Thursday, 19 April 2007

ARMENIA GEARS UP FOR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Published in Analytical Articles

By Grigor Hakobyan (4/19/2007 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Parliamentary elections will be held in Armenia on May 12, 2007. The opposition parties have yet again found themselves unable to unite around common candidates or develop effective campaign platforms to rally people around themselves. They fail to pose a substantial challenge to the ruling coalition government.

Parliamentary elections will be held in Armenia on May 12, 2007. The opposition parties have yet again found themselves unable to unite around common candidates or develop effective campaign platforms to rally people around themselves. They fail to pose a substantial challenge to the ruling coalition government. Instead, a new political force, known as Prosperous Armenia and led by a leading industrialist, has emerged on the political scene. This force’s relationship to the government remains a question mark. More than anything, the conduct and result of the election will set the stage for next year’s presidential elections.

BACKGROUND: Twenty-four political parties and one election block called “Impeachment”, (comprised of the formerly ruling Armenian National Movement and a number of small parties and organizations) will compete during the May 12 parliamentary elections in Armenia. Recent electoral reforms have changed the number of candidates to be elected on proportional party list and in single-mandate constituencies, where party membership is not required. Specifically, 1497 candidates will compete for 90 mandates available under the proportional systems based on party lists, while 41 parliamentary seats will be filled through single-mandate constituencies. Furthermore, as provided by the new Armenian constitution, the distribution of powers between the main branches of government are balanced out at the expense of curtailed Presidential powers.

Other changes that occurred as a result of these electoral reforms were the creation of a new national voter registry database, and the introduction of new regulations regarding official announcements of voting results. Specific guidelines regarding the handling of voter complaints were also established in tandem with an expansion of the rights of candidate proxies and electoral observer teams present at the polling stations. Further electoral reforms were carried out in order to streamline the process of counting votes and preventing any tampering with ballots and ballot boxes. However, despite constitutional changes and major electoral reforms, the opposition parties in Armenia have failed to unite themselves into a political force that holds promise to bring significant changes in the internal political dynamics of the country.

The lack of charismatic leaders among the opposition parties and their inability to unite on a common political and economic platform, as well as their inability to elect united opposition candidates, cast doubts on their overall abilities to rally a significant portion of the Armenian electorate to secure enough seats in Armenia’s post-election parliament. This would prevent the opposition from exerting enough influence to establish the frequently promised strong and transparent democratic institutions in the country, or any influence on the foreign and domestic polices of the government. These shortcomings, prevailing among the Armenian opposition, are further compounded by a lack of available resources.

Furthermore, the absence of clear party lines on various issues important to the Armenian electorate undermines the opposition’s efforts to gain substantial representation in the new Armenian Parliament. This includes proposals to resolve Armenia’s prevailing problems, including the high unemployment rate, excessive tariffs on public services such as gas, water and electricity that many consumers cannot afford, the lack of competition in various sectors of Armenia’s economy, widespread tax evasion by the most profitable companies, and rampant corruption among law enforcement bodies and local and state governments. Additionally, indifference among many discontented voters toward political affairs is likely to further weaken the voter turnout for the support of opposition candidates.

IMPLICATIONS: As a result of the many weaknesses of the opposition camp, the only major political forces that have a prospect of gaining a decisive mandates in the next Parliament are the Prosperous Armenia Party, the Republican Party of Armenia, and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. A small number of other parties, including oppositional ones, may be able to secure several seats as well, yet their individual and collective political clout is likely to be limited to the point of being ineffective in exerting any influence upon the political process.

Among the parties representing the ruling coalition government, the Republican Party of Armenia is the most influential, due to its possession of large financial resources and its ability to rally numerous voters into supporting the RPA, at times utilizing questionable methods to do so. The recent death the RPA’s former leader, Prime Minister Andranik Markaryan and the meteoric rise of long-time Defense Minister Serge Sarkissian to the helm of the RPA leadership and into the position of acting Prime Minister is likely to have boosted the RPA’s prospects of winning a large number of parliamentary seats in the upcoming elections. Markaryan was known for his openness to dialogue with the opposition and balanced approach toward the competing interests of Russia, the U.S. and the EU in the region. Serge Sarkissian’s closeness to Russian business circles and the ruling leadership in Moscow makes the RPA Moscow’s favorite. By contrast, the opposition parties that present themselves as western-oriented do not have enough resources or supporters to effectively compete with the RPA. Moreover, it is not exactly clear which party or group of parties within the Armenian opposition genuinely believe in western values and thus could become effective conduits for western ideas into the Armenian public mainstream.

The only political force in Armenia appearing to have the potential to seriously challenge the RPA during this election campaign is the Prosperous Armenia Party, headed by Gagik Tsarukian. Tsarukian is by some accounts the richest oligarch in Armenia, and currently a member of Parliament from electoral district #42. Tsarukian is a member of Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defense, National Security and Internal Affairs. He is formerly a Chief Engineer at the Yerevan Institute of Animal Husbandry and Treatment, and presently owns a range of large profitable businesses, including the Kotayk Abovyan Beer Factory, the Abovyan Plant of Measuring Equipment, Yerevan Chemical Factory, Mek Furniture Network and Yerevan Ararat Brandy, Wine & Vodka Factory.

The weaknesses of the Prosperous Armenia party are nevertheless many. They range from its lack of any specific political ideology that the party would have aligned itself with to the absence of major ideas about ways to improve the state of Armenian economy, finding means to tackle the problem of tax evasions and public corruption in the country or having any vision of the country’s foreign policy direction and priorities. Although the Prosperous Armenia Party boasts having the largest number of members and voting constituents, their loyalty to the party and its leader in the long term are rather doubtful. Furthermore, the role of Prosperous Armenia Party in the rivalry between the opposition and the ruling government is rather vague and its future course of action remains undefined.

CONCLUSIONS: Due to continuous political pressure by the EU, the U.S. and various international bodies on the government, it is very likely that the parliamentary elections will register improvements in the conduct of elections and the tabulation of votes. Washington’s decision to connect the disbursement of Millennium Challenge Account funds to Armenia with the conduct of the elections is likely to play a major role in improving the transparency of electoral conduct. This will to some extent deter high-ranking individuals or those with ties to the ruling government from making efforts to engage in an electoral fraud. A number of prosecutions associated with electoral fraud are also expected.

The results of Armenia’s parliamentary elections will be decisive for the upcoming 2008 presidential elections. Those who will win a significant mandates in the Parliament will be able to utilize much greater resources in waging a strong presidential campaign. Furthermore, the degree of transparency and fairness in the conduct of the parliamentary elections will provide a better picture of what to expect during the Presidential elections.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Grigor Hakobyan is a freelance writer based in the U.S. East Coast.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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