BACKGROUND: The scenario for exercise Rubezh-2006 (“Frontier-2006”), which occurred between August 24 and 29, posited a major terrorist attack against a member government as well as opportunistic behavior by other countries. The three sides were the “reds” (CSTO members); the “blues” (armed terrorist formations seeking to establish a Central Asian caliphate); and the “browns” (countries seeking to exploit the situation to expand their regional influence). CSTO officials often describe NATO leaders as having such ambitions. Rubezh-2006 involved some 2,500 troops from CSTO members Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The first and second stages involved joint command and staff exercises. In the third operational phase, however, dozens of armored vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and warships engaged in a simulated combined airborne-amphibious assault near the town of Aktau on Kazakhstan’s Caspian coastline. The exercise saw two innovations. First, it included all branches of the CSTO armed forces, including the ground forces of the four countries involved as well as the navies and air forces of both Russia and Kazakhstan. The CSTO’s main standing unit, its Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF), also participated. Second, the exercise involved all the CSTO’s major command and control components – its permanent combined staff, institutional secretariat, and the new CRDF standing joint headquarters, established two months earlier. CRDF units have engaged in several major exercises in the past, including the CSTO’s two previous annual anti-terrorist exercises – Rubezh-2004 in Kyrgyzstan in August 2004, and Rubezh-2005 in Tajikistan in April 2005. The CSTO also provides for the mobilization of larger multinational military formations in the event of external aggression. A protocol adopted earlier this year identifies three such groups: an East European Group (between Russia and Belarus); a Caucasian Group (between Russia and Armenia); and a Central Asian Group (which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and now Uzbekistan). The Belarusian-Russian group held a major joint command-post exercise, Shchit Soyuza-2006 (“Union Shield-2006”), in June 2006.

IMPLICATIONS: In 1999 Uzbekistan, along with Azerbaijan and Georgia, suspended their membership in the 1992 Collective Security Treaty (CST) that underpins the CSTO. After the Uzbek government signed a protocol committing it to undertake all CSTO membership obligations, CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha told the media on August 17 this year that “from this moment Uzbekistan is a full-fledged member of the CSTO, de facto and de jure.” Although Uzbek officials began actively working with CSTO structures in June, their involvement occurred too late for the Uzbek armed forces to participate in the planning or conduct of the exercise. Like the other two nonparticipating members, Armenia and Belarus (which currently holds the rotating CSTO chair), Uzbekistan instead sent military observers. With its admission, Uzbekistan is eligible to purchase Russian weapons and send officers for training in Russian military institutions on a subsidized basis. These benefits are especially important given the U.S. and EU arms embargo imposed on Uzbekistan. Tashkent spends more on defense than any other Central Asian country, including regularly paying hard currency to educate dozens of its military officers each year in Russian schools. Bordyuzha expects the Uzbek armed forces to contribute combat forces to the CRDF. In addition, Uzbekistan’s entry makes implementing the organization’s long-discussed proposals to send CSTO units into Afghanistan to combat Taliban fighters and drug traffickers more plausible. Any major military intervention would require access to Uzbekistan’s defense facilities. An important CSTO function became clearer this year. In response to a question at a June 2006 session of the Russian Duma about rumored U.S. plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses (BMD) in Kazakhstan, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that CSTO members were obliged to inform one another of their foreign military ties. He noted that the Kyrgyz government had accordingly briefed its partners about the negotiations with Washington regarding the renewal of the U.S. military base at Kyrgyzstan’s Manas International Airport. Lavrov expressed confidence that Kazakhstan would inform other CSTO governments about any plans to deploy American BMD assets on its territory. CSTO governments clearly value how the organization promotes mutual military transparency and consultations regarding foreign military activities in member states. In addition, the CSTO has been deepening ties with other international institutions active in Central Asia. In August 2006, Bordyuzha said that the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) were drafting a protocol to extend their collaboration, which thus far has remained largely confined to contacts between the SCO Regional Counterterrorism Center and the CSTO’s own antiterrorist experts. Enhanced cooperation would increase the effectiveness of their efforts to address terrorism, narcotics smuggling, and other shared concerns in Central Asia. The CSTO has also taken recent steps to strengthen ties with the Eurasian Economic Community (Eurasec). At the August 15-17 Eurasec summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed the interconnection between national security and economic prosperity. Although discussions continue among member governments regarding possible cooperative projects, the Russian and Central Asian media have speculated about a possible future merger of the two institutions. On July 26, the CSTO and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) agreed to cooperate to counter illegal migration, including human trafficking, within CSTO member states. In May and June of this year, the CSTO conducted its first joint operation against illegal migration in member countries. CSTO officials argue that, as with the narcotics trade, trafficking in people generates revenue for terrorist groups and allows them to infiltrate operatives and weapons into targeted countries. At a press conference marking the CSTO-IOM agreement, Bordyuzha raised the issue of the tense relations between Russia and non-member Georgia. He denounced perceived threats by the Georgian government to use force in the Kodori Gorge, noting that the fighting in the early 1990s generated a wave of refugees into CSTO member Russia. The Georgian Foreign Ministry subsequently dismissed Bordyuzha’s suggestion that the CSTO could contribute peacekeepers to prevent renewed fighting in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The statement chastised Bordyuzha for “forgetting” that, because Georgia withdrew from the military arrangements of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1999, CSTO decisions “carry no force on the territory of Georgia.” Since the CSTO troops would merely replace or supplement the existing Russian peacekeepers, their main function would be to bolster the legitimacy of a mission widely criticized outside of Russia for being biased and ineffective. CSTO’s relations with one institution, NATO, remain unresolved. CSTO leaders still see the Atlantic Alliance as both a potential partner and a potential adversary. Since late 2003, CSTO officials, strongly supported by the Russian government, have tried to initiate joint programs with the Atlantic Alliance. NATO officials, noting Moscow’s dominance of the organization, have resisted developing formal ties with the CSTO as a collective organization, preferring instead to rely on direct contacts with its individual member governments. More recently, Bordyuzha and other CSTO officials have openly complained about further NATO expansion plans and its military activities near Russia and Belarus. If not motivated by pique, these statements could indicate their assessment that only by becoming more confrontational will they get NATO to start taking the CSTO more seriously – a worrisome sign for the future.

CONCLUSIONS: Although the presidents of Armenia and Belarus have expressed the largest interest in securing CSTO assistance against possible conventional foreign attacks, other members appear more concerned with using the CSTO to counter what Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov has termed “new types of threats,” such as terrorist attacks and nuclear proliferation. For this reason, while the CSTO governments have made considerable progress in antiterrorist cooperation, they have yet to specify how members would implement Article 4 of the CST, which refers to mutual military assistance should a signatory come under attack from a third party. The Rubezh-2006 exercise scenario also raises the intriguing question as to whether the member governments might seek to activate CSTO military intervention to counter domestic threats. Recent developments suggest that at least some CSTO members want to transform the institution into a Warsaw Pact-like alliance that tries to guarantee the incumbency of its pro-Moscow leaders.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute.