BACKGROUND: Since the Andijan crackdown of May 13, 2005 U.S. relations with Uzbekistan have declined to the point of frigidity. The Uzbek government forced the United States to leave its base at Karshi Khanabad, attacked Washington countless times for supporting or inciting the rebels at Andizhan, signed an alliance with Russia allowing it to use Karshi Khanabad if necessary, joined the Collective Security Treaty organization sponsored by Moscow, signed major gas deals with Gazprom, and joined Moscow’s economic bloc, the Eurasian Economic Community. Washington, for its part, has reciprocated with Secretary of State Rice pointedly refusing to travel to Tashkent when she made her tour of Central Asia in October 2005. During that tour Rice unveiled a new U.S. strategy calling Kazakhstan the potential leader of a new Central Asia and endeavoring to find ways to enhance what diplomats now call a strategic partnership with Kazakhstan rather than Uzbekistan. However, in April 2006, Washington and Moscow collaborated with the Uzbek government to remove spent bomb-grade nuclear waste back to Russia, showing that if the issue is serious enough that America can engage with Uzbekistan and even collaborate with Russia. Moreover, in May, 2006 the Financial Times reported that a debate had broken out within the Bush Administration over the idea of trying to reengage with Uzbekistan. Vice-President Richard Cheney, well known for his advocacy of a tough-minded defense of U.S. interests abroad, evidently is advocating such a reengagement on strategic grounds, i.e. to keep the country from falling completely under Russian and Chinese influence. Obviously such an effort will trigger a major debate within the Administration if it has not already done so over the desirability and utility of such a reengagement. As the foregoing suggests, by early 2006 Uzbekistan was thoroughly estranged from America and “leaning to one side” in the current geopolitical rivalry among the great powers for support in Central Asia. Russo-Chinese support for repression, corruption, and misrule in Uzbekistan will, however, not offer Uzbekistan a way out of its dead end. The repeated incidence of episodes of civil violence dating back to 2004 and culminating in the Andijan violence and repression have, along with mounting corruption and falling living standards, contributed to a situation where Uzbekistan is widely regarded by many experts as a failing state. And should something happen to Karimov, it could become a failed state and be thrown into an intense environment of civil violence. Most observers believe that Karimov’s tactics of forcefully repressing all dissent have swelled the number of oppositionists and potential extremists opposed to the regime, either in Uzbekistan itself or in nearby areas. Those opponents of his policies, having been deprived of legitimate outlets either for their opposition or even for simple demonstrations of Muslim piety, have therefore had no choice but to become radicalized. Worse yet, it was clear by 2004 that Karimov’s misrule was exporting potential terrorists and insurgents to neighboring states like Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Since Karimov’s term expires in 2007 everything is already in place for a succession crisis that could easily become violent.

IMPLICATIONS: A violent outcome in Uzbekistan would have potentially catastrophic repercussions for the war in Afghanistan and the greater global war on terrorism. It would create another front for the terrorists and their allies and would inevitably draw in one or another great power who felt obliged to protect its investment. Since Uzbekistan is the largest, most centrally located country in Central Asia, civil strife there, whatever its outcome, has immediate and significant repercussions that could even transcend Central Asia. Yet at present, for all intents and purposes Washington has nobody to speak to in governing circles and no way to make its support for reform pay off even to a modest degree. The Western punishment of Karimov for the Andizhan crackdown, which, however horrible, is not an open and shut case of a massacre of the innocents, has had predictable results. The Western indictment of Uzbekistan has led Karimov to take the country into the Russo-Chinese camp even at the expense of any hope for reform, progress, or for the full recovery of Uzbekistan’s sovereignty and freedom of maneuver in world politics. Under the circumstances, Uzbekistan’s loss of external freedom mirrors its growing internal gloom. Certainly we cannot say that the punishment of Uzbekistan had advanced the cause of democratic or even liberal reforms in that country. Neither is there any real chance for such reforms taking place as long as Moscow and Beijing support repression and encourage it even though the country may be slouching toward uncharted waters. Since there will eventually be a succession and new elite bargains among the rival factions and clans around Karimov, leaving the field to Moscow and Beijing means continuing to abandon the country to their tender mercies. But since it is all too likely that the course of action that those great power patrons would prefer for Uzbekistan will almost certainly drive it into conflict, affecting vital American interests, but where America has no voice, it is not too difficult to conceive of a strategic justification for seeking re-engagement, even at a lower level and on an agenda that could yield mutual gains for both sides. Reengagement can only be achieved if it takes place in an atmosphere where mutual confidence among the interlocutors is steadily reinforced, even if only in small issues or urgent ones like nuclear waste removal. Otherwise, it seems all too clear that no matter how brutal a regime this is, American interests and values will be put further at risk if the most likely outcome of present trends is allowed to come about without any effort to reverse that tide of events.

CONCLUSIONS: Every Administration spokesman and many experts who testified before Congress before Andijan, and some who have written about Uzbekistan since, have argued on behalf of reengaging Tashkent. It is not difficult to make the case on both strategic and democratic grounds that it is against our interests and values to have no voice in what is happening there or to be utterly unable to influence the course of events. While it may be necessary to engage the country mainly if not solely in long-term projects to help alleviate immediate distress, a so called “lifeboat strategy”; doing so not only shows the American hand in Uzbekistan, it also helps to restore connections to key socio-economic and political actors with whom a continuing dialogue is essential. Such a program of action also enables us to begin acting purposefully to avoid what would almost certainly otherwise be the descent of Uzbekistan into the maelstrom of civic violence should the regime falter or a succession crisis take place. Inasmuch as observers believe either or both of these alternatives to be likely, a countervailing course of action commends itself or should commend itself to policymakers. There clearly is no gain, moral or otherwise, from leaving the field exclusively to Moscow and Beijing who have not the slightest interest in democratic reform or even in liberalization which in itself would be a major step forward. Thus one can easily construct the kind of justification for reengaging Uzbekistan that may be making the rounds of those who support Vice President Cheney’s recent initiative. Undoubtedly there is a case to be made for the other side. But apart from the benefit of taking a stand on principle, even though we have hailed Kazakhstan, hardly a beacon of reform, as a leader in Central Asia, the tangible benefits of such a position have yet to make themselves visible.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not represent those of the US Army, Defense Department, or Government.