The death of Osama bin Laden on May 2 placed the future of foreign military engagement in Afghanistan in the limelight. Incidentally, Arab militants may also prefer abandoning their traditional bases amid growing unrest in the Middle East. The Afghan capital, Kabul, has been buzzing with ideas for bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table. Neighboring Pakistan, embarrassed after the disclosure of bin Laden’s presence and the U.S. operation, has long advocated efforts to transform the Taliban militia into a political entity. Washington’s zero tolerance for any future slackness in localizing key leaders of al-Qaeda and the Taliban has resulted in accelerated Pakistani search operations in its vast territory.

BACKGROUND: The idea of isolating al-Qaeda from the Taliban is gaining ground; in fact, the approach of the Bush Administration at the start of the military campaign in October 2001 to fight both groups along the same lines, in spite of their different agendas and scope, only cemented their relations. Harsh military rhetoric and excessive use of force based on weak intelligence damaged relations with large segments of the exhausted and deprived Afghan population.

Both al-Qaeda and the Taliban exploited the security vacuum in the long stretch of semi-autonomous mountainous tribal areas along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. ISAF and NATO troops could not enter these areas, nor had there been a single Pakistani soldier there since the country won freedom from the British in 1947. The trust deficit dating back to era of the Soviet Union’s withdrawal proved a vital obstacle to the development of intelligence-sharing and logistical cooperation between Pakistan and the U.S.. The delayed entry of the Pakistani regular military, with little expertise in guerilla warfare, into the tribal areas did not prove successful until recently. However, U.S.-Pakistani intelligence sharing resulted in the capture of over 500 al-Qaeda operatives including figures like Khalid Shaikh Mohammad, awaiting trial in Guantànamo.

After initial reluctance, al-Qaeda and the Taliban started punishing Islamabad for its alliance with the U.S. Pakistan’s government claims to have lost over 30,000 civilians and 4,500 security personnel, including two and three-star generals, besides a financial cost of US$ 50 billion by 2010. The war in Afghanistan cannot be won without its conjoined twin, Pakistan, on board. While Pashtuns in Afghanistan have affinities with two neighboring Pakistani provinces, Baluch in the southeast have historic relations with adjacent districts across Pakistan and Iran.

Landlocked, barren and war-torn Afghanistan depends heavily on Pakistan for everything from petroleum supplies to agricultural provisions. With a severely weakened economy compared to one decade ago, Pakistan cannot afford more unrest along its western border. While the extremists had already lost whatever support they enjoyed owing to anti-Americanism amongst the Pakistani public, the news of bin Laden’s presence close to the Abbotabad military installations left the military and political establishment in shock.

Amid hardened pressure from the U.S., Pakistan is demanded to increase its domestic efforts to fight the extremists, or otherwise prepare for repeated unilateral commando operations. Despite a parliamentary resolution denouncing U.S. drone attacks on its soil, Washington has not relented. Pakistan seems caught between increasing U.S. pressure and serious fears of retaliation attacks by al-Qaeda and its likeminded terrorist outfits. Within a fortnight, a massive attack on freshly graduated paramilitary cadets claimed 80 lives last week while a bulletproof U.S. embassy limousine was targeted in the northwestern city of Peshawar close to Afghanistan’s border, killing one Pakistani.

IMPLICATIONS: For years, senior Afghan leaders have been talking of Taliban fatigue with the war and the unbearable burden of accommodating al-Qaeda. President Karzai has also repeatedly invited the Taliban to talks. Recently, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said “Our message to the Taliban remains the same. You cannot wait us out, you cannot defeat us, but you can make the choice to abandon al Qaeda and participate in a peaceful political process”. A decade of experience proves to the west that excluding the Taliban from any future political setup is bound to fail, given the extent of support they enjoy among the Pashtuns, Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group.

Despite a heavy financial and human cost, Pakistan’s limited success in curbing extremism coupled with half-hearted NATO action along the Afghan border may lead to a nightmarish retaliation scenario. Ironically, Pakistani public opinion is sharply critical of the missile attacks by U.S. UAVs in the tribal areas. While the elimination of bin Laden came as a relief to most Pakistanis, increasing violations of international borders and civilian casualties mount pressure on the elected government from popular opposition leaders like Imran Khan. The partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan remains at its lowest point as the two countries have severed their relations on the intelligence sharing front after the May 2 unilateral operation against bin Laden’s compound.

Nonetheless, being one of the three countries to acknowledge the Taliban regime in 1996-2001, Pakistan considers the Turkish initiative of opening a Taliban representative office in Turkey a positive move for all stakeholders in the Afghan imbroglio. Prior to taking such a bold initiative, the Turkish leadership has helped Pakistan and Afghanistan to break the ice, and the leaderships of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey are scheduled to meet in September. The fact that the proposal of establishing a Taliban representative office in Turkey, a NATO member, originated from the Afghan High Peace Council, headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, should increase its chances of success. The initiative is fully in line with Pakistan’s longstanding desire for a negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan crisis at a neutral venue.

A trilateral meeting between Pakistan, the U.S. and Afghanistan slated for the first week of June in Kabul could become the first step towards rebuilding confidence amongst the key stakeholders. Islamabad, Kabul and Washington can lay the foundations for a lasting political process by isolating the Taliban from al-Qaeda, promoting policing instead of aerial or armored shelling in urban centers, and exercising extreme caution to avoid collateral damage in western and southern Afghanistan, as well as the tribal areas of Pakistan.

To keep Pakistan on board, the U.S. will have to extend a helping hand instead of what is in Pakistan often perceived as arrogant criticism. Without any confidence-building gestures towards the Taliban, negotiations may never start. Turkey seems set to exercise the clout it enjoys in Afghanistan for its avoidance of combat operations despite being part of NATO forces. Nevertheless, the Taliban representative office in Turkey depends on sufficient ground work within various factions and figures in the Taliban militia.

CONCLUSIONS: Pakistan, which is likely to be hit hardest by retaliations for the death of bin Laden, will have to revamp its security forces besides revisiting its counter-terror doctrine. Whether in the form of a siege of an Army General’s Headquarters or an inability to capture bin Laden next to an officers’ training academy, Pakistan has suffered frequent failures in combating terrorism. Pakistan has faced a mammoth challenge in gathering confidence and commitment for this task, which was nevertheless shattered again in the May 22 attack on a naval aviation base, where four to six individuals could destroy two newly inducted P3 C Orion antisubmarine and maritime surveillance aircraft worth US$ 40 million each.

Without the international community’s resolve, the 180 million strong and nuclear armed country, now at the mercy of an IMF financial package, could turn against a peaceful development Afghanistan by increasing anti-U.S. fervor or political unrest. The world is losing patience with Pakistan, especially with its military establishment. The unrest following bin Laden’s death is brewing in Pakistan, where incompetent politicians and praetorian generals contribute to an increasing risk of systemic failure.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Naveed Ahmad is an investigative journalist and academic with a special focus on diplomacy, security and energy politics. He jointly heads Silent Heroes, Invisible Bridges, a multi-lingual journalistic organization promoting cross-cultural and cross-religious efforts for social integration and peaceful co-existence. He can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .