BACKGROUND: The success of the Eurasian corridor pipeline deal (Baku-Ceyhan and Transcaucasian gas pipelines) represents a breakthrough, for Georgia and Azerbaijan that have envisioned a new strategic reality based on a revival of the ancient Silk Road. The pro-Western oriented Eurasian corridor project signifies the creation of a new geo-economic regional partnership, that will create a joint military force to defend the pipelines from military and terrorist attack. This new partnership will creating a route for Central Asian oil outside the control of Russia, despite Russia’s demand that Caspian oil flow through Russian territory to Novorosiisk. Although Georgia’s President Shevardnadze has been extremely focused on regional security pacts, Georgia has made clear its desire to become a member of NATO to distance itself from or place itself outside Russia’s military orbit.

The achievement of the Eurasian corridor deal has the potential for undermining the regional security for which Shevardnadze has worked so tirelessly. The deal was made possible with the support of Western countries, most importantly the United States that is making strong efforts to involve itself in the Transcaucasus and Caspian Sea Basin. The US pledged its support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in November 1999 and supports another pipeline plan to deliver Turkmen gas to Turkey via Azerbaijan and Georgia. Russian is most irritated by plans to protect the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline with a joint Georgian-Azeri-Turkish military force. Russia views this plan as a deliberately threat against Armenia which is supported by Russia. Georgia has been placed in a difficult position as it has consistently opposed to the idea of putting any regional cooperation onto a military track.

Shevardnadze has stood firm that the GUUAM alliance, which includes Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Moldova, is essentially an economic regional alliance, without military or political implications. Shevardnadze acknowledges that Russia’s politicians and analysts are irritated with the increased cooperation between post-Soviet states but he clearly has chartered a path away from Russia’s influence. As Shevardnadze quips, "many people are now more afraid of GUUAM than of NATO". Shevardnadze’s support for the Eurasian corridor project signals a move that will place the project on a military track regardless of the economic nature of the project. And matters have not been helped much recently as Shevardnadze has called for renewed discussions about the removal of Russia’s military bases from Georgian territory in the wake of his reelection.

IMPLICATIONS: The Transcaucasus region faces a credible threat of becoming divided between two opposing military blocs made up of the countries that are most affected by Eurasian corridor project. On one side are Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey that are backed by US and on the other side are Armenia, Greece and Iran that consider that implementation of the Eurasian corridor project will pose both an economic and a strategic threat to their interests. The latter group is backed by Russia that considers the post-Soviet south as its exclusive sphere of interest. Menawhile, recent reformist and democratic forces in Iran are beginning to play a far more active role, strengthening the stability and security of the region. The Iranian Foreign Minister will visit to Georgia in a few days to regional cooperation in order to develop peace and stability.

A new assertive Russia under the leadership of President-elect Putin has asserted that it is its national interest to regain influence over the southern Caucasus in order to ensure Russia’s lasting control over the northern Caucasus. Parallel to its campaign in Chechnya, Russia is exerting pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan, accusing both countries of assisting Chechen rebels by providing shelter and supplies. Should Russia decide to act on its threats, it is possible that both countries could face mass destabilization. Should this occur, the conflict in Abkhazia would intensify for Georgia in like manner that the struggle over Karabakh would confront Azerbaijan. And security in the Eurasian corridor security could be seriously undermined.

Military and government strategists in the Caucasus countries already are developing military scenarios predicting that the implementation of Eurasian corridor projects will transform the Transcaucasus into an area of military opposition and division. Should these negative outcomes come true, the process for peace and stability in the Caucasus region as well for a considerably wider area will be stymied. It is thus important to increase the number of interlocking regional cooperation initiatives on different levels that engage the opposing actors of the region.

CONCLUSION: It is inevitable that post-Soviet countries will soon no longer see the world limited by Russia. The cooperation between them is extending on many levels, be it the Peaceful Caucasus Initiative, GUUAM or Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Such cooperative initiatives are acquiring greater significance and coincide with a declared pro-west orientation. Although it is important to implement the Eurasia Corridor project, it is crucial to avoid a growing division of Transcaucasus into a number of opposed military groups facing off against one another along the pipeline routes.

For the states of the Caucasus region, the prospects for peace and stabilization remain only rhetoric if they are not backed by both internal agreements and political will. They must also have the increasing support of the West, the United States in particular. Increasing external support for interlocking regional cooperation initiatives could prove decisive to bring together the opposing forces in the region. As US Pentagon officials now consider strategies for the development of a Eurasian corridor security system in preparation for their mission to Georgia in May, the success of regional cooperation initiatives depend upon Western and United States policy commitments to the region and the sense of security those commitments will bring.

AUTHOR BIO: Khatuna Salukvadze works as an Advisor to the Georgian Parliament’s Committee on Security and Defense. Presently, she is a Visiting Fellow at Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the Johns Hopkins University-SAIS. Ms Salukvadze received her M.Sc in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

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