BACKGROUND: Russia recalled its ambassador from Tbilisi and introduced harsh economic sanctions against Georgia almost immediately after the arrest by the Georgian government of four Russian military officers on charges of espionage on September 27. The officers were released soon afterwards, on September 29, but Russia has continued to pressure Georgia, keeping the sanctions intact and deporting around 700 Georgians for alleged registration violations. Several Russian human rights groups believe that the authorities’ actions against Georgians are tantamount to acts of ‘racial discrimination’, and Georgia is preparing a lawsuit to the European Court of Human Rights. Although Russia’s response was clearly disproportionate, Georgia’s image in the West also suffered, from what many European capitals see as an unnecessarily provocative stance of President Saakashvili’s administration towards Moscow. It is also abundantly clear that the EU will not consider any further enlargement in the nearest future. An action plan in the framework of the European neighborhood policy was signed only several days ago, but ENP does not have any type of membership perspective. In relations with NATO, Georgia has attained its realistically maximum attainable objective at present, by beginning an Intensified Dialogue with the alliance on September 21. Against this background, on November 10 President Saakashvili announced a cabinet reshuffle, which re-assigned Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili to the Ministry of Economy. Addressing the EU parliamentary assembly on November 14, President Saakashvili reiterated his intention to continue the dialogue with Moscow and stressed that Georgia has no intention of solving the secessionist conflicts by force. Saakashvili also hopes for a bilateral meeting with President Vladimir Putin on the margins of the CIS summit in late November.

IMPLICATIONS: By Okruashvili’s dismissal, Saakashvili made a conciliatory gesture towards Russia. Many in Moscow saw Okruashvili as personally responsible for the hard-line policies and some of the harshest statements towards Russia, and especially in relations with a breakaway province of South Ossetia. Saakashvili nevertheless made it clear that the “line of the battle [with Russia] shifted to the economy” and that he is not planning to make any radical concessions, such as transferring Georgia’s economic assets – gas transit pipelines and energy generating units – to the control of Gazprom. Okruashvili’s dismissal also concludes a phased modification of Georgia’s policy towards South Ossetia. The referendum on independence and the presidential elections in this breakaway province were held on November 12. Okruashvili, a native of South Ossetia, was keeping the pressure high on the region’s self-proclaimed leader, Eduard Kokoity by issuing military threats and, famously, promising to “celebrate New Year 2007” in the South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali. Gradually, however, Tbilisi shifted to a more risky, but potentially more effective policy. Ethnic Ossetian leaders who clashed with Kokoity and were exiled or jailed, have recently formed a “Committee for the Salvation of South Ossetia” which held parallel ‘alternative’ presidential elections in South Ossetia’s Georgian and mixed Georgian-Ossetian enclaves. Dimitry Sanakoev, a former prime minister of South Ossetia, emerged victorious in these ‘alternative’ polls. He pledged to seek a higher degree of autonomy of South Ossetia within Georgia and not to seek independence. Official Tbilisi refuses to recognize either of the elections in South Ossetia, but yielded high media coverage to Sanakoev. In South Ossetia, as earlier in Abkhazia’s Kodori gorge, Tbilisi is attempting to create parallel systems of authority, thus undermining the legitimacy of the Moscow-backed leaders of these provinces. With a political alternative present, the military threat will be scaled back. At the same time, the move is unlikely to immediately diminish the political influence of Okruashvili, or to significantly affect the Defense Ministry. As Defense Minister, Okruashvili shaped the core of the professional and committed military cadre and supervised an unprecedented increase in the military budget, beefing up combat readiness, armament and infrastructure. The post-Okruashvili Ministry of Defense is likely to pack less political muscle and become more focused on professional tasks, in tune with the advice coming from Georgia’s Western allies. Just before Okruashvili’s departure, his trusted ally Col. Zaza Gogava, formerly head of the special forces with actual combat experience and popular with the rank-and-file troops, was appointed Chief of General Staff. In the coming days, the Parliament is to pass amendments to the law that will replace the General Staff with a NATO-recommended Joint Chiefs. This will increase the operational independence of the uniformed military from the civilian Defense Ministry leadership. Okruashvili will now be responsible for overseeing large infrastructural projects in road construction, tourism and employment. Georgia invests heavily in all these areas, to achieve a re-orientation of the economy away from the Russian market, and thus to remove this lever of political influence from the hands of the Kremlin. Although he became widely known as the Defense Minister and as a chief “hawk”, before joining the government Okruashvili ran a private law firm, serving many major economic players. The economic portfolio improves Okruashvili’s chances of further political growth to the position of Prime Minister or, possibly, even to succeed Saakashvili in the presidency after his term expires.

CONCLUSIONS: Tbilisi is sending a conciliatory signal to Russia and is fulfilling the promise to its Western allies to tone down the anti-Russian rhetoric. The core policies of the Saakashvili administration nevertheless remain unchanged, but there is a shift of focus: away from defense and toward the economy. Saakashvili also attempts to consolidate tactical successes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As the Western allies are not yet ready to consider changes in peacekeeping, parallel authorities both in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are designed to question the legitimacy of the secessionist authorities, and to create an additional argument against using Moscow-favored Kosovo parallels in Georgia’s secessionist provinces.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Jaba Devdariani is the founder of Civil Georgia (civil.ge) and works at the OSCE mission in Belgrade.