On May 27, Georgia accused the UN Secretary General of giving in to Russian blackmail in his latest report on the situation in Abkhazia. The report – produced after Moscow and Sukhumi refused to take part in scheduled Geneva talks with Georgia – fails to refer to the breakaway republic as part of Georgia, and takes no account of Tbilisi’s requests for an international law enforcement mission there. The episode suggests that Russia has again used its influence in the UN Security Council to legitimize its policies and presence in Georgia, and highlights a need for Western states to take a determined stance with regard to Georgia’s territorial integrity. Failing to do so could result in new Russian aggression against Georgia, and risks further undermining the role of international organizations in Georgia’s conflict zones.

BACKGROUND: On May 18, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon released his latest report, the fourth since the war last summer, on developments in the Georgian conflict zones. Like previous UNSG updates, the May 18 report outlines the security situation in Georgia’s breakaway republic of Abkhazia, and puts forward recommendations for keeping the peace in Georgia’s conflict zones. However, the wording of the latest report is notably different from previous assessments. In particular, its title excludes the usual reference to “the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia”. Instead, the title simply indicates that the report has been developed pursuant to the three latest Security Council resolutions on Abkhazia. Also notable is that the report omits the usual reference to the breakaway leaderships as “de facto” governments. This may be interpreted as a step towards recognition of the legitimacy of the two leaderships at the UN level.

The new rhetoric of the UNSG caused Georgia’s UN envoy Alexander Lomaia to lash out at the UNSG office, claiming that the report had been modified from its original version as a result of Russian “blackmail”. In a press conference on May 27, Lomaia pointed at the three day deferral of the report (the report was originally due on May 15) as evidence that Russia had rejected the initial draft, using its leverage in the Security Council to force through a change in its original wording. Lomaia later reported to Reuters that he had been informed that Russia had threatened to veto any extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission (UNOMIG) if the UNSG office did not modify the report in accordance with Moscow’s requests.

Tbilisi, moreover, objects to the recommendations put forward in the report, particularly with regard to the future role of the UNOMIG in Abkhazia. During the May 27 press conference, Lomaia objected to the continuously weak mandate of the UNOMIG and restated Georgia’s long-term plea for an international mission with law enforcement competencies in Abkhazia. The Georgian envoy also criticized the UN for the absence of emphasis on the withdrawal of Russian forces from the conflict zones, as required by the August 2008 ceasefire-agreement.

It is notable that the UNSG report was produced only hours after Russia and the separatist leaderships of Abkhazia and South Ossetia jointly boycotted the Geneva talks led by the UN, EU and OSCE, while awaiting the final wording of the overdue report. Following the release of the report, the parties returned to the negotiation table, but the episode clearly highlighted the pressure put on the UN secretariat with regard to its language in relation to the breakaway regions. The separatist capitals, backed up by Moscow, objects strongly to language implying that their territories are legally part of Georgia.

Ban Ki-Moon immediately rejected Georgia’s accusations, referring to the UN charter, which stipulates that the Secretary General’s office may not receive instructions from any governments. Moon’s office went on to state that the Secretary General had chosen to rename the report to, as quoted by Reuters, “find a neutral title that would be acceptable or least offensive to the parties involved”. Moscow too denied Tbilisi’s allegations, claiming they had nothing to do with the “real state of things”.

IMPLICATIONS: The May 18 episode should cause worry not only in Tbilisi but also in Western capitals, for several reasons. First, it indicates that the UN Security Council is once again allowing Russia to bargain over the role of the international community in relation to Georgia’s conflicts. Indeed, it is not the first time that Tbilisi finds itself let down by the UN in this regard. Georgia suffered a humiliating defeat in October 2006 when the Council, in spite of numerous indications to the contrary, adopted a resolution noting the “stabilizing role” of the Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia. Failing to take note of Tbilisi’s repeated pleas for the internationalization of the peacekeeping format in Abkhazia, the Security Council instead urged the Georgian government to refrain from provocative actions in the conflict zone. As voting on a resolution concerning North Korean nuclear testing took place the same day, the wording of the resolution was believed in many quarters to be the result of a tradeoff between the U.S. and Russia.

Second, while the May 18 report is not formally binding for the UN Security Council, it risks setting the tone for upcoming Security Council resolutions on Abkhazia. In this respect, the wording and content of the report is troublesome, not least as it threatens to undermine the clearly articulated majority line of the UN Security Council of non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In this light, Tbilisi has valid reasons to be concerned by the UNSG choice of words in relation to its two breakaway republics.

Third, the wording of the report fails to emphasize acts of ethnic cleansing of Georgians from the two conflict zones during the August 2008 war. This is a worrisome implication, not least given that Georgia has brought Russia before the International Court of Justice for acts of Racial Discrimination against ethnic Georgians last summer, a case that is currently pending.

CONCLUSIONS: The renewed failure of the West to take a determined stance against Russia with regard to Georgia’s separatist territories does little to improve the already fragile security situation in Georgia’s conflict zones. Moscow has already largely escaped accountability at the international level for its full-blown invasion of the Georgian territory last summer. Since then, Russia has confidently displayed to the international community its refusal to compromise on the security structures in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, effectively keeping the EU Monitoring Mission from accessing the two conflict zones and using its veto to expel the OSCE mission from South Ossetia. Thus, the Security Council’s submission to Russian pressure is a dangerous development, given that the UN remains the only organization with a security mandate in the conflict zones.

While Ban Ki-Moon’s May 18 report hints at a troublesome shift towards at least tacit acceptance by the UN of Russia’s policy vis-à-vis Georgia’s breakaway territories, it is too early to judge whether it will set the direction for future UN policies in the region. Much will depend on the next UN resolution on Abkhazia (extending the mandate of the UNOMIG), which is likely to be subject to debate in the Security Council. What is clear is that if Moscow is allowed to continue to use its leverage in the Council to legitimize its policies regarding Georgia’s separatist territories, increasingly aggressive moves by Russia against Georgia should not be excluded. Needless to say, allowing Moscow to bargain its way within the framework of the UN will also only further undermine the organization’s already questionable role as a peacekeeper, beyond the borders of Georgia. It remains to be seen how the Western powers in the Security Council will respond to this challenge.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Johanna Popjanevski is Deputy Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, based in Stockholm.