BACKGROUND:EU countries rely on Russia for more than 40 percent of their natural gas imports. Russia controls the majority of gas pipeline infrastructure connecting Central Asia and Russia to Europe and denies other parties access to its excess pipeline capacity. Concerns over Russia�s questionable business practices and reliability as an energy supplier have led European policy makers to support alternative routes for natural gas transport to EU markets, and they are turning to Turkey as a potential conduit for gas transit lines. If proposed pipeline projects through Turkey come to fruition, natural gas will travel from Russia, the Caspian, and the Middle East to Turkey, and on to the Mediterranean and Central and Western Europe. New pipelines would provide Turkey with transit revenues, cheap and plentiful oil and gas supplies for its growing economy, and elevated status as an essential link in the energy-supply chain. Two gas pipelines currently run from Russia to Turkey: the eastern branch of the Trans-Balkan Pipeline, which reaches Turkey via Bulgaria, and Blue Stream, which runs from Isobilnoye, Russia to the Black Sea port of Dzughba, then underwater to Samsun on the Turkish Black Sea coast. A proposed Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline would transport gas from Blue Stream to Ceyhan on Turkey�s Mediterranean coast. Another proposal, the Turkey-Israel Oil/Gas Pipeline, would deliver Azerbaijani and Russian gas to Haifa in Israel. Pipelines from the Caspian region to Turkey are still at the construction or proposal stage. Those under construction include the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline, or Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (SCP), and the Turkey-Greece Interconnector. SCP, due for completion in late 2006, will pipe gas from the Shah Deniz field off Azerbaijan�s Caspian coast to Erzurum In Turkey. The Turkey-Greece Interconnector, also due for completion in late 2006, will span the Dardanelles, connecting the natural gas grids of Anatolia in Turkey and Thrace in Greece. The most important of the pipeline proposals are the Nabucco Pipeline and the Trans-Caspian Pipeline. Nabucco, with strong Turkish support and official approval from the EU, is expected to be built in 2008. It will provide a direct link between Caspian natural gas fields and European markets without Russia as an intermediary, bringing Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Turkmen, and Iranian gas from Erzurum to Austria via Romania and Hungary. A Trans-Caspian pipeline would link the large gas supplies of the eastern Caspian to Baku, presumably feeding Kazakh and Turkmen gas into SCP and subsequently Nabucco. These nevertheless remain on the planning stage. Turkey would also like to build a gas pipeline from Iraq parallel to an existing oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Yumurtalik, near Ceyhan. However, Iraqi oil and gas supplies are unreliable, as its pipelines have been frequent targets of insurgent attacks, making further pipeline construction in Iraq unlikely in the near future. On August 19, 2006, separatists from the Kurdistan Workers� Party (PKK) attacked a natural gas pipeline in Turkey�s Agri province, resulting in a massive explosion that disrupted gas deliveries from Iran. While workers were able to quickly repair the pipeline and resume gas flows on August 23, the attack highlights Turkey�s emerging role as a strategically pivotal country in the transit of natural gas. IMPLICATIONS:Both European consumers and Caspian and Middle Eastern producers of natural gas stand to gain from Turkey�s new role as a middleman. On the supply side, more buyers of Kazakh and Turkmen gas could result in more competitive price offers and greater demand for exports. On the demand side, a greater number of suppliers to energy-dependent economies would prevent any one supplier from exercising excessive market power. Turkey would also derive political benefits from assuming a more significant role in the energy transit market. Turkey has long been a prospective EU member country, and as a valuable supplier of energy to Europe, it may have more leverage in EU accession negotiations. However, Turkey�s conflict with the resurgent PKK poses a threat to its energy infrastructure. Also, investment risks in many energy-supplier countries may obstruct pipeline projects. Turkmenistan, for example, is notorious for its murky business practices, including an almost complete lack of transparency and a reputation for arbitrary expropriation, raising fears that Turkmenistan will not honor contractual obligations regarding pipeline construction or sale of its natural gas supplies. Moreover, Russian contractual obligations for future gas deliveries to Europe and Asia require substantial imports of Turkmen and Kazakh gas. If Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan begin exporting larger volumes of gas to Europe, then Russia may come up short in its contracts with foreign buyers. Russia will likely take measures to ensure that it meet its obligations, specifically by denying others access to Central Asian gas reserves. If the bulk of Caspian natural gas continues to rest in Russian hands, Turkey may not be able to procure the volumes of gas necessary to fill all the proposed pipelines. Turkey is a moderate Muslim state, but its leadership has recently displayed less affinity for the West and more for its Muslim neighbors. Iran is an important natural gas supplier for Turkey, and in August 2006, Turkey and Iran developed a framework agreement on exporting Iranian gas to Europe through Turkish pipelines. The two countries� close trade ties could alienate Turkey�s Western partners and strengthen reservations voiced by some EU leaders about Turkish membership in the EU, especially in light of current concerns in the West over Iran�s nuclear enrichment program. CONCLUSIONS:Political risks aside, Turkey will have ready access to diversified supplies of natural gas and income from existing pipelines and those under construction. These two benefits alone can drive economic growth. If Turkey can balance the interests and demands of the many parties with a stake in its natural gas transport infrastructure, then its geopolitical location can be used to its advantage in both trade and foreign policy relations. Thus, as a critical player in transit shipping supply and distribution of oil and gas, Turkey will gain new sources of income and greater global influence. This will nevertheless require an active foreign policy with a determined strategy of its own, which will succeed in fending of monopolistic ambitions. AUTHORS� BIO: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in International Energy Security at the Heritage Foundation. Conway Irwin is a 2005 graduate of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.