BACKGROUND: The Saakashvili administration has set itself an ambitious agenda. Its priorities include changing the format of the Russian-dominated peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, setting the country firmly on a course towards NATO and the EU, and rectifying Georgia’s decrepit infrastructure and economy. Now, the Georgian leadership finds that all of these priorities are impossible to pursue simultaneously. An agreement to remove Russian military bases from Batumi and Akhalkalaki signed in May 2005 has, so far, been Tbilisi’s largest success. This has predictably irked Russian politicians, military and bureaucrats, especially against the background of Tbilisi’s unwavering desire to join NATO as soon as possible. In this context, reforming the peacekeeping missions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to include international forces is met in Russia not only with discontent, but with unconcealed hostility. Saakashvili’s and his ministers’ occasional militaristic rhetoric towards the secessionist provinces and momentous police escapades, especially in South Ossetia, has convinced Georgia’s potentially most powerful ally in changing the peacekeeping format – the EU – to tread warily. As the current EU efforts are concentrated in Transnistria, there is not enough will to tackle Russia on yet another front, especially as the Georgian behavior proves hard to predict. Russia has retaliated with an asymmetric but most damaging riposte, banning Georgian wine and mineral water – the country’s primary exports – from Russian markets, along with Moldovan products. At the same time, top Russian officials, including the Foreign Ministry, have alluded to the fact that Georgia’s territorial integrity might be a principle of international law, but the right to self-determination of nations is no less valid. Thus Moscow confirmed its official complacency in the past years’ efforts to extend citizenship and economic benefits to residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Slightly more comically, Russia officially granted shelter to Igor Giorgadze, Georgia’s former security chief and rumored KGB operative, who is wanted for an assassination attempt on then President Eduard Shevardnadze in 1995. Kremlin-controlled media now positions Giorgadze as an alternative to Saakashvili.

IMPLICATIONS: Georgian businesses and wineries are dependent on Russian sales. Although the IMF analysis concludes the Russian wine ban would slow down country’s GDP by an estimated 1 percent only, the political effect of the ban, affecting ordinary peasants as well as well-off traders, is far more damaging for Saakashvili. Russia suggested continuous retributions that would affect Georgian citizens living and working in Russia, from refusing to recognize Georgian university diplomas to banning currency transfers to Georgia. Conservative estimates of Georgians working in Russia stand at around two hundred thousand. These measures, if implemented, would also affect their families back at home, who depend on remittances, and might damage the stability of the Georgian currency. Being at loggerheads with Russia has also been damaging on international stage. Saakashvili had to first tone down, and then almost completely relinquish his calls for EU membership. Certainly, issues independent from Georgia – European disillusionment with enlargement, political uncertainty in the Ukraine – played into the EU’s reluctance to back the Georgian cause. However, many European bureaucrats are also unwilling to meddle into what seems to be an exceptionally venal spat between two neighbors. Although Saakashvili tried to involve the EU in expanding its participation in conflict settlement, he proved impatient of EU’s tedious political process and unwilling to follow its ‘long waves’. So far, the EU chose to limit its participation, dispatching delegations to state its general interest, and pledging financial support if conflicting sides come to an agreement, but staying clear of putting pressure on Moscow or contriving any sort of military or police participation. Things have not gone too well for Saakashvili at home, either. Although the reform of the police has been one of his cabinet’s most outstanding achievements, the police has been in the eye of damaging scandals recently. The public was outraged at the alleged involvement of high-ranking police officials in a bar-brawl that led to the death of a young banker in January 2006. Later, the police’s “shoot-to-kill” policy for assaulters and robbers came under close and unsympathetic public scrutiny. Most recently, the country’s Public Defender has issued a scathing critique of the police as well as the penitentiary system, which is supervised by the Ministry of Justice. This has significantly weakened the position of the ruling National Movement party on its much-prized law-and-order dimension. An Ill-tempered debate began to flare within the Parliamentary majority. These all are bad omens for Saakashvili, readying his party for the first serious electoral test after the post-revolution elation has died down, the local elections expected this fall. Under these conditions, further escalation with Russia is hardly a viable option for Tbilisi. President Putin, on his part, would also like to present a positive dynamic in relations with Georgia, as its unfounded agricultural and wine bans as well as nasty political rhetoric from Moscow have been a smear on Russia’s G-8 presidency. It is hence likely that both presidents will try to present their June 13 meeting as a success. The chances for a real breakthrough, however, are slim. Georgia’s priorities are in open contradiction to Russia’s stated policies. Tbilisi will not relent in its efforts to join NATO, and in contrast to Ukraine, there is no serious public opposition to the idea in Georgia that Russia might exploit. Nevertheless, there is room for pragmatic bargaining. Saakashvili has provided a glimpse of what he can offer –talk of leaving the CIS has been toned down, and the parliament delayed its discussion of announcing the Russian peacekeeping presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia illegal. In exchange, Saakashvili expects Russian acceptance of Tbilisi’s South Ossetia peace plan, meaning, among other things, increased international participation in the political, if not military, arm of the peacekeeping operation. On Abkhazia, Tbilisi signaled a willingness to abandon all militant posturing and actively support the de-isolation of Abkhazia by opening the railway link with Russia and, perhaps, a sea link with Turkey. Tbilisi expects Putin to publicly support Georgia’s territorial integrity and nudge Abkhaz leaders towards open dialogue. Putin can also decide to lift the blanket ban on Georgian wines and mineral water, replacing it with a set of specific requirements that Georgian companies will have to meet to re-enter the Russian market. Putin’s positive attitude towards these matters would help him to start the G-8 chairmanship with a constructive streak. This will also help Saakashvili tidy his own political house before the local elections. However, Putin might well be of the opinion that he will be giving out far more than he is gaining in this trade. Now that Russia has discovered a taste for leaning on its troublesome neighbors through newly found economic means, the bureaucratic inertia will be hard to reverse. Not to mention the private interests of the regional elites in North Caucasus that benefit handsomely through shady property and business deals in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

CONCLUSIONS: President Saakashvili is likely to try to tone down the skirmish with Russia by offering several tactical concessions at the June 13 meeting in St. Petersburg. Georgia is also bound to narrow down its political priorities to joining NATO, and put the EU ambitions on the back burner. Tbilisi is widely expected to receive an invitation for Intensified Dialogue with the Alliance during the Riga summit, which means eventual membership can be conceivable by 2008-2010. This is conditional, however, on relative stability in Georgia’s domestic politics, which hinges largely on relative calm in the secessionist provinces and more temperate relations with Russia. Saakashvili comes to the vivid realization that this is a tall order, and requires continued public support to stand any chance of succeeding. In tactical terms, his absolute priority now is to gain a vital break on the foreign policy front, to solidify his party and increase chances of not only proving his democratic credentials during the local election campaign, but also winning those elections in style.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Jaba Devdariani is the founder of Civil Georgia (civil.ge) and works at the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.