In recent weeks, the Russian government has taken steps to consolidate its hold over the two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as affirm that all of Georgia falls within its zone of influence. Although desiring to improve relations with Moscow, NATO governments have rightly contested these Russian actions, which threaten to further weaken Western governments’ already diminished influence in Eurasia. Moreover, Russia’s visceral reaction to a long-planned NATO exercise in Georgia has indicated the level to which Moscow’s rhetoric has increased.

BACKGROUND: On May 1, Russian border guards began patrolling the administrative boundaries separating Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the rest of Georgia. The action implements the provisions of the two agreements signed between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the separatist leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Sergei Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoity, the day before in the Kremlin. Under their terms, the Russian government will police the regions’ frontiers, including Abkhazia’s Black Sea coastline, until the separatist regimes establish their own border security agencies with Moscow’s assistance. The three men also signed cooperation agreements between the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the security agencies of the two separatist regimes, the Abkhaz State Security Service and the South Ossetian Committee of State Security.

The Georgian Foreign Ministry denounced the agreements for violating international law and representing “yet another Russian attempt to strengthen the military build-up on Georgia's occupied territories and legitimize the occupation process.” The Russian authorities have already announced plans to keep approximately 10,000 Russian soldiers in the two separatist regions indefinitely as well as construct military bases on their territories, including a Black Sea naval base in Abkhazia. Western governments, which recognize the Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-South Ossetia boundaries as internal administrative boundaries within Georgian territory rather than as international frontiers between Georgia and independent countries, also denounced the move. Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg, the current holder of the EU's rotating presidency, said that Moscow’s action had destroyed the European Union’s trust in Russia as a reliable partner. Except for Nicaragua and the equally isolated Hamas regime in Gaza, the world’s other governments, including Moscow’s closest allies within the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, have declined to join Russia in recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries under Moscow’s de facto control.

Even so, with the most recent security agreements, the Russian government is now able to exercise a degree of control within Abkhazia and South Ossetia equivalent to what Moscow would enjoy if it had formally annexed these Georgian territories. For example, the agreements exempt the Russian border agency from the jurisdiction of the regional authorities while requiring the separatists to obtain Russian government consent to enter Russian property in either region.

Before its latest actions regarding Georgia, Russian officials had attacked NATO for preparing to conduct long-planned military exercises, “Cooperative Longbow/Lancer-09,” in Georgia from May 6 through June 1. The purpose of the drills, held under the auspices of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, is to rehearse integrated command-and-staff work among national militaries engaged in a large-scale crisis response action. The exercise scenario simulates multinational support for a UN-mandated, NATO-led operation. Although over 1,000 troops from NATO members and PFP partners will participate, the exercises will occur at Georgia's Vaziani military base, located 20 kilometers from Tbilisi, and not near the two separatist regions. In addition, the exercises will not involve live-fire drills or major conventional weapons. The troops will use computer programs and other electronic means to practice simulated joint operations. 

Notwithstanding their peaceful intent or that Russian forces had been invited to participate in Cooperative Longbow/Lancer-09, Medvedev called the exercises an “open provocation” on April 30, shortly after signing the border agreements. The President added that, “We view any actions that could be considered by Tbilisi as encouragement of a course towards the country's remilitarization and the senseless strengthening of military components as measures that run counter to the six principles of conflict settlement agreed last August.” Medvedev’s reference to the August 12, 2008, ceasefire agreement he negotiated with French President Nicolas Sarkozy is surprising since the Russian government has failed to adhere to its provisions requiring Moscow to reduce to prewar levels the number of Russian combat troops on Georgian territory.

IMPLICATIONS: Russian opposition to Cooperative Longbow/Lancer-09 reflects Moscow’s determination to weaken security relations between Tbilisi and its Western allies. After the August fighting, Russian officials warned allied governments that Moscow’s willingness to cooperate with NATO on Afghanistan and other alliance priorities would depend on NATO restricting its ties with Tbilisi. They threatened to sever all ties should Georgia receive alliance membership or even a formal NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), which would have improved but by no means ensured the realization of Tbilisi’s NATO membership aspirations. Russian officials have also complained whenever NATO has sought to strengthen the Georgian military with arms or training.

It was only on April 29 of this year that NATO countries resumed high-level talks with the Russian government. On that day, the NATO-Russia Council formally met in Brussels again at the ambassador level. Since last August’s Russian-Georgian War, the allies previously had only engaged in informal consultations with Russia’s ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin. In an emergency meeting on August 19, the NATO foreign ministers denounced Russia’s military response to Georgia’s offensive in South Ossetia as “disproportionate.” Earlier that month, the Russian military had occupied Georgian lands outside the disputed region of South Ossetia, attacked targets deep in Georgian territory, and helped expel Georgia troops from the other contested region of Abkhazia. NATO’s August 19 decision excluded meetings between senior NATO and Russian officials, including sessions of the NATO-Russian Council, until Russian troops withdrew from newly occupied Georgian territory back to their prewar deployments, a development that has yet to occur. Russia retaliated by halting military cooperation programs with NATO.

Despite NATO’s initial response, Russian policy makers might deem their military intervention a success because it has decreased the prospects of Georgia (or Ukraine) soon becoming a NATO member. Although the August 19 communiqué had denounced the idea of creating new dividing lines in Europe and reaffirmed the right of any country to join NATO, the foreign ministers simply restated their intent to review Georgia’s application for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) at their meeting in December, as they agreed at the Bucharest summit four months earlier. NATO governments publicly reaffirmed their support both for Georgia’s territorial integrity and Tbilisi’s desire to join the alliance eventually, in order not to appear intimidated by Russia’s forceful dismemberment of Georgia and threats of retaliation should NATO grant Georgia a MAP or membership. In private, however, many allied leaders indicated they were even less inclined than previously to deepen Georgia’s ties with NATO given the risks of becoming entrapped in another Russian-Georgian War.

In addition to using the imminent exercises to justify its two border protection agreements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian officials pressured other countries to shun the NATO exercises in southern Georgia. Although declining to recognize the two regions’ independence, the governments of Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Serbia—all of which have close ties with Moscow—have announced that they will not participate in Cooperative Longbow/Lancer-09. Conversely, the United States and other NATO and Partner governments, including Azerbaijan, have also confirmed their involvement.

CONCLUSIONS: Russian authorities are using the upcoming NATO exercise as an opportunity to consolidate their de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as to establish that all of Georgia falls within Moscow’s sphere of influence. Russian officials aim to constrain Georgia’s foreign and defense polices by keeping Georgia weak and NATO divided. The alliance’s April 29 decision to expel two Soviet diplomats in retaliation for Russian espionage activities in Europe, along with NATO’s refusal to cancel the Georgian exercises, shows that allied government refuse to acknowledge Russian hegemony in the South Caucasus despite Moscow’s threats and blandishments.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. He is the author, among other works, of Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2008).