Recent events suggest increasing Sino-Russian military cooperation, with the participation of several Central Asian countries. Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov proclaimed that Russia and China would hold up to 25 joint military maneuvers this year, plans that have are materializing. In May, Russia, China and three Central Asian countries engaged in military exercises in Tajikistan. This emerging military and geopolitical cooperation seems to indicate that Russia and China are in the process of building an alliance, with the U.S. as a potential target. Still, the U.S. presence in the region is not the main reason for the Russian-Chinese rapprochement. Rather, the decline of this presence makes Russia and China apprehensive, for it could well create a geopolitical vacuum in Central Asia.

BACKGROUND: Historically, one could observe continuous improvement of the Russian/Chinese relationship for the last 20 years, after a decisive step for the better after Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to China in 1989. China and Russia became even closer in the beginning of the Yeltsin era. In the beginning, Russia saw its dealings with China in a purely economic perspective. As time progressed, another dimension was added to this relationship: China began to emerge as a possible geopolitical counterbalance to the U.S. at a time when the relationship between Russia and the U.S. started to sour, among many other reasons due to NATO’s eastward expansion. NATO’s attack on Serbia/Yugoslavia in 1999 was a turning point for both the Russian and the Chinese elite. Consequently, the 2000 treaty and the military maneuvers of 2005 and 2007 were indeed directed toward the U.S.

The consensus among the Russian and Chinese elites seems to be that a weakening of the U.S. would lead to a much-desired “multi-polarity”, beneficial for both Russia and China. The weakening of the U.S., increasingly clear since the end of the Bush administration, seems to confirm Russia’s and China’s anticipation of the emerging “multipolarity”. Still, it is becoming clear to the elites of both countries that a weakening of the U.S. could also bring serious problems for both Russia and China.

For a long time, the Russian elite in many ways related American might, in the holistic meaning of the word, with the U.S. economic standing. This was especially clear during the Yeltsin era when the dollar ruled supreme in Russia. The decline of the dollar in the late Putin era was a huge blow to the image of the U.S., regardless of the dollar’s recent rise vis-à-vis the ruble.

In the beginning of the U.S. troubles, the Russian elite were quite pleased with the American decline. The assumption was that Russia would benefit from the U.S. predicament. Still, the crisis spilled over into Russia and reinforced in the minds of the Russian elite the notion that not only is the U.S. weak but its weakness could be a source of trouble to others. This change of paradigm, from the idea that the U.S. should be a cause for concern because of its strength to the notion that it should be feared because of its weakness, could be seen in the minds of the Chinese elite as well. Indeed, China recently expressed concern that Obama’s spending spree could undermine the value of the dollar and T-bills that China holds. This change of paradigm clearly indicates that the U.S. decline is not always seen as beneficial for either China or Russia and that the transition to “multi-polarity” entails not just benefits but also dangers. And developments in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan are among these potential dangers.

The Russian press increasingly presents the situation in this part of the world as extremely dangerous, deeming the rise of the Taliban and general chaos in the region as almost unavoidable. Some Russian pundits still believe that the Americans just use the Taliban threat as an excuse to establish military bases in Russia’s proximity and that these bases are the actual threat for Russia. But increasing numbers of Russian observers see the events in a different light. They argue that both the Taliban and Al-Qaida are creations of the U.S. but that the genie is now out of the bottle and is beyond the control of its creator. Others see Islamic extremism as largely independent of the U.S. from the start. In any case, all of them regard the U.S. situation in Afghanistan and Iraq as quite difficult or even hopeless. This hardly pleases the Russian elite, who in this case understand that “the enemy of my enemy” is my enemy as well. A collapse of Afghanistan would lead to a spread of insurgencies not just to Pakistan and other countries of the region but also to Central Asia, housing oil and gas supplies crucial to Russia.

IMPLICATIONS: In order to prevent trouble in Central Asia, Russia has recently engaged in several actions. Most important is the recent creation of Special Forces, besides Russians including soldiers from various Central Asian states. Yet, the viability of these forces and the general cohesiveness of alliances are quite questionable. Tajikistan serves as a primary example: Tajikistan has become increasingly unstable and vulnerable. The country’s vulnerability is underscored by the fact that it is located just north of Afghanistan. It would thus seem that the Tajik elite would have been strongly supporting a close relationship with Russia and other Central Asian states. Yet, the opposite has happened. Tajikistan’s relationship with nearby Uzbekistan has soured; and even the relationship with Russia became tense when the Tajik press accused Russia of causing all types of problems for the country. Russia is even accused of fomenting civil war in the 1990s. In this situation, Russia doubts that its allies in Central Asia are viable and has turned to China as the last option. China reciprocates, for it also receives a considerable amount of oil and gas from Central Asia. The region’s proximity to restless Chinese Uighurs and other Muslim minorities caused additional potential problems. All of this created incentives for China to engage in military maneuvers in Central Asia either under the umbrella of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) or on bilateral grounds.

CONCLUSIONS: While both Russia and China have vested interests in maintaining a modicum of stability in the region, it remains questionable whether the two countries could cooperate effectively. Mutual suspicion continues to be high. Russians still worry about China’s economic, military, and especially demographic clout and fear, not without grounds, that in the future they could lose the Far East and Siberia to China. Some Russian pundits believe that China and the U.S. could forge a global alliance and divide the world at the expense of others, Russia included. China, on the other hand, regards Russia as competition for Central Asian resources. Moreover, Russia’s war with Georgia and plans to engage in “regime change” in Tbilisi; as well as Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remind China of the 1960s-70s, when Russia and China were close to war, with the Chinese expecting a preventive strike from the North. All of this hardly helps smooth cooperation and opens for questioning of Russia’s and China’s abilities to act in unison as guardians of Central Asian stability if Afghanistan and the adjacent region would explode.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History, Indiana University at South Bend.