BACKGROUND: International experience demonstrates that higher income, investment and growth rates as well as higher life expectancy are evident in those countries that have efficient and fair governmental institutions, where job promotion is based on the personal merits of the candidate for promotion and clear and efficient regulations are available. In these countries, everyone is subjected to the law and the state is not captured by elite groups who pursue their personal interests. Moreover, in these states civil society and mass media have an independent voice, strengthening the accountability of the Government. At present, the most important objective in both Kyrgyzstan and other post-communist countries is to continue the process of reform. The slowing down of the process of change with the parallel accumulation of foreign debt has posed serious risks, and resulted in the growth of poverty. Analyses of the socio-economic situation in Kyrgyzstan conducted by international experts highlights that the key barrier to reforms is inefficient public administration, the result of which has been the growth of the shadow economy and corruption. Fighting corruption in particular has become a major problem. In spite of political declarations of the Akayev government, efforts to fight corruption in Kyrgyzstan were imperceptible during his time in power. In fact, the level of corruption increased substantially, although no specific numeric data is available. Neither reliable indicators or methods of assessment of corruption were available, and the environment was not conducive to such work. The problem of corruption and the effectiveness of public administration was discussed in the “Comprehensive Development Framework of the Kyrgyz Republic till 2010”, developed in 2001. The Council for Good Governance, headed by the Prime Minister, was established, and there were attempts to involve civil society in the development of anti-corruption policy. Yet overall, the approach was based on a top-down model, and did not yield positive results. Recently an anti-corruption agency has established, but its activities and the development of a comprehensive program are still being discussed. After the events of March 24, 2005, the country’s new political top management put forward the concept of anti-corruption as one of its priorities. For the time being, however, it is difficult to judge whether these statements have been met with deeds. Indeed, problems in the struggle against corruption continue to abound: First, there are numerous statements but fewer concrete actions, especially of a comprehensive and preventive type. Second, no procedures or norms exist regarding the accountability of the branches of power. Third, the authorities and responsibilities of the President and government are not clearly divided. Fourth, the danger of a “capture” of the state by informal groups of politicians remains. Fifth, there is no system of monitoring and evaluating that would permit the tracking of successes or failures of reforms. Sixth, the electoral system and the parliament remain weak. These factors all impact on the quality of legislation, which directly influences the regulatory basis containing possibilities for conflict of interests and corruption. There is still no institution of preventively assessing bills presented to parliament from a corruption standpoint. In terms of the reform of economic policy, numerous problem areas also remain. The process of deregulation of the economy is being weakened; the tax code is outdated and includes complicated tax administration procedures; a lack of transparency in budgeting remains, and finally, procedures for decision-making are unclear.

IMPLICATIONS: This overview makes it clear that it is high time to continue the deregulation process that was started several years ago. A decrease of state regulatory and control functions in the business sphere should minimize the opportunities for state bureaucrats to engage in corruption. A simplified and clearer tax code with transparent taxation procedures needs to be adopted. In terms of budget transparency, the recently started practice of holding budget hearings on a continuous basis holds some promise. The main problem nevertheless lies in conducting institutional reforms. In many respects, for example in the notoriously corrupt customs system, reform is basically related to external structural changes. Laws which were adopted are frequently not working in practice. Local self-government institutions practically have no resources or power to carry out their functions. The centralization of the distribution of means ensures a low level of control on the part the local communities over the distribution of resources. The reform of state governance and public service is still fraught with problems, including outdated organizational and administrative structures, the remaining system of executive power, low salaries of civil servants, and the absence of a merit-based system of selection of civil servants. In terms of reorganizing ministries and administrative departments, significant steps have been taken in the past few years with the support of international organizations. Functional reviews led most of the ministries to reconsider their tasks and functions, leading to recommendations on the elimination of unnecessary and duplicating functions and the elimination of conflicts of interests. But in the absence of a monitoring and evaluation system, it was impossible to track the implementation of the recommendations provided. Provided political will is present, such a system could easily and speedily be introduced. In the legal sphere, dependence on executive power; the low salaries of judges, and the absence of reforms in the law enforcement system remain the main problems. To a significant scale, a “capture” of the judicial system has taken place. Judicial bodies face pressure from both political forces and the criminal underworld. Clearly, the eradication of the problems of corruption and state capture in the legal sphere will require serious resources and political will on the part of the government. No serious system of financial oversight exists in the government. Even such institutions as a system of state purchasing or budget oversight are absent. Corruption in the financial sphere, including in debt servicing, remains large. The further improvement of procedures directed to achieve greater transparency and accountability is necessary. The strongest element in the fight against corruption in Kyrgyzstan is civil society. In fact, all basic elements of civil society participation in the struggle against corruption are present. Civil society groups participate in decision-making, the press is free, access to information is expanding, and at the local level, community involvement and the participation of women can be observed. Yet very often, influence on these processes from authorities has been so significant as to transform civil society participation into a mere formality.

CONCLUSIONS: The successful monitoring of anticorruption measures requires the assessment of resources in several important spheres of anti-corruption efforts. In examining political, institutional, technical, financial and human resources, this researcher found that the most promising direction within the comprehensive approach to fight corruption is the development of civil society institutions. In this sector, there is a high level of readiness, estimated at 80 on a 0-100 scale. The least promising directions are public administration and civil service reform, where readiness is estimated at 45 on the same scale. Other sectors range in between these two – 46 for political reform, 50 for institutional reform, and 67 each for the legislative, financial oversight and spending policy reforms. The successful implementation of the above-mentioned anti-corruption measures requires the political will of the leadership to pursue reforms systematically, using administrative and preventive means on various levels. It is important to distribute scarce resources, identify weak spots, and to conduct systematic monitoring of anticorruption measures and their results.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Talaibek Koichumanov is a Fulbright Visiting Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, in Washington DC. He is a former Minister of Economy and Minister of Finance of Kyrgyzstan.