The human suffering and acrimony that accompanied the August 2008 war was accompanied by constructive criticism. One month after the cessation of violence and less than a year after the violent dispersal of protesters in Tbilisi by Georgian police, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Schaeffer encouraged President Saakashvili to “strengthen your democracy.” After much rhetoric and some reforms, much remains to be done. Western support has waned somewhat since the 2008 war and the allocation of reconstruction funds that followed. This change, however, reflects a redirection of U.S. foreign policy, Western economic turmoil, and great game politics with Russia rather than Western disappointment with President Saakashvili’s domestic policies.

BACKGROUND: That a Western entity such as NATO would link Georgia’s domestic political circumstances with the 2008 violence might be surprising. Although some link Saakashvili’s narrowing political circle with the August events in Tskhinvali, most analysts concede that the war’s precursors are far more complex than stagnant democratization in Georgia. The Western democratic admonitions of Saakashvili, rather, reflect an evolving discomfort with the trajectory of Georgian politics since shortly after the Rose Revolution, when the Georgian government began its program of consolidating executive authority by enlarging presidential power over the parliament and judiciary. In February 2008, Saakashvili announced that he hoped to extend parliamentary terms from four to five years to match those of the presidential office, as well as to expand the circumstances under which the president could dissolve the parliament.

The government also centralized its influence over its only de facto Autonomous Republic, Ajara, making the regional executive an appointee of the President and subjecting all legislation passed by the regional legislature (an elected body) to central scrutiny. The government restructured the system of local governance, in some ways centralizing political power in the provinces. Yet the same reforms also granted district governments their own power to tax and offered budgetary discretion.

Georgian civil society groups questioned the press freedoms available to the media, protested human rights violations by the powerful and judicially protected political elite, and contested the balloting of the 2008 presidential and parliamentary contests. The November 2007 protests that sparked government violence accompanied a government crackdown on Imedi television, the mouthpiece of the media mogul and opposition figure Badri Patarkatsishvili. Accused of spreading dangerous rumors and fomenting sedition, the station lost its license for political programming. It was permitted to go on the air later, but no longer airs critical content. The only stations that currently reflect the views of the political opposition, Kavkasia and Maestro, are private entities, have had trouble maintaining their licenses, and broadcast largely to a Tbilisi audience. 

Finally, there is a general disquiet regarding the relationship between the judiciary and the state apparatus, particularly with the leniency offered interior ministry defendants in the high-profile murder investigation of Sandro Girgvliani. This perception lingers to the current day, particularly with the September 2009 amnesty of the convicted killers three years after their sentencing, halving their already controversially “short” sentences. While the regime has avoided overt crackdowns of the sort that occurred in November 2007 during opposition rallies in downtown Tbilisi from April to June 2009, there were some smaller skirmishes between protesters and police.

At the institutional level, however, some decentralizing reforms have been made, although few have occurred since the war. Saakashvili rescinded his proposal to further weaken parliament and even suggested some roll back of presidential power (although this change is still to be realized). The May 2008 parliamentary elections marked the decrease of the voting threshold for representation from 7% to 5%, a concession made after the November 2007 government crackdown. In his September 2009 U.N. address, Saakashvili announced a reform that would permit the direct election of mayors, which would further decentralize power. As a result, Saakashvili’s key rival, Irakli Alasania, has announced his candidacy for mayor of Tbilisi. Saakashvili also has set up a democratization task force, but little of constitutional import has changed since the war.

IMPLICATIONS: If one examines popular perceptions of civil liberties, there are reasons to believe that the fragility of Georgian democracy might be overstated. In a recent analysis, Hans Gutbrod and Koba Turmanidze measured an increasing trend from 2007 to 2009 showing that over 70 percent of Georgians affirm that democratic institutions are the most appropriate mechanisms for governance and that they feel comfortable engaging in political speech. Those numbers have remained stable. Although their poll also highlights some areas for growth, Gutbrod and Turmanidze conclude that the mass level political culture is becoming more, not less, democratically oriented.

Recent statements by representatives of the EU, the U.S. government, and the United Kingdom all pledged support for Georgia’s independence and territorial integrity, cited economic support for its continued development, and encouraged the leadership to invigorate democracy.

Yet, outside the admittedly remote possibility of EU membership in the very distant future, the West is dangling very weak carrots and brandishing fewer sticks for political change. The vast monies pledged for reconstruction after the war will not be renewed, and while the West continues to proffer aid in the post-recession era, it does not do so in amounts akin to those after the Rose Revolution or 2008 war. The Georgian economy, in the meantime, languishes: FDI in Georgia is down 80 percent and unemployment, already a problem prior to the war, is increasing. NATO membership, a powerful motivator before the April 2008 Membership Action Plan rejection, is increasingly unlikely after the war with Russia. The U.S. presidential transition has shifted that country’s priorities away from the unabashed support for Georgia during the Bush years. And Russia’s regional influence, particularly its natural resource domination in Europe, makes the politics of befriending Georgia an increasingly risk-acceptant endeavor for all Western countries, including the U.S.

CONCLUSIONS: The political and security environment after the war, coupled with the economic downturn and increasing Western isolationism has decreased the Western engagement in terms of real tangible pressure. In the early days of the 2009 opposition rallies, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden issued a statement congratulating Saakashvili on his “measured response” and for not resorting to the tactics of November 2007. That demonstrates rather low expectations and may be an indicator of what Western players have come to anticipate from Georgia. They seem to be waiting for 2013 and the next election, if not different economic and political circumstances of their own. Coming to terms with its own political ambitions within its difficult geopolitical environment may be just what is needed for Georgia, however. With an active opposition and a population that craves good governance and responsible leadership, it might be that Western support for specific administrations only prolongs the pain of transition rather than furthering democratic consolidation.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Julie A. George is an assistant professor of political science at Queens College, the City University of New York. She is the author of the forthcoming book, The Politics of Ethnic Separatism in Russia and Georgia.