The leaders of the various ethno-republics in the Northern Caucasus rely on different personalities to represent their political interests at the federal level. Presidential aides Sergei Naryshkin and Vladislav Surkov represent the leaders of Ingushetia and Chechnya respectively. Meanwhile, the embattled leader of Dagestan, Magomedsalam Magomedov, is represented by Suleiman Kerimov, a billionaire oligarch who represents Dagestan in Russia’s upper house of parliament. Kerimov’s influence is such that it would be difficult for the Kremlin to interfere in Dagestan’s political system without first coordinating with him.

 

BACKGROUND: Although he is not yet a full year into his term of office, the Head of Dagestan, Magomedsalam Magomedov, is already under intense political pressure. In November 2010, the Russian President, Dmitri Medvedev, complained publicly about the slow pace of economic development in the republic. There is a sense that Medvedev has come to regret appointing Magomedov to his current position last February. Certainly, Magomedov was not the candidate initially favored by the President’s circle. Medvedev and his chief of staff, Sergei Naryshkin, originally wanted to nominate Magomed Abdullayev, a former university acquaintance of the Russian president.

 

As events unfolded, Medvedev and his staff were persuaded – by whom we do not precisely know – to choose a more experienced candidate. The eventual selection of Magomedov signaled a political triumph for Suleiman Kerimov, one of the most influential actors in this prolonged lobbying process. While Magomedov enjoys his own political support base in Dagestan – his father, an extremely influential man, ruled the republic between 1987 and 2006 – the fact that Kerimov was acting as his agent in this process probably secured the presidency for him. Abdullayev was installed as prime minister, a role in which he has yet to distinguish himself.

 

It would not be altogether accurate to describe Magomedov as a pawn of Kerimov. Nevertheless, he is indebted to him for his recent political advancement, and as matters stand, Magomedov may shortly be relying on Kerimov to dissuade a dissatisfied Russian president from replacing him. If Magomedov believes that he is the only politician in Dagestan who is represented on a federal level by Kerimov he is mistaken. Rizvan Kurbanov, a deputy prime minister in Dagestan’s government, is another who enjoys a close association with Kermiov. Kurbanov was appointed to this position shortly after Magomedov’s installation as president. He is responsible for overseeing the republic’s security agencies and has been careful to cultivate local, national and international media since his appointment.

 

Kurbanov has been tasked with implementing various counter-insurgency initiatives in Dagestan, including an amnesty process and the establishment of pro-government volunteer militias to combat insurgents. Because of these activities, he has been caricatured as Dagestan’s version of Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of neighboring Chechnya. Kadyrov’s ruthless counter-insurgency methods have reduced rebel activity significantly in Chechnya over the past several years. The comparison with Kadyrov is not one that Kurbanov has sought to dispel. Should a change of leadership be deemed necessary in Dagestan, Kurbanov’s candidacy should feature prominently.

 

IMPLICATIONS: Kerimov has emerged as a favored go-between for Medvedev’s administration in its dealings with Dagestan’s political elite. At this point, Kerimov’s influence as a lobbyist – strictly in relation to Dagestan’s political affairs – appears to surpass that of Vladislav Surkov, Medvedev’s deputy, who counts Ramzan Kadyrov among his clients.

 

One of Surkov’s main responsibilities as a presidential aide is to ensure that regional leaders throughout Russia maintain political coordination with the Kremlin. Surkov’s influence in Dagestan has never been particularly strong. Although some observers detected Surkov’s hand in the successful campaign last March to replace the head of Dagestan’s Pension Fund, it should be noted that it was Sagid Murtazaliyev, the head of the Kizylyurt District and a known associate of Suleiman Kerimov, who ultimately secured jurisdiction over this lucrative financial resource.

 

Surkov’s influence in Dagestan was certainly greater during the presidency of Mukhu Aliyev (2006–2010). Aliyev was originally recommended for this position by the then-Presidential Representative to the Southern Federal District, Dmitri Kozak. Keen to secure additional political support both in Dagestan and in Moscow, Aliyev formed an undeclared political alliance with the influential Mayor of Khasavyurt, Saygidpasha Umakhanov. Umakhanov has boasted publicly about his close political relationship with Surkov. He has recently suggested that this relationship may have given rise to a controversial incident in April 2010 during which Umakhanov’s residence in Khasavyurt was surrounded and searched by a detachment of armed men. According to Umkhanov, this ‘provocation’ was instigated by an unnamed Dagestani oligarch interested in destabilizing the situation in the republic.

 

Surkov’s stake in the presidential selection process rested with Magomed Magomedov, a politician-businessman who made it onto the list of five candidates submitted to President Medvedev for evaluation in November 2009. Neither Surkov nor any other political lobbyist with access to Russia’s corridors of power can hope to match Kerimov’s influence in this sensitive theatre of Kremlin decision-making. Kerimov’s list of contacts is extensive. In addition to Magomedov and Kurbanov, Kerimov is also on good terms with any number of influential political barons throughout Dagestan; these include Sagid Murtazaliyev, as well as the freshly installed Mayor of Derbent, Imam Yaraliyev.

 

Should Medvedev decide to dismiss Magomedov forthwith, every one of the conceivable alternatives is dependent on Kerimov’s involvement. Kerimov would be confident of retaining his influence under Magomed Abdullayev. Abduallyev does not have a political powerbase of his own in Dagestan. This is one of the reasons he is so favored by Medvedev and his team: as someone who has lived outside of Dagestan for much of his professional life, it is assumed that Abdullayev will be immune to the sort of corruption associated with inter-clan politicking in Dagestan. Although Kerimov is not associated with Abdullayev directly, he will almost certainly be tasked with recruiting a suitable bailiff to protect the interests of Medvedev’s protégé. Such is the extent of Kerimov’s influence at this point that it would be difficult for Medvedev to find a viable leadership candidate from within Dagestan’s political elite who is not somehow associated with the well-connected oligarch.

 

CONCLUSIONS: Magomedov’s failure to impress the Russian president will not reflect negatively on Kerimov. The prolonged selection process that preceded Magomedov’s appointment last February resulted from Medvedev’s unbridled enthusiasm for Abdullayev’s candidacy. At the urging of more seasoned advisors Medvedev reconsidered at length, and this allowed Kerimov to impress the reluctant president with a suitable alternative in the shape of Magomedov. Kerimov has not attempted to conceal the extent of his influence within the Magomedov administration: he notably sat in on a meeting between Magomedov and the Russian president in Sochi last August. As long as Dagestan’s rebel movement continues to carry out high-profile attacks on state representatives, and so long as the republic’s economy continues to underperform, it will be difficult for Kermiov to reassure Medvedev about his client’s suitability to lead. In any case it will be difficult for the Kremlin to reconstitute the political system in Dagestan without seeking the advice and intercession of Suleiman Kerimov, Dagestan’s most influential man.

 

AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree from University College Cork, Ireland.