BACKGROUND: The first visit by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan during the last week of August 2006 is part of Japan’s efforts to shape its foreign policy towards this resource-rich and strategically important region. This visit is not a single diplomatic effort as pictured by some analysts, but a continuation of the efforts by Japanese policymakers to find the most suitable and effective track for Japanese diplomacy in Central Asia. Japan was late in asserting its influence in Central Asia. The initial Japanese interest towards the region, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, was mainly connected to Japan’s Russian vector of diplomacy. This was clearly defined in the Eurasian Diplomacy concept formulated by the former government of Ryutaro Hashimoto in 1997, which had a three-layered structure: political dialogue, economic cooperation and cooperation in nuclear non-proliferation, democratization and maintaining stability. This mainly implied maintaining bilateral ties with Central Asian countries but more importantly dealing with Central Asia in a broader Eurasian context, taking into account Russian interests in the region. This policy engagement was continued by the government of Keizo Obuchi, who previously played an active part in the formulation of the Hashimoto’s policy towards Central Asia. The Koizumi administration attempted to change the patterns of Japan’s involvement in the region. This happened largely against the background of the intensification of competing Chinese policy towards the region through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Chinese efforts to dominate energy-export related projects in the region, and growing Russian influence through the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community. A Japanese policy of engagement in Central Asia materialized firstly in the Japan’s “Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue” initiative announced by Foreign Minister Yuriko Kawaguchi in 2004, the distinctive feature and competitive advantage of which is to encourage Central Asian regional integration and to enhance the capacities of these countries to deal with regional problems by regional means. This direction of Japanese foreign policy was further supported by Kawaguchi’s successor in the post of Foreign Minister Aso Taro, who in a June 2006 speech stressed the regional holistic approach to Central Asia, support for regionalism and promotion of democracy and market economy in the region. Such attempts by Japan to assert more active Central Asian diplomacy, under rhetoric of strengthening the capacities of the regional states in dealing with their own problems, are seen by many as a part of the Japanese efforts to limit Russian and Chinese attempts to subvert the Central Asian countries. Whether or not this is the intended Japanese policy or wishful interpretations remains uncertain. However, what is clear is that Koizumi’s visit to Central Asia peaked all previous efforts of Japanese diplomacy and aimed to accomplish a breakthrough in relations with regional states.

IMPLICATIONS: There are several areas of special interest to Japan in its relations with Central Asia. These include areas of cooperation in education, economic development of the region and political reforms. In terms of energy resources, Japan aims to compensate for its own lack of resources and overdependence on Middle East in supply of oil, gas and similar products. In addition, China’s policy of securing major pipeline routes from Central Asia adds to Japan’s motivations. This situation greatly predetermined the main themes of Koizumi’s visit to Kazakhstan, where a memorandum on cooperation in peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy and uranium mine development was signed. This does not only symbolize the national interest of Japan to secure a stable supply of energy, but reflects on the desire of private Japanese corporations to have governmental commitments on both the Japanese and Central Asian sides in securing access to energy resources. In Uzbekistan, in addition to energy-related talks and the commitment of both sides to launch a framework for working-level talks on various issues, Koizumi emphasized two main themes. The first was Japanese aid for education projects involving increasing the number of students from Uzbekistan attending Japanese educational institutions, and the second was connected to political reform and improvement of the human rights situation. The first theme is seen as an attempt to enforce the plans made during the announcement of the Central Asia plus Japan forum in 2004, which envisaged provision of education to a considerable number of students and professionals from Central Asia in Japanese educational institutions. This step is also connected to the overall task of encouraging democratization, human development and various reforms in Uzbekistan through providing education and engaging the younger generations of policy makers. The Japanese leader’s visit to Uzbekistan was the first visit by a head of state from the industrialized world to Uzbekistan following the Andijan events of 2005, in the course of which the U.S. and other western countries heavily criticized the Uzbek government for its excessive use of force in dealing with riots in Andijan. On par with the Japanese interest to the region, there is a considerable expectation of Central Asian leadership towards Japan. In particular, leaders of regional countries would like to see more active encouragement by the Japanese government of direct investments by Japanese corporations and companies, especially in the fields of energy resource development and transportation. In this sense, the interests of all sides coincide. Also, the hope for Japanese support through the Central Asia plus Japan scheme in strengthening regional integration and creating a common market in the region is very high. On their side, the Central Asian leaders continuously and consistently express their support for Japan’s bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council, and join in support of Japan’s concerns about the situation on the Korean peninsula. Japanese involvement in the region is accompanied by strong public support among Central Asia’s population Asia. In a poll conducted by the University of Tokyo throughout Central Asian countries in the autumn of 2005, the number of those who suggested that Japan has good and rather good influence on their country in Kazakhstan constituted 40% of those asked (10.4%-good influence and 30.3%-rather good influence), with even higher figures registered in Uzbekistan (15.9% and 36.3% respectively). Higher ratings in Kazakhstan are registered only for Russia (38.9% and 41.1% respectively), while in Uzbekistan Japan ranked third after Russia (56.8% and 34.1%) and South Korea (28.6% and 40.1%) which is attributed to close proximity, historical linkages and resident minority groups of Russians and Koreans. Japan is traditionally considered to be a non-threatening to the region because of its peace-forwarding foreign policy, its distance from the region and certain cultural and life-style similarities.

CONCLUSIONS: As is obvious from above, Central Asia-Japan relations have always had very promising potential. Yet just a fraction of this potential has materialized in the fifteen years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with much more to be left to pursue. Throughout the years following their independence, Japanese diplomacy towards Central Asia, while considered important, lacked concrete policy objectives, political will and dynamism. In this sense, the first visit by a Japanese Prime Minister to Central Asia is an encouraging sign and, for the moment, the most significant attempt to break through the years of passive Japanese involvement in this region. The ambitious task of intensifying the Central Asian direction of foreign policy is also challenging, with many obstacles and problems ahead. One of the tasks for both Japanese and Central Asian leadership is to provide for a continuity and dynamism of the process even after the expected change of leadership in Japan in September 2006. As many suggest, Koizumi’s visit at a time when his term in office is effectively finished, offers little in terms of real outcomes. Another point of concern is that although Japan emphasizes a regional approach to Central Asia, only two, though undoubtedly the most important, countries of the region were given the privilege of a visit, while the remaining countries were simply put on hold. In terms of international standing, Japan’s Central Asian or Silk Road diplomacy attempts to send a message to its Chinese and Russian neighbors that its policy towards Central Asian region is not motivated by a competitive drive (for natural resources or geopolitical influence) but is boosted by Japan’s desire to place its relations with regional countries into mutually beneficial realm. While such intentions of Japan are well-understood and welcomed by regional countries, whether China and Russia share these perceptions remains to be seen. AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Timur Dadabaev is Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities of the University of Tsukuba and Visiting Associate Professor at the University of Tokyo.