BACKGROUND: The U.S. Government has recently proclaimed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar an international terrorist. This reflects a realization of the growing threat Hekmatyar poses to the stability of Afghanistan, and also to American presence there, since his return to Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.

Hekmatyar, a Pashtun from Kunduz, is legendary as the Mujahideen commander, whose disagreement with Rabbani and Masoud over the formation of a Mujahideen government in the early 1990s led to the razing of Kabul. Their conflict was central to the anarchy that developed in the country, providing the fertile ground in which the Taliban movement emerged. Hekmatyar has ideologically been close to the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami, a more progressive strain of radical Islamic thought than the Taliban. Hekmatyar opposed the Taliban when they emerged, though many of his commanders later defected to them. He was eventually forced to flee Afghanistan, finding refuge in Iran. After September 11, 2001, Hekmatyar immediately opposed America’s war in Afghanistan, turned around and took the side of the Taliban, and proclaimed a Jihad against the U.S., returning to Afghanistan where he found a base in the unruly Pashtun-populated southeastern provinces of Afghanistan, from Kunar to Paktia. These provinces were his old power base in the 1980s, and serve the same purpose again. At present, Hekmatyar has recast himself in the role as a magnet of Pashtun dissatisfaction in Afghanistan. He is pursuing a clear Pashtun nationalist agenda, seeking to appeal to the things Afghans have always loathed and often risen up to fight against: foreign occupation, foreign troops, puppet governments, violations of Pashtun traditions.

Hekmatyar also benefits from his long-standing connections in Pakistan. Hekmatyar was once the favorite darling of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which contrary to conventional wisdom continued to support him long after the Taliban was formed, with the support of Benazir Bhutto’s Interior Minister, Nasirullah Babar. Only when it was abundantly clear that Hekmatyar would lose (incidentally because the Taliban and the later anti-Taliban icon Ahmad Shah Masoud made common cause against him) did the ISI abandon him and endorse the Taliban. For close to 25 years now, Hekmatyar has entertained local strongmen and erstwhile government officials in Pakistan’s border areas with Afghanistan. He knows the areas, the tribes, and the landscape well, and can benefit from significant goodwill and long-standing economic links there.

IMPLICATIONS: The term ‘Taliban’ has lost much of its meaning in today’s Afghanistan. As a movement, the Taliban is all but dead; parts of the movement defected to join warlords that are now allies of the U.S.; others simply took off for their home villages. One could very coarsely say that a ‘Talib’ today is basically synonymous to an ‘angry Pashtun’. Hekmatyar is trying to serve as the magnet of the disaffection among Pashtuns that stems from several elements of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Firstly, the simple knee-jerk reaction of Afghans, especially Pashtuns, against any foreign, especially non-Islamic military or other presence in the country. This allergy to foreign rule contributed to the uprisings against the British and the Soviets, and although U.S. military presence is very different from occupational armies of the past, the memory of colonialism can be used to raise resentment against the U.S. Secondly, the Panjshiri Tajik dominance in the Afghan government is a major source of resentment, which enables Hekmatyar to depict Afghan President Hamid Karzai as a puppet of the Tajiks and the ‘Ferengi’ (foreigners). The U.S. has tried to limit the power grab of the Panjshiris, but not enough to make a dent in the feeling that Pashtuns are marginalized in the Afghan political setup. Third, in the process of prosecuting its war against Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants, the U.S. is creating considerable discontent through the violations of Pashtun tribal law. In particular, intrusive searches by U.S. military involving the violation of Purdah are causing resentment that Hekmatyar can build on. U.S. soldiers braking into the confined areas where women live is a grave violation of tribal custom, and though perhaps necessary from a military point of view, carries with it significant implications for the U.S. military’s relationship with the local population. The possible war in Iraq will be taken by many forces as a sign that America may distracted from Afghanistan, and lead to various internal and external forces moving their positions forward in the country. Hekmatyar may well capitalize on this window of opportunity to rally greater support for what is in fact a classic nationalist cause. He is known for his maximalist ambitions in negotiations, which have not earned him many points as a negotiator, but certainly has earned him a certain level of respect as a man who does not make shady deals.

Hekmatyar poses a danger in a confined geographical area – mainly the Pashtun-populated Eastern parts of Afghanistan, including the Kunduz, Kunar, Logar, Nangarhar and Paktia provinces. He may have some sympathizers in the southwestern area around Kandahar, but does not command authority there. It is conceivable, though, that he may strike a tactical alliance with forces from the southwest, such as former Taliban commanders still on the loose.

CONCLUSIONS: Hekmatyar is not at present in a position to seriously challenge the American military in Afghanistan, or the Karzai-led government. However, Hekmatyar may prove a constant irritant that may pose a limited and confined military threat to U.S. forces, and to that a growing one if the current level of discontent among the Pashtun population remains or increases. At this point, the personnel reshuffles that the U.S. is forcing the Afghan government to undertake will not suffice to quell discontent, since the very mode of U.S. warfare in the south of Afghanistan is a source of discontent. Solving the Hekmatyar problem will require either the physical elimination of Hekmatyar, or the removal of the sources of discontent that he feeds on.

AUTHOR BIO: Awamdost Pakhtunkhel was a civil servant in the ministry of culture of Afghanistan until the Communist takeover in 1978. After the Soviet invasion, he joined the resistance movement, first as part of the Hizb-I-Islami (Khalis) movement and then under Jalaluddin Haqqani. He briefly joined the Taliban movement in 1995, before moving in disillusionment to his present home in the North Waziristan agency of the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan in 1997, from where he frequently writes on Afghan politics in the regional media.