The dust has yet to settle entirely following the leadership controversy last August which pitted the putative leader of the Caucasus Emirate, Doku Umarov, against a group of erstwhile colleagues in Chechnya’s rebel organisation. Umarov’s steadfast refusal to relinquish his leadership position has not prevented his opponents in Chechnya from restructuring themselves politically and militarily. The leaders of this anti-Umarov constituency command sizeable support and can call upon the services of a number of militarily gifted field commanders. Conversely, support for Umarov within the Chechen organisation appears to be insignificant; is there a way for Umarov to redress this state of affairs?

BACKGROUND: It is nine months since Doku Umarov provoked a sharp difference of opinion within Chechnya’s rebel organisation by refusing to relinquish his position as Emir of the Caucasus Emirate. Umarov’s prevarication upset many within the organization in Chechnya and several senior field commanders – Hussein Gakayev, Tarhan Gaziyev and Aslanbek Vadalov – felt obligated to complain publicly about his continued stewardship of the Caucasus Emirate. Following the outbreak of this controversy, it became fashionable among analysts and observers to refer to the complainants as dissidents, as though they were representatives of a minority point of view within Chechnya’s rebel organisation. It has become apparent, however, that by voicing their opposition to Umarov’s continued leadership, Gakayev, Gaziyev and Vadalov were in fact speaking for a majority within Chechnya’s rebel organization.

While Gakayev and his fellow complainants insist that their objections to Umarov’s continued leadership are rooted in the latter’s failure to adhere to long-established standard operating procedures – his alleged failure to convene the Majlis al-Shura on a regular basis, for example – it is now clear that there was considerably more popular disquiet about Umarov’s 2007 proclamation of the Caucasus Emirate than was initially thought. Gakayev and his supporters seem to have no fundamental problem with the idea of Chechnya being subsumed into a virtual Caucasus Emirate, which also includes the jurisdictions we recognise today as Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria. Yet it is clear that many of Umarov’s countrymen were not pleased with the unilateral manner in which the decision to proclaim the Emirate was arrived at.

According to Gakayev, the basis for his opposition to Umarov is the latter’s failure to lead by consensus. Umarov’s decision to proclaim the Caucasus Emirate in late 2007 was taken, Gakayev complains, “without consulting all of the Mujahedeen”. Gakayev argues that such a monumental initiative should have been put before the rebels’ Majlis al-Shura for extended deliberation. Umarov took the decision to proclaim the Emirate on foot of consultations he held with a narrow circle of advisors, very few of whom were in harmony with the main body of opinion within Chechnya’s rebel organisation.

Gakayev paints a picture of Umarov as an autocrat, indifferent to the collective will of the Majlis al-Shura. By ignoring this institution, Gakayev argues, Umarov has exempted his leadership from accountability and oversight. “If a person ignores the Majlis, if a person is not advised by his brothers, then such a person does not deserve to be Emir”, Gakayev concludes.

IMPLICATIONS: Gakayev now styles himself as the Emir of Chechnya (or the Vilayat of Nokhchicho, in rebel parlance) and has convened a new Majlis which includes field commanders from throughout Chechnya. Naturally Gakayev is included in this body, as are Gaziyev (Gakayev’s deputy) and Vadalov (commander of the Eastern Front). The Arab fighter Muhannad is also a member of the new Majlis, though in what capacity he is included – as the figurehead of the foreign Mujahedeen in Chechnya or as commander of the Western Front – is an open question. Muhannad has been identified by Umarov as being chiefly responsible for the current discord within the rebel ranks. At the time of writing, unconfirmed reports were circulating that Muhannad had been killed on April 21 during a confrontation with pro-Russian forces in Chechnya’s Shali district.

Six sector commanders are also included in the Majlis, three from the Western Front and three from the Eastern Front. Emirs Zumso, Abu Muslim and Abdullah represent the West, while Mahran, Muslim and Zaurbek represent the East. Practically nothing is known about Emir Zumso other than the fact that he was previously under the command of Tarkhan Gaziyev as part of the now-defunct South-Western Front. Abdullah and Abu Muslim have also been associated with Gaziyev. Available information about these two field commanders and their respective backgrounds is negligible and contradictory.

Quite a bit more is known about the respective records and backgrounds of the sector commanders from the Eastern Front. Emir Mahran, (real name Mahran Saidov) is a particularly active guerrilla leader who commands the Tsentoroi sector of operations in Chechnya’s Gudermes district. Emir Muslim, or Muslim ‘Dunga’ Gakayev, is in charge of the Shali sector of operations in eastern Chechnya. He is the younger brother of Hussein Gakayev and has in recent years been one of those responsible for the recruitment and training of suicide bombers. Emir Zaurbek, or Zaurbek Avdorkhanov, is the younger brother of Akhmed Avdorkhanov, killed in 2005. Akhmed Avdorkhanov was a close associate of the late Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov. Emir Zaurbek is a successful guerrilla commander in his own right who operates mainly in the Kurchaloi and Nozhai-yurt districts. Along with Vadalov, Mahran and Avdorkhanov planned and executed the attack on Ramzan Kadyrov’s compound in the village of Tsentoroi last August.

It is clear, therefore, that the Gakayev-Vadalov-Gaziyev axis enjoys considerable support from Chechnya’s rebel rank and file. But how much support does Umarov continue to enjoy?

The case of Emir Ilman (Ilman Estemirov) merits attention in this context. Estemirov was the Emir of the rebels’ Tevzana sector in Chechnya’s Vedeno District. In August 2010 he had been included on a list of Chechen field commanders allegedly opposed to Doku Umarov. This list was posted on the Daymohk.org website which has taken Gakayev’s side in the recent controversy. The integrity of this compilation has been called into question in recent weeks. According to certain rebel sources, Ilman was killed on March 28 in the Ingush village of Upper Alkun, during the same special operation that accounted for Umarov’s deputy, the Chechen ideologue Supyan Abdullayev. Does this indicate that Emir Ilman was actually in league with Umarov at the time of his death? Was he playing a double game, adopting an equivocal stance by staying on terms with both parties? Or could it be that he was present in Abdullayev’s camp as Gakayev’s emissary, with the mission of soothing relations between the two factions?

Emir Ilman’s presence among the casualties of the raid on Upper Alkun suggests that Umarov will continue to exert influence within Chechnya’s rebel community until such time as he is killed. Furthermore, this apparent inaccuracy in the internet list mentioned earlier suggests that there may be other field commanders who are still reluctant to commit themselves to either party. Assuming it exists, should Umarov begin canvassing this undecided constituency aggressively, there is a possibility that he might broaden his support base substantially.  

CONCLUSIONS: It is difficult to see how Umarov might be reconciled with Gakayev and his followers, although one should note that he is an extremely resourceful individual and that the political fault lines demarcating this conflict have proven notoriously inconstant in the past. It is certain, however, that Gakayev and his allies now represent the most influential rebel constituency currently active inside Chechnya. Gakayev’s supporters hope that his will be a more inclusive regime where decisions of strategic significance will be reached by way of a more collegial process.

For his part, Umarov may attempt to rescue his dwindling legitimacy by appointing himself, or one of his supporters, to the vacant position of Emir of Ingushetia. It should be noted that opposition to Umarov’s rule has largely been confined to the rebel organisation in Chechnya, with branches in Dagestan, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria hastening to reaffirm their loyalty to him. Throughout his career, Umarov has shown himself to be a skilled courtier; with some lower ranked field commanders uncertain, or perhaps indifferent, as to whom they should support, Umarov may yet be able to rescue his foundering leadership.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Kevin Daniel Leahy holds a postgraduate degree from University College Cork, Ireland.