A recent well-publicized exchange between Vladimir Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov has given rise to speculation as to whether the Chechen president has finally exhausted the Russian premier’s patience with him. But in their haste to identify fissures in the Putin-Kadyrov relationship, observers are overlooking more obvious tensions elsewhere in the Moscow-Grozny relationship, tensions that are becoming increasingly apparent amid the worsening economic situation in Russia.   

BACKGROUND: On March 20, Ramzan Kadyrov arrived at Novo Ogarevo for an audience with Vladimir Putin. Given the worsening economic situation in Russia, Putin has naturally been eager to get as clear a picture as possible of economic difficulties in the regions. Not surprisingly, therefore, the entire conversation between Putin and Kadyrov was devoted to economic matters: foreign investment, wage arrears, unemployment, and the restoration of public services in Chechnya.

What struck some observers about the meeting, however, was the unusually inquisitorial, almost schoolmasterly, tone Putin adopted throughout the encounter. In previous meetings between the two, Putin has invariably excused Kadyrov’s less-than-commanding grasp of his brief by accepting the latter’s bland replies to his questions and by keeping the audience brief and amicable. On March 20, however, Putin seemed in no mood for either brevity or amicability. Putin began by asking Kadyrov if his discussions with the finance ministry were finished. ‘Everything is great with the finance ministry now,’ Kadyrov responded. ‘Friends?’ prompted Putin, indicating there had been some disagreement between the two parties. ‘Friends thanks to you, Vladimir Vladimirovich,’ the Chechen president insisted. At this point, clearly irritated by Kadyrov’s perfunctory attempts to ingratiate himself, Putin abruptly corrected his interlocutor: ‘No, [friends] because of your joint cooperation with the Ministry of Finance.’

Quarrelling between Russia’s economic ministries and the Kadyrov clan was an enduring feature of the relationship between Grozny and Moscow during the tenure of Ramzan’s father, Akhmed Kadyrov, pro-Moscow president of Chechnya until his assassination in 2004. Unlike his father, Ramzan has demurred from arguing publicly with this bloc, although he has persistently (and with some success) prevailed upon the federal government to increase its subsidization of public services and restoration projects in Chechnya. The Kadyrov clan’s use, or perhaps misuse, of federal funds has been subjected to particular scrutiny by Russia’s Federal Audit Chamber. Over the past nine years, this agency has periodically published reports alleging massive misuse and misappropriation of federal subsidies by the Chechen government. In 2007 the Chechen branch of the Audit Chamber announced that an estimated R1.9 billion (US$71.7million) had been either embezzled or misspent by pro-Moscow Chechen officials.

In contrast to his father, who would doubtless have hastened to the nearest microphone to express his indignation at such an unwelcome demarche, Ramzan did not rise to the bait and is not in the habit of commenting publicly on reports of this nature. However, while the current Chechen president may prefer to keep any disputes with Russia’s economic ministries as private as possible, the subtext of his March 20 conversation with Prime Minister Putin serves as a reminder that certain tensions still exist between these parties.

IMPLICATIONS: It is possible to read altogether too much into the March 20 exchange between Putin and Kadyrov. Putin certainly permitted himself an air of distracted annoyance during the meeting, and unquestionably subjected the Chechen president to a more demanding audience than on any previous occasion. However, one should not form the impression from a single, mildly intemperate audience that Putin has become disillusioned with the Chechen leader.

Instead, one might ascribe the prime minister’s somewhat irascible disposition to the fact that as the man tasked with steering Russia’s economy amid the current global economic crisis, Putin is now under greater sustained professional strain than at any point thus far in his political career. Quite possibly, Putin was simply too tired or too busy to humor his poorly briefed visitor from Grozny. Kadyrov, whose credentials for overseeing Chechnya’s economy are highly suspect, was surely of limited use to Putin in painting an informative, detailed picture of the economic situation in Chechnya. Alternatively, conscious that this was the ‘in camera’ portion of the meeting, the prime minister may have concluded that it was politically opportune for him to demonstrate to the Russian public that he is demanding of regional managers that they redouble their efforts in light of current economic difficulties. How better to do so than by subjecting a public figure, widely regarded as one of his most loyal political supporters, to a choreographed public inquisition on the economic conditions in his sphere of responsibility?

The most important part of the Novo Ogarevo encounter took place behind closed doors. A mere five days after this meeting, on March 25, Kadyrov announced that the ‘counter-terrorist operation’ in Chechnya would be completed by the end of March. This announcement, which was almost certainly coordinated with Putin at the March 20 meeting, paves the way for a sharp reduction in the number of federal personnel currently deployed in Chechnya – a welcome vista for the Russian government given the fiscal challenges it is currently facing. Of course, many such announcements made by Grozny and Moscow in recent years have been confounded by regional realities; nevertheless, this announcement inadvertently raised the question as to how viable a leader Kadyrov would prove under peacetime conditions.

If, as Kadyrov claims, the Chechen rebel movement has been virtually annihilated, the most pressing challenges now facing Chechnya’s government are of an economic nature. There have been reports of factories in Chechnya closing down; signal construction projects have been suspended due to lack of federal funding; workers throughout Chechnya have seen their salaries reduced. In a word, Chechnya is experiencing the same economic difficulties as every other constituent part of the Russian Federation. For Kadyrov, who must realize that federal funding for Chechnya will very likely be reduced in light of current global economic trends, the political and economic priority at this juncture must be to persuade the Russian government to reduce its investment in Chechnya’s economy by as little as fiscally possible.

CONCLUSIONS: The relationship between Vladimir Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov is in no way based on comradeship or ideological fellowship. In reality, it is a relationship of mutual political convenience: Kadyrov receives massive subsidization from the Russian exchequer in exchange for subduing the insurgency in Chechnya, while Putin gets to tell the world that the rebel movement is a paper tiger and that any interested international parties should look to deal with the ‘elected’ Kadyrov government instead. The Machiavellian nature of this strategic bargain does not preclude the possibility of inter-personal tensions existing between the two principals; Putin and Kadyrov do not have to like one another for this political arrangement to bear fruit.

A more immediate source of conflict is to be found in the ever-fraught relationship between Kadyrov and the federal government’s economic bloc, those responsible for drafting the federal budget and regulating the federal exchequer. With government economists seemingly intent on reducing federal aid for regional and local budgets, Kadyrov, like other regional leaders, must be seriously worried. The recent disagreement between the Chechen president and the Ministry of Finance, alluded to by Putin at the outset of the March 20 meeting, may well presage a fresh round of none-too-civilised centre-periphery bargaining between the Kadyrov clan and the economic bloc in Moscow.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree from University College Cork, Ireland.