BACKGROUND: Regional economic and political pressures as well as strategic payoffs by the United States prevented the emergence of the RCI grouping so far. The American-British victory in Iraq and disagreements over the U.S. led international order nevertheless appear to have revitalized the concept. Military sales, fear of extremism and terrorism, and the desire for commercial spheres of influence has led China, India and Russia to reorganize bilateral priorities. However, Russian concern about the possibility of new permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq and most likely in the nearby regions necessitated a reassessment of their long-term regional security interests in order to decrease/neutralize the impact that new geopolinomics might have in Central and South Asia and the Caucasus. The international positions of China, India and Russia manifest concern over the world order dialogue and their role in it, as well as related trade and military-strategic developments. China and India being the largest customers of Russian weaponry (approximately 800 and 400 billion dollars, respectively, over the last five years), count on receiving the most advanced Russian technologies. All three countries no longer entertain seriously opposing strategic interests, and possibly share an understanding about developing a Eurasian anti-missile defense system project possibly with European cooperation, if the U.S. went ahead with its own program. The post-Cold War shifts in balance of power have gradually led to an unparalleled normalization of relations and bilateral understanding between the three countries. The RCI strategic understanding has been interpreted as the beginning of another Cold War by some analysts.

IMPLICATIONS: Regional cooperation in the CIS and the SCO is bound to tie Central Asia and surrounding regions at least partially into RCI-related strategic understandings. Regional cooperation between Central and Southern Asia under RCI appears more promising to regional leaders for dealing seriously with the problem of landlockedness. The mostly weak Central Asian states exercise caution about each other and vis-à-vis other regional powers; hence they are open to alternate strategic relationships with simultaneous arrangements with the East and West, seeking economic and political stability. The new geopolitics in the Middle East has led almost all regional states including India and Pakistan to reassess their earlier positions on key issues. The interdependence of China, India and Russia in their bilateral relationships with the U.S. and increasing U.S. strategic concerns and associated payoffs are likely to prevent RCI from becoming a formal anti-American military alliance. To landlocked Central Asian nations surrounded by stronger powers, the notion of multiple power representation offers a limited sense of security. However, fears that the new U.S. responsibilities in the Middle East may reduce assistance and investment in Central Asian oil and gas industry have increased; besides, the reduced oil prices caused by expectations of Iraqi oil flow, and lessening of support for revitalizing the Silk Road, has encouraged continuing reliance on pre-independence economic, political and communication structures. Reassessment of regional priorities over the last few months has led Kyrgyzstan to allow a Russian Air Force presence in this country, which seeks to balance U.S. military presence. New initiatives in Russia-Turkmenistan relations, and a seeming Turkmenistan-Iran understanding on water boundaries in the Caspian as well as increasing bilateral cooperation between regional countries are signs of these new realities. For the first time, India, a main potential consumer of Central Asian gas and electricity, and Pakistan, the major transit-route to Central Asia, have softened their positions, calling for the resolution of Kashmir conflict under a win-win scheme, indicating the possibility of turning the Line of Control into an international border. Both countries now emphasize increasing trade relations between South and Central Asia. There is also an emerging consensus among regional countries that continuing instability and regional tensions in Afghanistan need to be alleviated through integrating the Pashtun population in government. That said, statements on drastically changing the sociopolitical status quo in the Middle East worry many regional leaders, who are engaged in promoting a very gradual and slow democratization process, within the bounds of their own unique political and cultural realities. Amid the pain of serious economic and political transitions, the RCI concept, coupled with a continuing opportunity of balancing East-West presence in the region, appeals to leaders in Central Asia, where people continue to survive on relatively cheap Chinese and Russian consumer products. Russia and China remain among the most active investors in oil and gas production and transportation routes – and China in small and medium level businesses – in the region. Collective initiatives under RCI and Indian participation, through Iranian but eventually by necessity also through Pakistani routes, can broaden regional cooperation in the economic-strategic sphere. Regional interdependence based on transit routes complements RCI proposals by addressing the still unresolved landlockedness issues of the region. By Central Asian calculations, RCI, if materialized, may revive the still unrealized opportunities to unlock the Silk-routes trade.

CONCLUSION: The RCI strategic understanding scheme at one time was associated with the beginning of a new Cold War. However, U.S. ascendancy in the Middle East has changed that scenario. Russian pressure to revitalize the CIS is obvious, while Central Asian states desire a reasonably balanced East-West power relationship. Breakthroughs in India-Pakistan relations should not be seen merely as a result of external pressures, but need to be understood in terms of new post-Iraq war domestic and regional priorities. Moreover, the nature of bilateral Russian, Chinese and Indian relationships with the U.S., and growing American interest in the region (particularly the interest in new bases on the Indian coast with related payoffs) are likely to neutralize RCI’s possibilities to become an anti-American military alliance. U.S. influence could thus restrict RCI to geoeconomic activity, which can be used for regional stabilization, in breaking the landlocked isolation of Central Asia and reinforcing the long delayed materialization of Silk-route trade. RCI does not appear as much a threat today as it did earlier. The Primakov concept has been subjected to new geopolitical and foreign policy realities.

AUTHOR BIO: Professor Aftab Kazi is a researcher at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, and a fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Leipzig University. Currently, he is writing a book on United States-Central Asia Relations.