One year after the August war between Georgia and Russia, the EU’s profile in Georgia has strengthened. The most visible consequence is the presence on the ground of the EU Monitoring Mission, which aside from seeking to implement cease-fire agreements provides decision-makers in Brussels with first-hand information about developments in the country. Before the war, however, implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was patchy; key areas such as market reforms and regulatory convergence faced strong opposition in key circles of the Georgian government. This has changed after the war. However, a “Europeanization” scenario in Georgia will probably lead to more tensions with Russia, and more assertive Russian policies in the entire region.

BACKGROUND: One of the outcomes of the August war was EU involvement on the ground and growing support for the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The by EU standards quick deployment of the EUMM, which is now the only international monitoring mission in Georgia, is highly appreciated among political circles and in Georgian society; it has undoubtedly increased the political profile and the visibility of the EU in the area. Less visible, but with more far-reaching implications for the country’s future, is progress in the implementation of the ENP and the prospects for deepening relations with the EU in the form of an Association Agreement in the context of the EaP. After the Rose Revolution and the expectations created by the reform-oriented government led by Mikheil Saakashvili, the EU included Georgia and the rest of the South Caucasus in the ENP and prompted the pledge of US$1 billion, of which US$150 million were pledged by the European Commission, in a Donors Conference organized by the Commission and the World Bank in 2004. However, with the death of Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania in February 2005, Georgia not only lost a strong supporter of the integration with the EU, but power gravitated increasingly to the institution of the President and to Saakashvili personally. Between 2004 and 2008, Georgia was a paradigmatic example, praised by the World Bank for its rapid liberalization of the economy, and at the same time embracing a ‘minimal state’ strategy.

In spite of the pro-EU rhetoric of the Saakashvili administration since the early days of the Rose Revolution, implementation of the ENP stagnated and the EU lost its grip on the country’s reform process. In fact, the path of reforms undertaken by the government after 2005 was at odds with the regulatory approach of the EU and the adoption of necessary parts of the acquis communautaire. Apart from making NATO membership an even more distant prospect, the August war also proved the limits of the U.S. influence in the region; in that sense, Georgia needs the EU. However, increased political and economic support from the EU can only come through a serious implementation of market and political reforms envisaged by the ENP Action Plan. That is the nature of the EU’s external relations. In that sense, it seems that positions within the Georgian government regarding the implementation of the ENP have softened since the end of the war. Key supporters of the ‘libertarian approach’ such as former minister of economy Kakha Bendukidze and former Prime Ministers Zurab Noghaideli and Lado Gurgenidze have also been replaced. Current Premier Nikoloz Gilauri is more pragmatic toward the implementation of EU-oriented reforms, especially regarding the long-standing issue of regulatory adjustment.

IMPLICATIONS: The potential leverage of the EU in Georgia has never been higher than now. In spite of the rhetoric, political circles in Georgia are well aware of the impossibility of reversing the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia anytime soon. In this sense, an indirect result of the war and the need of more EU support and to keep the EUMM in Georgia is an opening of the political system and real power sharing beyond a facade of democratic institutions. This also means that Russia’s policies can become more aggressive and, even worse from a European perspective, more unpredictable. The war increased anti-Russian feelings in the country, especially in the younger generation, and with the recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence, Russia has lost leverage for influencing Georgian politics through its control of conflict resolution processes. The immediate effect for the current government, and most probably for the one to follow after Saakashvili, is that close cooperation with the EU and the U.S., and consequently support from international financial institutions, is the only policy available in their foreign-policy toolkit.

As a consequence, a more comprehensive implementation of reforms related to the ENP (and especially those that affect the country’s economy in order to obtain a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement), the rule of law, media freedom, and power sharing giving more powers to the Parliament are likely to advance. This is the only way to obtain strong EU political and economic support, even more so when divisions within the EU regarding Russia and policies towards the Eastern neighborhood show no signs of abating. The drawback is that starting a real process of Europeanization in the country will further increase tensions with Russia. In spite of concerns about NATO enlargement to the East, what Russia fears most is EU expansion: when a country joins the EU it is lost forever for Russia, hence the Kremlin’s concerns, expressed by Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov or President Medvedev in some occasions, about the Eastern Partnership.

CONCLUSIONS: The war showed political elites in Georgia that the country’s security cannot only revolve around the U.S. and a hypothetical accession to NATO. In Brussels, some political circles have spelt out the possibility of a scenario of ‘more EU, less NATO’ in order to provide some security guarantees to Georgia without NATO membership. This year has seen a steadier process of converging positions between the EU and Georgia, as talks on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, visa facilitation and Justice and Home Affairs have moved forward. However, the momentum has also been slowing down within the EU as divisions among member states in relation to Russia are deeper than ever. Georgia and the EU find themselves at a crossroads. More EU support and deeper relations with Georgia imply further political opening of the Saakashvili regime, involving risks for the current political and economic elites. For the EU, the Europeanization of Georgia would face regional implications. At least, this opens a window of opportunity is open for the democratization and stabilization of the country.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Oscar Pardo Sierra is a Doctoral Researcher at the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, United Kingdom.