BACKGROUND: Since 1991, every Central Asian leader managed to win presidential elections with at least 75% of popular support. The higher, the better, - with 99.9% being the record for the Turkmen president Saparmurat Niyazov in 1992. Even in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan with more open political systems, recent presidential elections were won with 90 and 96% of the vote in July 2005 and December 2005, respectively. In the 1999 presidential elections, Rakhmonov gained 97%. Presently, Rakhmonov enjoys strong support in the parliament, as its majority is represented by the pro-presidential Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP). No other party was able to form a parliamentary bloc after the 2005 parliamentary elects. There are four representatives from the communist party and two from the Islamic Renaissance Party. However, since the head of the Islamic party Abdullo Said Nuri has been experiencing health problems, only Muhiddin Kabiri, the IRP’s deputy chair, represents the religious opposition in parliament. There are also ten independent members of parliament from various law-enforcement agencies, who are generally pro-PDP. The PDP members also occupy most positions in the government. As noted by some members of the Tajik parliament, the legislative power plays only a figurative role and most bills are prepared by the executive branch. In the 2005 parliamentary vote, parliamentary seats were in fact informally “distributed” among PDP members prior to the elections. Rakhmonov has been maintaining cohesion inside the PDP by allocating economic opportunities to its members. All large businesses in the country are owned by government officials or people with political connections. Unlike in Kyrgyzstan, where ousted president Askar Akayev was deeply unpopular because of his corruption, the Tajik public retains high support for Rakhmonov despite the obvious corruption of his regime. Rakhmonov remains associated with stability brought with the end of the civil war in 1997. As one employee of an international organization put it, “people will rather support a government that is corrupt, than one that shoots”. Almost a decade after its end, the memory of the civil war predetermines people’s political behavior. According to official records, the PDP has roughly 100,000 members. The IRP has 22,000 members, but party representatives claim the membership reaches 40,000. The communist party had over 40,000 members in the 1990s, but lost its popularity since then. Other parties have significantly lower membership. With the PDP’s majority in the parliament and a weak opposition, the regime attains the necessary support for pursuing its own interests. Rakhmonov has also succeeded in eliminating all major warlords who could challenge his political regime in a violent way. These warlords included both those from the ranks of the opposition and those who fought on the side of government. Yet Rakhmonov still strongly relies on the military. Almost a decade after the end of the civil conflict, there are still roughly 100,000 men under arms in Tajikistan: 40,000 are under the ministry of interior, 12,000 in the ministry of defense, and 8,000 border guards. In addition, there is a presidential guard, a drug control agency, and troops under the ministry of emergencies. For a country such as Tajikistan, where about 600,000 people of a seven-million population reside abroad as labor migrants, this is a high proportion. According to unofficial estimates, about 17% of GDP are spent annually on supporting the military. With nearly 40% of the population under age, the education and health sectors receive much less state support.

IMPLICATIONS: Despite the predictability of the upcoming elections, the IRP is determined to actively participate in the vote. Such political dynamics reflect Rakhmonov’s attempts to create at least an image of political pluralism for international consumption. The Islamic party, unlike other political formations in Tajikistan or other Central Asian states, has quite an advanced internal structure. The mechanisms of its internal functioning suggest that it has a well-defined hierarchy fixed by the party’s legal base. This year the party will likely carry primary elections before announcing a presidential candidate. The Islamic party has conservative and liberal wings. On the one end of the spectrum, there are members who promote the establishment of a religious state. The party’s conservatives are strongly against Rakhmonov’s cooperation with the west. Yet, on the other hand, there are leaders who think that religion should not influence the state, but that religious literacy among the population will build a shield against radical views and contribute to social cohesion. However, in order to preserve internal unity, the party’s liberals refrain from contesting their conservative colleagues. Rakhmonov’s attempts to build at least a democratic veneer are driven by Tajikistan’s strong dependence on international donors. However, the efforts to reinforce limited political pluralism have minimal impact on fostering civic engagement on a grassroots level. In fact, the Tajik government is disinterested in making the society politically active and economically independent. Governmental control over cotton production is one of the examples where the Tajik state hinders the evolution of entrepreneurial skills among the population. The dependence of Tajik agrarians on state directives allows the government to extract maximum benefits from cotton production and pursue its own political agenda among an impoverished population. Though the Tajik opposition has a voice in the parliament, it has little leverage over the legislative process. In fact, representatives of the Tajik religious opposition in the parliament help the government to create a visibility of a political regime with features of a democratic governance. The opposition serves the role of “shirma” (cover) of the government’s functioning, as one IRP member observes. The functioning of the president’s party against the background of some political pluralism contributes to the international recognition of the Tajik government. As is widely noted by local expers, “the government has an outer shell, but internally functions according to informal relations”. Although the Islamic party will likely announce a candidate for the upcoming elections, the party fully realizes that Rakhmonov will win with an absolute majority. As IRP representatives argue, it is in the regime’s interests that the Islamic fraction acts as a counter-weight to the secular politics promulgated by Rakhmonov. It will help the president to illustrate that the only alternative to his secular regime is a religious party. Some IRP members hence suggest boycotting the elections, thus making Rakhmonov the only candidate in the elections.

CONCLUSIONS: There is almost unanimous agreement among Tajikistan’s population and political leaders that the Kyrgyz scenario of power transformation will not be replicated in Tajikistan. Rakhmonov’s government is widely supported by the Tajik population because it was able to maintain stability after civil war ended. However, the upcoming presidential elections indicate that Rakhmonov is not so much concerned with remaining in power, as with increasing his political dominance. His construct of the PDP and maneuverings with the IRP help to build the image of a façade democracy for international donors. Yet, this stability might well be just a short-term effect. High unemployment and impoverishment is not being tackled by Rakhmonov’s government. Likewise, systemic corruption across all public institutions averts most efforts by international donors.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Erica Marat is a Research Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program.