Wednesday, 29 November 2006

THE BOOMERANG EFFECT OF ANS TV’S CLOSURE

Published in Analytical Articles

By Alman Mir Ismail (11/29/2006 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND:On November 24, Azerbaijan’s National Council on TV and Radio Broadcasting issued a decision to stop the licensing of ANS TV, the first, most professional and most respected independent TV channel in the country. The move came following year-long pressures on the media outlet both by the Council and the tax authorities. The head of the National Council, Nushiravan Maharramli, informed journalists that ANS TV has been issued nine warnings in the past for violating rules of broadcasting.
BACKGROUND:On November 24, Azerbaijan’s National Council on TV and Radio Broadcasting issued a decision to stop the licensing of ANS TV, the first, most professional and most respected independent TV channel in the country. The move came following year-long pressures on the media outlet both by the Council and the tax authorities. The head of the National Council, Nushiravan Maharramli, informed journalists that ANS TV has been issued nine warnings in the past for violating rules of broadcasting. These involved such issues as passing over the limit of advertisements on news programs, allowing too much time for political ads during elections, opening a radio station in the Sheki region without proper license from the authorities, etc. ANS TV’s leadership denies these accusations and has taken the National Council to court. Yet, despite these disagreements, the law enforcement bodies of the country were quick to dismantle the broadcasting antennas of the company and stop the operations of the TV and Radio stations. Both the President and Vice President of ANS Company were summoned to the prosecutor’s office yesterday. It is expected now that a new tender for the frequencies, used by ANS will be held soon. Although the possibility of ANS’s closure had been discussed in society for a long time, the news surprised various layers of society. A group of prominent members of the intelligentsia sent an open letter to President Ilham Aliyev, expressing concerns about the closure of ANS TV. Opposition parties, NGOs and the international community have taken similar steps. Protests letters poured in even from abroad, including such prominent organizations as the OSCE and Reporters without Borders. The staff of ANS TV and Radio has signed a petition to the President as well, asking for his personal involvement in the matter. ANS TV has been closed several times in the past as well and quickly reopened afterwards. This time, however, the issue seems much more serious and complicated. Ironically, during this same week, ANS TV was celebrating its fifteenth anniversary, showing footages and images of its staff working in the first, very difficult, yet historically important days of independence of the country, the Karabakh conflict and the civil conflicts of the early 1990s. The closure was made more surprising by the fact that ANS was considered to have strong and friendly relations with President Aliyev himself. Last year, when the company came under harsh attacks directed by the President uncle and Member of Parliament, Jalal Aliyev, the President personally met with the leadership of the company the next day to ensure that such attacks did not turn into a spiral, and in order to publicly display trust and support for the activities of ANS. Thus, many people thought that the year-long pressures on the company were if anything a hint or a message and would not result in the complete closure of the media outlet. IMPLICATIONS:The first and most commonly used explanation for the recent events is “pressure on the free media”. Indeed, ANS was the most vocal, open-minded and critical channel in the country. Relative to other media outlets, ANS TV and Radio were doing a better job at revealing problems, especially at the local level, discussing issues, raising the voice of the public, broadcasting news about the mismanagement of the local authorities and somewhat balancing the interests of the ruling and opposition parties. The motto used by the company for its own operations was “Exact and impartial news.” ANS was for the most part and by regional standards doing this professionally, without allowing a clear political agenda or ambitions to derail its programming, although accusations to that effect have occasionally been voiced. Yet it is also true that in the larger picture, ANS was not working against the ruling regime. Despite its independent nature, there have been numerous circumstances, especially during elections, when ANS has supported the ruling party and directed criticism at the opposition. The leadership of ANS was involved in various business operations in the country, which made it even more dependent on the tax authorities. It was widely known that ANS often consulted with the authorities on whom from the opposition to invite to news programs, and how much airtime to give to opposition politicians. Thus, accusations by opposition parties that the closure of ANS means the closure of independent press in the wake of the upcoming Presidential elections in 2008 seem groundless. After all, ANS always supported the ruling regime in previous elections and had good relations with President Ilham Aliyev. This led most analysts to assume ANS would play the same game in 2008 regarding elections as in the past. At the same time, speculations that the government decided to shut down ANS with the goal of stripping the company’s leadership from the millions of dollars it has made on advertising also seem groundless as the scandal over the closure of ANS is costing the country’s leadership too much in terms of public image. In any case, financial deals are usually sorted out behind the scenes, not in public. Finally, some people tied the closure of ANS TV to the ongoing negotiations between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Minsk and the possibility of them reaching some sort of preliminary agreement on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is assumed that if the Presidents arrive at a deal on the conflict’s resolution, it would involve painful concessions on both sides. This has led to speculation that the closure of ANS would be aimed at shutting down possible ways to express anger and dissatisfaction with the terms of an agreement. This explanation also seems premature, as no serious breakthrough is expected to be made in Minsk. None of the circulating theories on the background to the TV channel’s closure hence hold water. Meanwhile, while the government’s version cannot be totally discounted, it is clear that the decision to close the channel was not simply administrative in nature, and that it did meet with political approval. It is hence likely that ANS has been drawn into the infighting among the various “oligarchs” within the ruling regime as its business dealings suggest, and that it has lost out in a rivalry among various power-brokers, many of which disliked the rather independent nature of the channel. Indeed, it should be noted that the closure of ANS occurs in the context of an increasing trend by various powerful oligarchs and ministers to use media outlets as instruments to discredit and undermine each other. CONCLUSIONS:Clearly, the closure of ANS TV and Radio in the short term hurts democracy and freedom of speech in the country. But more importantly, it is bringing a boomerang effect on the leadership of the country itself. Azerbaijan is about to enter the era of billions of dollars pouring into the country as a result of oil contracts. A lack of alternative voices and media watchdogs tracking how this money is spent would carry the likelihood of leading to highly inefficient spending as well as misappropriations of these funds. This, in turn, could pose a danger for President Ilham Aliyev himself in at least two ways: First, because of growing public frustration if glaring income disparities are not bridged and high public expectations founder; and second, as it would mean that the “oligarchs” would become even more wealthy and powerful than they already are. Another boomerang effect, seen from the perspective of Azerbaijan’s national interests, is likely to be felt on the patriotic spirit of the population, as ANS TV was the most respected channel in terms of covering events related to the Karabakh conflict, and was educating the young generation to be ready for the defense of the motherland. Finally, the scandal surrounding ANS hurts the reformist image that the President has built up in society and is taking pains to build up internationally. Having realized this, government officials have already accused the media outlets and opposition parties of politicizing the issue of ANS’s closure. Yet, the negative effects are undeniable. It now remains to be seen whether ANS will be resuscitated and if so in what way. Interestingly, it is in the interest of both the President and freedom of speech that the frequency occupied by ANS be granted to a responsible, balanced and independent broadcaster – something that Azerbaijan now lacks. AUTHOR’S BIO:Alman Mir-Ismail is a Baku-based freelance writer.
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