Since mid-July, rumors and official pronouncements have multiplied regarding the possible deployment of a second Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan. The base would be deployed in the town of Osh in the southern parts of the country, to house forces of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This sudden decision could cause confusion in other CSTO members, especially Central Asian ones, as long as decisions on the base are taken by Russia but portrayed as multilateral. This raises questions concerning whether the decision should be considered a unilateral geopolitical design or collective strategic wisdom.

BACKGROUND: Various discussions about the deployment and functions of military bases since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have demonstrated that the process of geopolitical reordering of this space is dramatic and confusing for the so-called newly independent states, especially those of Central Asia.

Russia’s first post-USSR effort at establishing a military presence in Central Asia was the deployment of the 201st Motor Rifle Division and Border Guards in the territory of Tajikistan during the civil war in the early 1990s. In addition, four countries of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan – sent battalions to Tajikistan as part of the CST forces. However, before the end of the civil war, the three Central Asian countries decided to withdraw from Tajikistan, leaving Russia with the only “collective security” forces. In the aftermath of the civil war, Tajikistan agreed to the deployment of the Russian 201st Division to a permanent military base in Tajikistan, operating there ever since.

Another major attempt to establish military presence in the region was the 2003 deployment of a Russian air base to Kant airport in Kyrgyzstan, also still operating. The bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are portrayed as fighting terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking across Central Asia. However, the forces in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have never taken military action against anticipated threats, although terrorism and drug trafficking are serious problems to the Central Asian countries.

Alongside the Russian/CSTO military forces, Western states deployed military contingents in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan from 2001 on for operations in Afghanistan. The major contingents were the U.S. forces in the Uzbek town of Khanabad (K2) and at the Manas airfield in Kyrgyzstan. K2 operated between 2001 and 2005, when it was closed following a crisis in Uzbek-American relations. Manas was also subjected to controversy earlier this year, when the Kyrgyz authorities decided to close it but later changed its mind.

The German base, deployed in the Uzbek city of Termez in parallel with the American contingent at K2, has kept operating. As relations between Uzbekistan and the U.S. are again improving, U.S. and NATO forces will expand their usage of this base to compensate for the loss of K2. Moreover, the U.S. and Kyrgyzstan agreed in June that the U.S. air base at Manas would be transformed into a Transit Center fulfilling almost the same functions, with a maintained presence of U.S. forces.

Russia’s plan to establish a second base in Kyrgyzstan has obvious strategic geopolitical implications. These implications are strategic since the base is claimed to serve the security interests of Central Asian states. They are also geopolitical, since the decision was obviously taken in the context of a new turn in the geopolitical game between Russia and the U.S. in the region. However, the decision on a second Russian/CSTO base is likely to also hold other undeclared purposes.

IMPLICATIONS: The Central Asian states never officially invited the Russian or CSTO military bases. Rather, these were deployed after secretive bilateral agreements between the recipient and provider of the military contingent. Such decisions have never been genuinely multilateral and backed by all CSTO members.

Much like the June 14 decision on the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces, the decision on a second Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan exacerbated the ‘collective confusion’ within the CSTO. It reflected not only the absence of strong collectivity on such a sensitive issue as the application of military power to defend the national and collective security of member states but also the likelihood of new tension among these if such a decision is adopted. Uzbekistan again demonstrated its reluctance regarding this decision.

There is reason to contemplate what Russia’s geopolitical endeavor might entail. A second Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan could certainly have immediate and long-term geopolitical implications.

First, an increased number of bases will add to the militarization of the region, increasing the emphasis on hard security at the expense of soft security, demonstrating to Central Asian publics that risks of military conflict exists.

Second, since the expanded Russian military presence in Central Asia takes place in a context of geopolitical rivalry between great powers, there is reason to doubt its capability for protecting the weak countries in the region. It seemingly does not envision a role for the forces of Central Asian states, especially those of Uzbekistan, in defending their own region.

Third, the Russian base in southern Kyrgyzstan, a region perceived to be prone to extremist actions, could increase Uzbekistan’s suspicions of Russian abilities to manage these actions to challenge security and stability in Uzbekistan. A Russian military presence in the Fergana Valley can be interpreted as a warning to Uzbekistan.

Fourth, Uzbekistan’s leadership could assess the base as a Kyrgyz demarche against Uzbekistan, thereby risking increased tensions between the two states. Russia would benefit from such a situation because this would simultaneously challenge the interests of Uzbekistan and the U.S.

Fifth, a new base in Kyrgyzstan would contradict Washington’s current drive to “reset” its relations with Moscow. It would also contradict the previously renewed strategic cooperation, agreed during former U.S. president George W. Bush’s visit to Moscow in May 2002.

Sixth, if the Russian decision to open a second base in Central Asia is underpinned by geopolitics rather than security, its strategy risks backfiring. The base deployment will discredit Russia for its lack of collectivity and unilateralism, although it is declared to be an element of the CSTO. For the time being, there is no visible U.S. challenge to Russia’s interests in Central Asia as to warrant emergency measures on Moscow’s part in the form of deployed military forces.

Seventh, it is hard to see how the new base could accomplish the task for which it is expected to operate – fighting terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking. Indeed, throughout their period of independence, all Central Asian countries have been able to cope with such threats on their own or by intra-regional cooperation. The scale of existing threats has not so far stipulated any major multilateral military actions. In the short and mid-term perspectives, the scale of such threats is unlikely to increase as long as their sources are fought by ISAF and OEF forces.

CONCLUSIONS: The second Russian base, even under the aegis of the CSTO, will for all practical purposes constitute a means for projecting Russian military and strategic power in its ‘near abroad’. From a security point of view, it will neither be needed, nor useful, in fulfilling the purposes for which it is officially intended. However, from a geopolitical point of view, Russia seems intent to preclude the consolidation of a long-term U.S. military presence in Central Asia. The price of such undertakings could well be Central Asia’s independence and unity.

There is no doubt that Central Asia, and perhaps the entire post-Soviet space, need some mechanism or format for collective security. The establishment of the second Russian military base, however, will hardly solve this task. It cannot provide an effective mechanism of this kind, because it is not a product of a collective will and reflects immanent friction in bringing the regional collective security system into existence.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science, and is Associate Professor at the National University of Uzbekistan.