Following an failed assassination attempt on June 22, Ingush President Yunas-Bek Yevkurov is current receiving treatment for serious injuries at a medical facility in Moscow. Although the attack on Yevkurov was probably the work of Islamist militants, it is an arch-enemy of the latter, Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov, who stands to benefit the most from Yevkurov’s misfortune. The main strategic consequence of Yevkurov’s near-assassination may well be the bestowal of a region-wide mandate for counter-insurgency operations on the ambitious Chechen leader. 

BACKGROUND: As he recovers in hospital from serious injuries sustained in an apparent suicide attack on June 22, it seems unlikely that Yunas-Bek Yevkurov will ever resume his duties as president of Ingushetia. Although Yevkurov managed to escape with his life, the devastating attack on his motorcade brought to mind the May 2004 assassination of the Chechen leader, Akhmed Kadyrov. Yevkurov may not have been killed on June 22, but the extent of his injuries has surely put a premature end to his involvement in political life.

A Lieutenant-Colonel in the Russian military, Yevkurov was appointed president of Ingushetia last October. As a direct replacement for the widely unpopular Murat Zyazikov, Yevkurov was enthusiastically welcomed by Ingushetia’s anti-Zyazikov opposition movement. The main media outlet for this opposition platform, Ingushetia.ru, heralded Yevkurov as ‘an honest and courageous person, for whom the interests of his people are not alien.’ Much was made of Yevkurov’s career in the Russian military, a feature of his curriculum vitae which, in the opinions of most Ingush, contrasted favourably with Zyazikov’s background in the secret services.

Yevkurov promised to adopt an inclusive approach to solving the republic’s many social problems. He was praised for taking Ingushetia’s security services to task for the indiscriminate tactics they had employed to combat insurgents in recent years. Predictably, Yevkurov’s arrival was not welcomed by the leaders of Ingushetia’s growing insurgency who, naturally, were entirely pleased with the polarizing affect Zyazikov was having on Ingush society. The attack on Yevkurov has since been claimed by the ‘Riyadus Salihiin Martyrs Battalion,’ a group founded by the late Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev but now apparently under the command the the self-styled Emir of the Caucaus Emirate, Doku Umarov. 

Arguably, Umarov and Ingushetia’s insurgency have the most to gain from Yevkurov’s misfortune. Yevkurov was a far more popular and artful politician than his predecessor and his attempts to build bridges with Ingushetia’s civil oppostion, as well as the population at large, were a direct hindrence to the insurgents’ political-military agenda which is geared towards completely destabilizing Ingushetia, both socially and politcally. One might also contend that the biggest political beneficiary of the attack on Yevkurov is Ramzan Kadyrov, the president of neighbouring Chechnya, who is believed to favour unifying Chechnya and Ingushetia in a single jurisdictional entity. Although some of Kadyrov’s spokespeople have spoken shamelessly about the prospect of reuniting the two republics, Kadyrov has shied away from expressing any forthright opinions on the subject. Nevertheless, these spokespeople would not be speaking on so sensitive a matter without private sanction from Kadyrov.  

Kadyrov has previously stated his willingness to ‘impose order’ in Ingushetia: ‘No problem… if we are given the order, we will impose order as surely as two times two makes four. It is only a small republic.’ This is not an option that appeals to most Ingush who fear, with some justification, that Kadyrov’s methods for combating the insurgents would prove even harsher than those employed by Zyazikov. 

IMPLICATIONS: How will Yevkurov’s unexpected incapacitation affect Moscow’s policies in Ingushetia? Observers have noted with interest the arrival of Ramzan Kadyrov at the Kremlin just hours after the assassination attempt, where he was received personally by President Medvedev. Acting in unison, Kadyrov and Yevkurov had recently been coordinating a joint military operation against militants along the borderlands between Chechnya and Ingushetia. The timing of Kadyrov’s visit to the Kremlin inevitably led to speculation that the Russian president was ready to grant his Chechen counterpart carte blanche to intervene militarily in Ingushetia’s internal affairs, with a view to subduing the insurgency there. Indeed Kadyrov emerged from his meeting claiming that the Russian president had ordered him to take charge of the ongoing security operation in Ingushetia.

The establishment of a working relationship with Kadyrov – a sometimes difficult interlocutor – was one of the principal political achievements of Yevkurov’s presidency. Relations between Kadyrov and Yevkurov’s predecessor had been strained, with Zyazikov clearly resentful of Kadyrov’s barely-concealed designs on his sphere of influence.

With Yevkurov’s sudden departure from Ingush politics, the options facing Moscow are five-fold. One possible response would be to promote someone from within Ingushetia’s fractious political elite. However, given the obvious dearth of suitable candidates this may not be a particularly viable course of action. Alternatively, Moscow may decide to install a ‘parachute’ candidate, someone like Yevkurov perhaps who, while ethnically Ingush, would not be hindered by prior association with the corruption and clan infighting which broadly define Ingushetia’s political environment. The third scenario, as discussed briefly above, would be to effectively amalgamate Chechnya and Ingushetia and grant Ramzan Kadyrov the remit to eliminate the Ingush insurgents. The fourth option would involve Moscow instituting direct rule in Ingushetia, a scenario that would probably see Yevkurov’s functions assumed by Medvedev’s plenipotentiary representative to the Southern Federal District or by some senior official in the Russian military.

The fifth option – what might be called ‘the Swat option’ – represents an appalling vista for the Russian government and for Ingushetia’s ruling class. This would entail the Russian authorities brokering some kind of armistice with the insurgents, a deal which would likely involve the complete, or partial, withdrawal of federal forces from Ingushetia followed by the introduction of Sharia law. Pakistani authorities briefly utilized this strategy in their confrontation with Islamic militants in the Swat valley earlier this year; the initiative ended in failure and the Pakistani military is currently in the process of reclaiming Swat. For now, this final option is a non-starter for Russian decision makers: negotiating with insurgents in Ingushetia or anywhere else in the North Caucasus remains a conceptual bridge too far for the Russian authorities.

CONCLUSIONS: Ingushetia’s political elite is nervous. Virtually no one in this constituency wants to see Ramzan Kadyrov increase his influence in Ingushetia. This may be unavoidable, however; while it is unlikely that Kadyrov will seek to ensconce himself in the presidential residence in Magas overseeing the day-to-day functioning of Ingushetia’s government, it is noteworthy that no one in the Kremlin, or the Russian White House, has moved to dispel Kadyrov’s self-assumed military mandate in Ingushetia. At the very least, citizens of Ingushetia, particularly those living along the border with Chechnya, may have to reconcile themselves to more regular incursions by pro-Kadyrov security forces. Inevitably, this practice will lead to local tensions, as it did in September 2006 when Chechen security forces became embroiled in a bloody altercation with Ingush police which left seven dead. The Chechens had been attempting to repatriate a prisoner they had detained on Ingush territory when they were confronted by Ingush border guards.

Moscow’s silence on Kadyrov’s presumptive ‘Ingushetia mandate’ suggests that the Chechen president’s military – and perhaps political – responsibilities are shortly set to assume a regional character. In anticipation of Kadyrov’s increased influence, should some member of Ingushetia’s political elite be appointed president over the coming weeks, it would difficult to in any sense conceive of that person as the undisputed master of his appointed political jurisdiction.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree from University College Cork, Ireland.