BACKGROUND: Since he came to power during the Soviet era, Nursultan Nazarbayev has distinguished himself by his political skill. Early on he learned to balance the interests of various ethnic groups in the country, diffuse radical nationalist strains, cajole Western policymakers, and attract foreign investment. Mikhail Gorbachev appointed him First Secretary of the Kazakh SSR in 1989 and shortly thereafter, the Soviet parliament changed his title to president. When independence came in 1991, Nazarbayev held uncontested elections to lock in his leadership. In December1993, the Soviet Parliament voted to disband and abolish regional legislatures, leaving the president to rule by decree until the March 1994 elections. But when the newly elected officials took their seats, the president, unhappy with the pace of economic reform, ousted the entire cabinet the following October -- a move that drew a chorus of criticism from the West.

Since then, Nazarbayev has often chosen to use more subtle tactics to advance his political goals. Mindful of Western observers, Nazarbayev maintains the pretense of having a system of checks and balance in place. While the executive branch clearly trumps both the legislature and judiciary in Kazakhstan, the other institutions nonetheless play an important symbolic role, necessary for the country to continue to secure foreign assistance. They have also helped legitimize Nazarbayev's grabs for power. Two instances stand out. In 1995, the Constitutional Court -- which had until then been a largely ineffectual organ - nullified the parliament because of alleged election fraud. While polling problems did probably occur, it cannot be ignored that the parliament in question was also the strongest and most independent minded to date. Indeed no politicians were in place to object to the March 1995 national referendum that extended Nazarbayev's presidency until 2000.

In 1998, Nazarbayev staged another act of political theater with the country's legislature. On September 30, in his annual address to parliament, Nazarbayev laid out liberalization plans - including a reduction of presidential powers, a call for governmental accountability, and an increase in the Supreme Court's independence - all aimed at speeding up the country's democratization. Yet six days later, on October 5, the parliament undercut these initiatives by again expanding the president's powers at the expense of the other branches of government. The latest law extending Nazarbayev's presidential powers for life that passed last week, ostensibly out of respect for the president on the eve of his 60th birthday, bears the unmistakable imprimatur of the Kazakh ruler.

IMPLICATIONS: The legislation creates new options for the aging Kazakh leader. At 60, the president may be thinking of a possible successor, perhaps even his own daughter Dariga, who runs the Kazakhstan's state-owned television, for the top post. In a system that has been described as "sultanistic" - where power is concentrated in a tightly knit circle of family and friends - only an insider would have a real chance of gaining the top job in Kazakhstan -- with or without elections. The new law all-but-guarantees that whoever assumes that role will be beholden to Nazarbayev. This could likely increase cynicism in the political process among local people.

In Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev's presidential powers for life are sure to dampen the political ambitions of potential presidential contenders not already in the power coterie, thereby stacking the odds even more in favor of incumbents. In the region as a whole, Kazakhstan's latest law serves as a potential model for the other Central Asian leaders who have not yet settled upon exit strategies of their own. Turkmenistan offered one variation last December when President Sapurmurat Niyazov declared himself president for life through his rubber stamp parliament. While Nazarbayev told the media that he does not want "to become a khan or president for life," the extension of his presidential powers will likely have the same net effect.

And as always, events in Russia have had a significant impact on Kazakhstani politics. Boris Yeltsin's dramatic denouement last December set the standard for his peers in the southern tier. Just as Yeltsin handpicked a successor, Vladimir Putin, so too might Nazarbayev and the other Central Asian leaders. As he has done with other political decisions throughout his tenure, Nazarbayev must have calculated how this law would play in Russia. And given Russia's own move toward centralized executive powers under Putin, it seems a safe bet that the Kazakh law would not draw criticism from up north.

CONCLUSIONS: The law insulates the Kazakh president who has long shielded himself with the country's political institutions. By placing him on a national pedestal, the law thwarts his critics, who are unlikely to have the opportunity to hold the president accountable for his actions while in office, including suppression of political opposition, authoritarianism, and abuses of human rights. The Kazakh legislation coincides with international headlines announcing a U.S. Justice Department-led probe into allegations of illegal payoffs between Western oil interests and Kazakh officials, including Nazarbayev and his family members. The new law insulates Nazarbayev from criminal prosecution - at least in his own country.

The extension of Nazarbayev's presidential powers is an attempt by the president to create new options for himself as he contemplates his ultimate exit from power. He can run for office in 2006, but even if he officially relinquishes his power at that time, he can be assured that he will not pass into oblivion. Though the concentration of power in one branch of government at the expense of others creates the potential for political instability in any country, Kazakhstan may be able to succeed in keeping its government stable if its economic potential pans out. If the country can translate its vast energy resources into sustainable and well-distributed economic development, then it is unlikely that any political opposition will be able to muster the popular mandate necessary to gain power.

AUTHOR BIO: Bea Hogan is journalist in New York who specializes in Central Asian issues. She holds a master's degree in international affairs from Columbia University and formerly served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Uzbekistan. This is her third article for this publication.

HOME

Copyright 2000 The Analyst All rights reserved