Numerous assassinations and violent attacks against regime opponents have reportedly been plotted by security officials and criminal groups in Kyrgyzstan. Such invasive participation of security institutions in civilian life demonstrates their growing political role in Kyrgyzstan under President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s regime. Loyalty towards the ruling regime among military officials is becoming more important than their professionalism. Presently, Bakiyev has surrounded himself with loyal military and security officials who support his growing authoritarianism. It remains unclear how these officials will continue to influence the political domain in the country and whether their role will continue to rise.

BACKGROUND: Like other former Soviet states, Kyrgyzstan inherited a military submissive to civilian control. During the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan remained passive in developing a legislative base for the military and security sector. It seemed as if Kyrgyz political elites were still expecting the CIS and Collective Security Treaty to exercise some sort of supra-national control over the armed forces on their territories. Only in the mid-1990s did then President Askar Akayev begin to actively endorse military legislature that would secure his control over the armed forces. He nationalized military assets and institutions left after the collapse of the Soviet regime. Kyrgyzstan’s political liberalism in the 1990s was not challenged by any significant tensions that would require an armed response. In 1997 Akayev unveiled a proposal to substantially decrease the number of army personnel because the country, according to his viewpoint, was not facing significant security threats requiring a military response. The proposal suggested retaining only the National Guard for symbolic purposes. However, the clash between Kyrgyz troops and guerrillas from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Batken in 1999 and 2000 completely changed the perception of the army’s role in national security. After the conflict, the Kyrgyz government embarked on a number of significant military reforms.

The unexpected armed clash in Batken propelled the Kyrgyz Security Council to revise its military and security planning and policymaking. Local mass media featured debates between conservative and liberal-oriented military officials in Kyrgyzstan over the course of the country’s security politics. As a reaction to public pressure, in 2002 the Security Council endorsed a fairly ambitious military doctrine aimed to fundamentally reform the army. The principal change was restructuring of the army into small and mobile forces forming a capital-intensive, professionally trained, and well-equipped army. Another change was converting the army into contract-based conscription to be accomplished by 2010. External financial support was sought from bilateral and multilateral partners. Although the doctrine turned out to be another paper document that only partially defined the rationale for the existence of the armed forces, military planning and procurement, it showed that Kyrgyzstan was ready for more substantial security sector reform.

Since incumbent president Kurmanbek Bakiyev gained power in 2005, he continuously granted military and security institutions greater political control over civilian institutions and civil life in general. Under Bakiyev, the military brass quickly changed from occupying a marginal role in state politics to turning into the primary coercive instrument for his regime. Today, all military officials are interested in sustaining the regime as they now take a direct part in the political life.

IMPLICATIONS: On March 24, 2005, when Akayev was ousted by opposition forces, the Kyrgyz military remained neutral. Akayev did not resort to military protection of his regime, while the military switched its loyalty to the new president within 24-48 hours. Whether the military will remain equally neutral should opposition forces mobilize to a similar extent again is now doubtful.

Although in 2005-2006, then Defense Minister Ismail Isakov brought substantial success in augmenting the internal morale of the military, this promising change did not last long. Isakov actively implemented better incentives for service and recruitment. Isakov’s success demonstrated how the enhancement of public institutions in the context of a decentralized Kyrgyz government is contingent on initiatives by individual agents. However, as Bakiyev continued to quickly lose his popularity among the masses, he turned out to be reluctant to bring in any substantial changes in the public sector and the military was not an exception. Bakiyev sacked Isakov and his deputies, appointing his former personal guard head, Bakytbek Kalyev, as defense minister.

By 2008, Bakiyev had replaced all influential military officials with cronies who would be loyal to him should the opposition organize mass protests before or after that year’s presidential vote. Minister of Interior Moldomusa Kongantiyev and the head of the Security Council, Adakhan Madumarov, worked closely with Bakiev to strengthen his power and the pro-regime Ak Jol party during 2005-2009. Before the July 2009 presidential elections, the ministries of interior and defense ministry worked to quiet opposition forces as public discontent, exposing the control wielded by the ruling regime. Many experts in Kyrgyzstan accuse the president’s brother, Zhanysh Bakiev, of being responsibility for various repressive measures since 2005.

In this environment there is less and less space left for independent mass media, public debate or NGO activity. Partly as a result of a muted NGO community and independent mass media, security officials show an inclination to impose more coercive rules upon society. Recently, Madumarov and head of the National Security Committee Murat Sutalinov proposed to legalize the death penalty again. Finally, last year, the Kyrgyz army was given the official right to intervene into internal affairs.

The Kyrgyz military’s continuous increase of political power might prompt military officials to take autonomous political decisions. The question today is whether the military and police will continue to support Bakiev’s authoritarian regime, or become a more autonomous institution. The military could remain loyal to the ruling regime and support Bakiyev’s policies as he rules, regardless of how authoritarian his regime becomes. In the case of regime change, the military could turn their loyalty to new regime holders independent of their political views. Alternatively, the military could take autonomous political decisions at times when the state’s security is challenged by internal or external threats. These could include mass demonstrations, civil disobedience, or aggressive opposition among secular as well as religious groups. Since the growing role of the military also provides justification for the use of violence by regime opponents against the state, it increases the risk of violent conflict between competing groups. The future of Kyrgyzstan’s civil-military relations is therefore more unpredictable today compared to the early 1990s and even the Soviet period.

CONCLUSIONS: Bakiev’s ability to physically remove and threaten his political opponents indicates the growing role of the military and security officials in the political domain. The military’s forceful engagement in politics could further lead it to take up arms against civilian demonstrations or individual opposition leaders, rent-seeking and extortion of the civilian leadership, and disagreements among military commanders,  further leading to violence. Without effective state mechanisms for peaceful transfers of power, the Bakiev regime seeks to secure the support of military officials. Both political and military elites, when threatened, are likely to appeal to coercive methods, rather than democracy and civil liberties.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Erica Marat is a Nonresident Research Fellow with the Central Asia – Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program.