BACKGROUND: In an interview published in the local Aki-press agency on February 19, 2006, the head of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Kyrgyzstan, Markus Mueller, once more expressed concern over persistent instability in the country. He called for a dialogue between the president, prime minister, parliament, and other major Kyrgyz political actors engaged in the country’s protracted and sometimes violent political struggle since the March 2005 “Tulip Revolution.” Mueller said that the OSCE headquarters in Vienna also is “worried about the situation” in Kyrgyzstan. The OSCE’s efforts to promote stability in Kyrgyzstan, like its attempts to resolve the “frozen conflicts” in Moldova and the South Caucasus, underscore the institution’s inability to resolve political disputes within and between Central Asian and Caucasian countries. The OSCE is perhaps Europe’s most comprehensive security institution in terms of both membership and areas of responsibility. Through the institution’s diverse components, its 55 member states—including Canada, the United States, and most European and Central Asian countries—address political, economic, and security issues. Among the latter are initiatives to avert mass violence, manage crises, and rehabilitate conflict regions. Like the European Union, the OSCE seeks to reduce political, economic, and social factors within societies that many believe contribute to instability, radicalism and terrorism. These causes include unfair elections, unjustified restrictions on freedom of expression, and discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, or other improper considerations. Besides supporting free elections, civil liberties and access to information (e.g., eliminating restrictions on Internet usage), OSCE bodies also advocate liberal economic reforms. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the OSCE has devoted greater attention to security issues in Central Asia. Its current projects in the region include reducing illicit trafficking in drugs and small arms, improving security components in travel documents, strengthening border controls, and countering terrorist financing and other terrorist activities. Another OSCE security priority in Central Asia has been improving police training, equipment, and oversight. This initiative began in August 2003 as an agreement between the OSCE and the Kyrgyz government. It soon spread to other Central Asian countries. The OSCE’s Special Police Matters Unit intends for this effort to bolster recipient governments’ ability to counter terrorism and other illegal activities, as well as curb corruption and other law enforcement abuses against citizens’ rights and freedoms. The OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation has succeeded in encouraging members to adopt stricter export controls on small arms, light weapons, and Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).

IMPLICATIONS: The OSCE’s leverage over its members derives mainly from its prestige. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) sends observers to monitor nationwide elections in its member states. Their assessment of a ballot’s fairness has a major impact on whether the international community deems the election legitimate. For this reason, the governments of Central Asia and other former Soviet republics typically seek its endorsement. President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s desire for his country to assume the OSCE chairmanship in 2009 appears to have contributed to the recent introduction of economic and political reforms in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, at a meeting in Moscow in 1991, the OSCE members agreed that they could send a mission of independent experts “to facilitate resolution of a particular question or problem relating to the human dimension” of the OSCE. According to the provisions of the Moscow Mechanism, “Such a mission may gather the information necessary for carrying out its tasks and, as appropriate, use its good offices and mediation services to promote dialogue and co-operation among interested parties.” If at least six OSCE governments request it, the OSCE can send up to three special rapporteurs to investigate an issue even without the consent of the state in question. OSCE members invoked the Mechanism for the first and, thus far, only time in November 2002, when a failed assassination attempt against Turkmenistan President Saparmurat Niyazov triggered a wave of government repression. The Mechanism’s limited utility became apparent after the Turkmenistan government declined to either appoint a partner rapporteur or permit the OSCE rapporteur to enter the country. Although the rapporteur issued a scathing denunciation of the Niyazov regime’s human rights policies, the OSCE members did little to pursue the matter because the Moscow Mechanism lacks enforcement provisions against governments found violating their human dimension commitments. U.S. Senator Sam Brownback unsuccessfully proposed employing the Moscow Mechanism to investigate the May 2005 Andijan incident. Besides preventing conflicts between or within member countries, the OSCE has long sought to resolve already existing conflicts. For instance, the institution attempted to help end the 1992-97 civil war in Tajikistan, though it finally took Russian military intervention to secure the peace agreement. Since then, the OSCE has sought to resolve the so-called “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet Union, including those in Georgia, Moldova, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Its progress in these cases has been minimal. The Russian and Central Asian governments have tended to see the OSCE as excessively preoccupied with democracy and human rights rather than with enhancing members’ security and economic development. On July 3, 2004, nine of the twelve leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) endorsed a statement criticizing the OSCE for interfering in the internal affairs of member states, employing a double standard that unduly focuses on abuses in CIS countries, and becoming overly preoccupied with human rights issues at the expense of managing new challenges and promoting members’ security and economic well-being. The declaration also castigated the ODIHR and the OSCE field operations for overspending, making unwarranted criticisms of members’ domestic political practices, and pursuing their own reform agendas. Russian officials have led the attack against the OSCE. In December 2005, the Chief of the Russian General Staff accused the organization of becoming a surveillance agency for overseeing adherence to democratic principles in CIS states despite these governments’ right to determine their own destiny. That same month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that ODIHR had become too independent and required more specific directions to guide its work. Since 2004, Russian officials have been trying to direct the OSCE to reduce its election monitoring activities and other democracy-promotion projects. As part of this campaign, the Russian government refused to approve the OSCE budget for several months until its members agreed to hold talks on Russia’s proposals. Since OSCE decisions are made by consensus, the other members have had to weigh the concerns of Russia and its allies. Although OSCE members eventually rejected most Russian demands, they did agree to reduce Moscow’s share of the OSCE budget. Other resource limitations also constrain the OSCE’s influence in Central Asia. The organization allocates far more funds and personnel to its field missions in southeastern Europe than to those in Central Asia. The OSCE has established a Special Representative for Central Asia, but the incumbent lacks funds to hire a separate staff.

CONCLUSIONS: In a multilateral response to any major domestic political crisis in Central Asia, the OSCE would soon be eclipsed by unilateral action or by more powerful security institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although these organizations have a weaker mandate to intervene in member states’ internal affairs than the OSCE, their superior resources and less confrontational dialogue with Central Asian governments gives these institutions greater opportunities to encourage these leaders to resolve internal differences that could escalate into major civil strife. Should actual fighting break out, one or more of these organizations will probably take the lead in organizing any ensuing peacekeeping force. China and especially Russia might attempt to impose peace unilaterally, but other governments likely would feel more comfortable if any military intervention occurred under the auspices of an international institution. Most importantly, a multilateral framework would make the situation more transparent and give other actors a mechanism to communicate their own interests and concerns. Unfortunately, the OSCE has proven itself largely ineffective at performing such functions.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute.