable of biting the proverbial hand that feeds him? Several of his political opponents believe so, speculating that the Kadyrov clan might now adopt a less obsequious attitude toward its political patron in the wake of its recent electoral success. Some even believe that a Kadyrov-inspired declaration of independence is feasible should Moscow at some point withhold federal financial contributions to the republic, or effect a less benign attitude toward the arbitrary behavior of the Kadyrovsty. Far from contributing to the reconstruction of war-ravaged Chechnya, federal subsidies – when looked at within the context of the ‘Chingizid syndrome’ – amount to little more than a retaining fee for Kadyrov and his clan, who consistently disburse only a small fraction of the allotted monies. Although he recently acknowledged the possibility that “law enforcement officers” in Chechnya might be “abusing their powers”, president Putin seems to draw no direct correlation between the free rein his administration affords the Kadyrovsty and the venality of the pro-Moscow government in Chechnya. Thus, the stated conditions that some think might lead to a rash declaration of independence are unlikely to manifest themselves any time soon. Nevertheless, Kadyrov is certainly keen to see further powers devolved from the federal centre. In late September, for example, he called for responsibility pertaining to special military operations to be devolved to the republic’s own interior ministry. Also, Kadyrov’s personal prestige is set to grow in that it is generally accepted that only his own mortality will prevent him from succeeding Alu Alkhanov to the presidency. Even though Russia’s sponsorship of Kadyrov as a regional ‘strong man’ is seemingly part of a historically ordained pattern, it may in fact be setting in place a circumstantial paradox which could well become apparent over time. History tells us that all wars inevitably reach their natural conclusion. With regards to the present Russo-Chechen conflict this would presumably entail peace negotiations between a hypothetical Russian administration and an equally hypothetical separatist leadership. Such an eventuality is unlikely to sit well with the Kadyrov clan which owes much of its prosperity and prestige to the political and military status quo. In such a situation the Kadyrovsty could emerge as an unexpected and extremely disruptive fifth column in any negotiating process.

CONCLUSIONS: The speculation indulged in by Kadyrov’s opponents is quite bereft of prescience unless placed in a proper historical context. Kadyrov is unlikely to push for full independence from Russia unless sorely provoked. For now, he will be happy to uphold his regime’s de facto independence from the federal centre while simultaneously enjoying Russia’s warm constitutional embrace. However, the situation in the North Caucasus is increasingly fluid. The insurgency is undoubtedly growing, both in terms of scope and intensity. With presidential elections scheduled for 2008, the new Russian leader may find him or herself - whether by choice or otherwise - inclined to pursue negotiations with the separatists. Should such a situation arise, it may well precipitate another mutation, in the word of Georgi Derluguian, within the near two-decades-long secessionist struggle, with the Kadyrovsty taking up arms against a peace process which by its very inception would not be in their interests. Thus, the actualization of the ‘Chingizid paradox’ could see Moscow forced to deal militarily with a Chechen president and his government previously elected under its own auspices.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree in International Relations from University College Cork, Ireland.