Iran’s recent electoral protests and the more recent demonstrations in Xinjiang suggest that Eurasian societies are still fundamentally unsettled or possibly entering a new dynamic phase of political development. Both episodes underscore the inherent fragility of authoritarian societies and their susceptibility to internal violence. In Iran the government brazenly rigged its recent presidential election, then launched high-handed coercive efforts to strangle the ensuing protests. The world’s view of Iran has nevertheless changed. In Xinjiang, the fruits of a policy best described as internal colonialism are visible, with the consequences of ethnic discrimination and a recourse to violence.

BACKGROUND: The Iranian government has made clear its determination to remain in power even at the cost of its legitimacy and authority. Thus it now stands on the brink of becoming a regime that relies exclusively upon force, fraud, and nationalist xenophobia rather than the domestic legitimacy it did previously enjoy to stay in power. Second, this domestic upheaval has fractured the unity of both the clerical establishment and the political elite. Consequently the actual ruling group is smaller and perhaps more cohesive than before, but the wider political class is more fragmented and the ruling elite’s legitimacy has been undermined by its own actions, making it a more isolated group. That situation almost certianly implies a greater resort to force, repression, and nationalist xenophobia if the regime is to stay in power. That would also entail a likely acceleration, if possible, of Iran’s nuclear program.

Consequently, by its no less high-handed efforts to blame the United Kingdom and the U.S. and its threats to put British diplomats on trial, Tehran has shown not just its abiding paranoia and willingness to blame foreigners for its defects, it has also made clear the ruling elite’s unwillingness to undertake genuine negotiations with the West on its nuclear programs, let alone stop them. Not surprisingly, officials in Washington if not elsewhere are beginning to realize that the Obama Administration’s efforts to engage Iran directly on this program will probably fail. It should be clear that this election fraud did not occur exclusively for domestic reasons of staying in power: the regime’s leaders do not want to engage in direct talks with Washington lest this expose the regime to Western influence or slow or stop the nuclear program. Indeed, there were signs that the opposition, led by Mir Hossein Mossavi, campaigned on the platform of negotiations with Washington and de-emphasizing Iran’s nuclear project.

Both Iran’s election crisis and the rioting in Xinjiang will have international implications going beyond the boundaries of their own countries. Unfortunately those implications are likely to be negative ones, at least in the short term insofar as prospects for greater liberalization, not to mention democratization, of these societies are concerned. The experience of watching the Iranian elections and their aftermath as well as the rioting in Xinjiang will probably lead Eurasian rulers to conclude that they must act even more resolutely to ensure that future elections cannot under any circumstances lead to a change in regime. For example, Azerbaijan has limited state reporting of events there, possibly for fear that popular protests in Iran could impact the country. While the Azerbaijani government has urged the return of stability at the earliest possible date, opposition and independent media have concentrated on the challenge to the Iranian regime, clearly intending to use Iran as a stand-in for Azerbaijan.

IMPLICATIONS: This situation will probably replicate itself in other Eurasian countries where official media and the government will seek to restrict knowledge of events in Iran and Xinjiang, while regime opponents will use those events as symbols of what they are criticizing in their own governments. As in the presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan, we may expect that authorities elsewhere will make sure that opposition candidates cannot run, mobilize popular support, or gain access to funding or media, and certainly that they cannot have any control over the actual counting of the votes. Moreover, in any case they will try to ensure beyond any doubt that the outcome is foreordained and then ratified as legitimate.

In practice this suggests several developments across Eurasia. First, increased interference with the operation of free media is to be expected, and especially a crackdown on the information technology of social networking. This can also include periodic or at least intermittent efforts to isolate countries from foreign media, including expulsions of foreign journalists, denial of visas to them, interference with the internet, and increased threats if not use of repression against news outlets and their reporters. This also means greater efforts to develop a “patriotic” media and mobilize popular support around those tamed and docile “house organs.”

Second, increased restrictions on opposition political movements are also likely. This repression will occur, not just in terms of their freedom of communication or access to the media, but also in terms of the right to assembly and publicly protest their condition. Invariably, this also entails heightened forms of repression. In Iran, the regime has essentially blanketed the country with police forces and some officials have threatened the opposition with heavy jail terms or even with being labeled enemies of the state. In Xinjiang, the authorities have followed suit and threatened any demonstrators with the death penalty. This likely trend also means more show trials and repressions like that of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, which is currently taking place in Russia. Kazakhstan’s efforts to ban the book written by Rakhat Aliyev and the current purge of former high-ranking officials on corruption charges also opens the door to the possibility of a larger campaign to stifle any potential political opposition. Similar phenomena can be expected and should not be ruled out in other Central Asian states, especially given a prolonged economic crisis that could shake the pillars of the state.

Along with the growth of repression and electoral chicanery we can also expect a growth in officially sponsored xenophobia. We already see a disturbing rise of ethnic violence in Russia as well as officially sponsored campaigns against the U.S. and the West. Since many leaders in these countries still accept the Leninist paradigm that their countries and governments are menaced by linked internal and external enemies, they regularly accuse NGOs of being in the employ of the CIA and claim that the so called color revolutions really represent U.S. efforts to undermine them. Therefore ethnic violence, directed against targeted minorities or just simply protracted repression and discrimination are by no means out of the question.

CONCLUSIONS: This increased xenophobia will invariably reinforce preexisting disposition to display a hostile attitude towards the U.S. on issues of foreign policy concern like Iranian proliferation or Russian foreign policy in the CIS, and Russian policy towards Iran. Indeed, intensified efforts are likely toward still more collaboration on the part of these governments to set up not just an alternative value system and ideology concerning democracy and international relations more generally, but also counters to organizations like the OSCE. The CIS’ use of member states’ election monitors to verify the “democratic procedures” of their elections and thus make a mockery of the OSCE and democracy will probably grow in frequency. Russia is already calling the Iranian election “an exercise in democracy.”

Therefore more resistance should be expected to the U.S.’ calls for democratization and human rights, which, in fact, have been attenuated under the present Administration. It makes no sense to demand that states like Turkmenistan conform to human rights obligations while simultaneously refusing to press China or Russia, the latter being a signatory of the Helsinki treaty, to uphold their treaty commitments. Since Russia is in many ways an alibi for other Eurasian states, this makes pressing it doubly important even if Moscow does not like to hear it. Refraining from doing so only tells Russian leaders that the West is not serious in its commitment and that they can therefore disregard the West with impunity.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Stephen Blank is Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. The views expressed here do not represent those of the US Army, Defense Department, or the US Government.