BACKGROUND: The postings were made to the Centrasia.ru site and signed Usman Khaknazarov, political analyst. The name is unknown to local observers and several analysts, together with the banned opposition party Erk, believe that this is a pseudonym for a senior government official. The government moved quickly to block access to the site, although this was officially blamed on \"technical problems\". Meanwhile, the Uzbek secret police tried to identify and root out the culprit, something they appear not to have done yet, at least publicly. The most serious allegation made by \"Khaknazarov\" is that President Karimov personally colluded in the activities of a drug trafficking ring, effectively sanctioning the transport of heroin between the Afghan warlord General Abdul Rashid Dostum and local Uzbek dealers in the 1990s. \"Khaknazarov\" also claimed that the bombings in Tashkent in February 1999, which killed 16 people and were widely believed to be an assassination attempt against President Karimov, were in fact stage-managed by the Uzbek Security Services as a pretext to crack down hard on internal political dissent. 22 people were subsequently convicted of involvement in what was called the Glinka Street plot, following what international observers described as a show trial, with scripted confessions and allegations that the accused had been tortured. Many have suspected that factions within the political elite may have had a hand in the bombings, or that the Russian Security Services engineered the plot to remind the Uzbek government that, despite its increasingly assertive regional policy, it remained ill-equipped to combat Islamist militancy closer to home. \"Khaknazarov\'s\" new accusations serve only to underscore the murkiness of that whole affair. Other stories covered Karimov\'s rise to power and named senior regime officials involved in high-level corruption and embezzlement. However, the most salient allegations to emerge are that President Karimov may soon resign on the grounds of serious ill-health, triggering a possibly violent struggle for the presidential succession, presumably between Uzbekistan\'s regional clans. The President\'s spokesman, Sherzod Kudratkhodzhayev, took the unusual step of going on record to specifically deny this story as a fabrication. He went on to say that President Karimov was susceptible to catching a cold just like everybody else. Nevertheless, careful television viewers apparently noted that Karimov plodded up the aircraft steps uncertainly on his departure to Spain at the end of January. The Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando Belloso, neither confirmed nor denied a reporter\'s suggestion that the official visit to Spain would precede further trips for medical treatment in the next few months. IMPLICATIONS: Sorting out the facts from fiction in relation to elite Uzbek intrigues is notoriously difficult given the country\'s closed political culture. However, this lack of openness may yet prove to be a major problem for the regime. Taken at face value, the allegations may have emanated from a relatively senior government official disillusioned by endemic corruption and the government\'s increasingly autarkic and isolationist economic policies. However, other explanations may also be possible. Groups within the political elite may be attempting to discredit Karimov or each other in order to position themselves for the succession or flush out potential opponents. Another theory is that there may have been Russian involvement (or at least acquiescence) in the stories. Russian influence in Uzbekistan has steadily been eroded in recent years, a trend accelerated by the establishment of semi-permanent U.S. military bases in southern Uzbekistan in late 2001. It is conceivable that elements in the Russian Secret Services might either be wishing to remind Karimov that they are capable of destabilizing his regime or may be promoting a more pro-Russian faction within the elite. The popular appetite for such rumors is immense, accentuated by the fact that where information is unable to circulate freely, rumors more easily take hold and become difficult to control. In Tashkent, the government has contributed to this situation by pursuing a series of highly unpopular policies over the past few months. The imposition of crippling import duties and the closure of the huge Ot Choprar market in Tashkent by the authorities in summer 2002 enraged small traders and prompted consumers and traders alike to decamp en masse to markets across the border in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In late December 2002, the border with Kazakhstan was closed, officially on public health grounds, but in reality because of the volume of cash being lost to the Uzbek economy. The government finally relented by reopening Ot Choprar in late January 2003 but has not backed down over the import duties. Khaknazarov did not state which of the regional factions was best placed to secure power. Karimov comes from Samarkand, whilst in the Soviet period, the long tenure of Sharif Rashidov notwithstanding, Communist Party First Secretaries emanated from either the Tashkent or Fergana oblasts. One senior political scientist, Bakhodor Musayev, who gave credence to the reports, predicted that should Karimov die in office, or be removed suddenly, violent conflict over the succession was highly likely. Whether with popular input or not, the likelihood of an orderly transition of power has been challenged. CONCLUSION: President Karimov\'s term of office, extended by referendum in 2002, is due to expire in 2007, by which time he will be almost seventy years of age. It has generally been assumed that, in common with other former members of the Communist Party nomenklatura still in power around the region, he would cling to office for as long as it was sufficiently feasible or lucrative to do so. Uzbekistan has been notable for its apparently monolithic stability, in contrast to several bordering states, which have succumbed to civil war, internal unrest or, in Turkmenistan\'s case, the whims of an increasingly unstable ruler. Few analysts would hitherto have put Karimov at the top of their list as the first of the five Central Asian strongmen to depart the scene. If there is any credibility behind the recent Internet reports, however, the U.S. administration\'s closest ally in the region may yet transpire to be its biggest liability. AUTHOR BIO: Michael Denison is a PhD. Candidate at the University of Leeds, United Kingdom.