BACKGROUND: During the first week of April 2003, Kazakh authorities detained two members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in the South of the country for allegedly distributing extremist leaflets, which called for a jihad against the U.S. and UK. The two arrested men are set to be charged under the country\'s laws on religious incitement and are likely to face a heavy penalty for their affiliation with the group. The leaflets were distributed widely in southern Kazakh areas of Kentau and Turkestan, and written in Kazakh. They specifically refer to the coalition war against Iraq and the conduct of American and British foreign policy in the Muslim world. Banned in almost every Muslim country in the world, Hizb-ut-Tahrir was established in 1953 by Taqiuddin an-Nabhani Filastyni, a Palestinian radical activist and Sharia judge in the Jerusalem appeals court. Rejecting the legitimacy of secular government in the region, it calls for the creation of a caliphate throughout Central Asia, governed by the principles of Islam and ruled by Sharia law. It was under the guidance of Filastyni\'s successor, Abd al-Kadim Zallum, that the party stepped up its activities in former Soviet Central Asia. Today, Hizb-ut-Tahrir activity is focused in the Ferghana Valley, straddling the borders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The modern party\'s main activity in Central Asia is distributing leaflets, many including openly anti-Semitic proclamations or accusations. These leaflets are, as a rule, directly translated into Central Asian languages from identical proclamations distributed by its activists in the Middle East.

IMPLICATIONS: The party has traditionally had less success in spreading its Islamist message in Kazakhstan than it has in several other Central Asian countries. Islam is not as deeply rooted or widely practiced there and many of the economic grievances of its neighbours are not shared in the oil-bolstered economy of Kazakhstan. The group\'s support there has mainly been confined to the southern areas of Kentau, Turkestan, and Shymkent, where the wealth brought by the booming oil sector is yet have any real impact on the local population. It is thus unlikely that the dissemination of pamphlets by Hizb-ut-Tahrir will be able to capitalize on the county\'s economic and social conditions, not to mention unease about American foreign policy adventures in the Muslim world, to any great degree in the short term. Witness, for example, the lack of any serious demonstrations in Kazakhstan against the war in Iraq, which were so much a feature elsewhere in region and in majority Islamic states. In the long-term, however, the unpopularity of the pro-government Spiritual Board for the Muslims of Kazakhstan could encourage the emergence of a politicized militant element. In light of the continuing allegations of presidential involvement in corruption scandals focusing on oil industry deals, it is also possible that influence could be gained amid popular disillusionment with President Nazarbayev\'s tenure. There are already indications of disillusionment among the country\'s elite. Indeed, it is in this context that recent indications have emerged pointing to an expansion of Hizb activism in southern Kazakhstan. Political commentator for Novoye Pokoleniya Andrei Gubenko suggests that the coincidence of difficult socio-economic conditions and the proximity of regional trouble spots, namely in Uzbekistan, could further allow Hizb-ut-Tahrir \'teachers\' to spread their word in the south. While Hizb-ut-Tahrir\'s ties to regional militant organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) are opaque at best, any organized dissent represents a significant political threat to the increasingly authoritarian regime which governs Kazakhstan. Officially, Hizb-ut-Tahrir condemns the activities of the IMU and there have been reports of a Hizb-ut-Tahrir delegation dispatched to the Ferghana valley in order to dissuade them from their path of militarism. Such efforts are highly unlikely to persuade the Kazakh authorities that the group does not pose a threat to national security. It is this threat which is likely to prompt a harsh crackdown against suspected Islamists in Kazakhstan. Since its emergence from the Soviet Union, neighbouring Uzbekistan has curtailed religious freedoms and conducted the arrests of thousands of suspected militants in response to the perceived threat from political Islam. Meanwhile, Tajik security officials have clamped down on religious expression in Soghd, in the Tajik portion of the Ferghana Valley, while Kyrgyz officials have taken similar steps. In November 2002, for instance, the Kyrgyz Islamic Ulema adopted a restrictive licensing system for religious publications. If Hizb-ut-Tahrir is indeed escalating its activism in Kazakhstan, similar measures are likely to be introduced.

CONCLUSIONS: Those involved in Islamist movements in Central Asia are well accustomed to strict state control. Each member of a group or cell of five is given specific tasks to carry out every week by the group leader. They then report back on their tasks after completion. As a rule, the members of this party cell structure do not even know other members or their tasks. The party is then divided into vilayats, which may cover several countries. This allows for a resilient organisational structure, as is evidenced by the party\'s continued presence in the Ferghana Valley despite years of state measures of control. The Kazakh government\'s reliance on force to meet the challenge posed by Islamic radicals, as it has relied on it to deal with other forms of internal dissent, does not have good prospects for success. In order to stem the possible influence of groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir in the future, the Kazakh government will have to exercise a more cautious and subtle approach that it has heretofore been shown capable of.

AUTHOR BIO: Mike Redman is a Political Analyst with AKE group, inc.