Since the 1950s, Kazakhstan has hosted on its territory the famous Baikonur Cosmodrome, but it has otherwise been a passive player in Russia’s space pursuits. Yet in recent years, Kazakh government authorities, interested in sharpening their country’s international image and financial power, have sought to become a part of the space race. Although Russia is Astana’s primary partner, India is also trying to position itself in this promising sector. Offering the possibility of significant technology transfer to Central Asia, India hopes to mitigate its weak military presence in the region by enhancing its image as a new technological power.

BACKGROUND: In terms of its space program, Kazakhstan is naturally oriented toward Russia. In addition to the space complex at Baikonur, where Moscow has extended its lease until 2050, Russia rents several other sites on Kazakh territory. In the Lake Balkhash region, it controls the Gulshad site, which monitors ballistic missiles and space objects circulating over Asia up to 3,000 kilometers away. In the Atyrau region, Russia rents a 1950s-era launch site, which it uses to test new weapons and train navy pilots, and in Karaganda, it maintains a cosmic waste disposal facility. Since 2006, three other sites Kazakhstan leased to Russia – Saryagash, which specializes bringing down rockets and air defense, and Emba and Aktobe, which both conduct weapons testing – were unified into a central state force with headquarters in the Astrakhan region.

Among the latest example of space cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan is the creation of the World Space Observatory Ultraviolet (WSO/UV), which will be developed with the assistance of Russia, Spain, Italy, and China, together with the Kazakh space agency, Kazkosmos. The Russian space agency Roskosmos, which has now replaced the Ministry of Defense in many space projects, announced in early 2008 that the Baikonur-based observatory would be operational before 2010.

Kazakh government authorities have made no secret of their ambitions to join the exclusive club of space powers in less than a decade. In 2004, President Nursultan Nazarbayev launched a national development program for space activity. In 2006, the country put into orbit its first sputnik. Kazakhstan is also currently working on the Baiterek Space Rocket Complex project, which will confirm the arrival of a specifically Kazakh space industry, although its specialists were all educated in Russia within the framework of strategic partnership between the two countries.

Since Astana wants to develop a space industry that is at least somewhat independent of Moscow – particularly since the accident involving the Russian carrier rocket Proton-M, which crashed in Kazakhstan – India’s technical skills are particularly welcome. In October 2007, a delegation from Kazakhstan’s space agency, led by former cosmonaut Talgat Musabaev, met with Madhavan Nair, the president of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), in order to establish bilateral cooperation in space affairs. The two countries share very similar goals in space, although India is far more advanced, and both seek new partners. They discussed the creation in Kazakhstan of a landing space, the launch of Indian IRS rockets, which are known for the quality of the images they take in space, and the use of a radar complex on Kazakh territory. Astana, for its part, was particularly interested in the technology center in Bangalore that houses the ISRO Rocket Center.

IMPLICATIONS: The conquest of space is viewed as a technological challenge, as much as it is military or political, which confirms a rise to great power status. New Delhi has already made a name for itself on the world market for launching heavy satellites. Valued at US$2.5 billion each year, the country plans to send fifty missions to space by 2013. This enthusiasm is due largely to the space industry’s profit potential, but also to the opportunities to transfer technology to the military sector. The rise of India’s military budget, which stood at US$25 billion in 2008, is not only a result of bad relations with Pakistan, but also of global competition with China for the status as the premier Asian power. (By official counts, China’s annual military budget is US$60 billion, but it is probably higher.) With a high-level industrial base, India seeks to quickly acquire new space and military sector skills, in part through collaborations with Russian, American, and European partners.

In Central Asia, New Delhi hopes to gain access through arms sales and technology transfers, which are relatively easy because they can be sent by air and do not require transit by road or train through Afghanistan. This shift to technology can offset the weak Indian military presence in Central Asia. In the 1990s, some Turkmen and Tajik officers trained in military academies in India. In 2003, Tashkent and New Delhi endorsed the creation of a bilateral working group to fight international terrorism, including the sharing of intelligence systems and joint military and paramilitary exercises. India also purchased six Il-78 tankers from the Tashkent aviation factory TAPO (formerly known as Tshkalov). In Kazakhstan, New Delhi is particularly interested in the formation of the Caspian military fleet, a domain in which it hopes to overcome competition from China. Finally, India assists in the training of specialists for the future navy of Kazakhstan, as well as mountainous combat units.

India also sees Tajikistan as a country in which to establish a military presence. Its proximity to Afghanistan is considered a key strategic factor for securing India’s northern border. Since 2001, Pakistan has regularly closed its airspace to Indian planes, forcing New Delhi to seek new routes. Tajikistan hosted joint aerial military exercises with India in 2004 near the Fakhrabad airfield, which is located in the region of Khatlon. In particular, New Delhi has helped in the training helicopter pilots, who take coursework in aeronautical engineering. India does not want to limit itself to the renovation of the Aïni base; it hopes to install there its first military base abroad, although Moscow is also present at the site. Dushanbe’s final decision will depend in part on the state of relations between India and Russia. Although military-industrial cooperation is a key element of its relations with India, Moscow might refuse to see another military power to rise in an area that is strategic to its own interests. The plan for a space partnership with Kazakhstan appears to be the major means of entry into Central Asia for the Indian economy.

CONCLUSIONS: Space cooperation between Kazakhstan and India is expected to grow in the coming years. It remains to be seen whether this cooperation will move forward at Russia’s expense or with its consent, however the latter seems more plausible. Russia cannot advance in this sector without Baikonur, while New Delhi needs to share technology with Russia, and Astana does not have the training facilities and technical expertise needed to independently manage its space ambitions. The Russian-Indian rapprochement, especially in the military-industrial sector, could give birth to triangular space relations between Astana, Moscow, and New Delhi. Such a situation would not be without self-interest and would quietly put aside Chinese cooperation that tends to come with heavy consequences.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Sebastien Peyrouse is a Senior Research Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. He is the author of Turkménistan, un destin au carrefour des empires (Paris, 2007, in French), among other books.