BACKGROUND: It is well known that the Turkish government failed to have the U.S. request for assistance and for the right to station U.S. troops in Turkey before the war with Iraq passed in parliament. In the current postwar situation there, the United States has asked Turkey for up to 10,000 troops to assist in post-conflict reconstruction and stability operations in Iraq. Those forces would be deployed in the southern, largely Shiite areas of Iraq. In turn Turkey has reportedly demanded certain conditions for the placement of its troops there. These may or may not include a UN mandate, but there are others that are critical to any future Iraq. Reportedly Ankara is demanding that the U.S. civilian leader in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, appoint a Turkish deputy, and that the American military commander Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, similarly appoint a Turkish general of appropriate rank as his deputy. Furthermore all of Iraq, i.e. all the Kurds, must be disarmed, the Turcoman population must enjoy special privileges and protection, and the United States should also fulfill the entire obligation of credits it promised to Turkey in March, 2003, a figure amounting in sum to $8.5 billion. From this vantage point, it seems highly unlikely that Washington will allow itself to pay this price. For these terms are seen as blackmail in the U.S. and reflect serious Turkish miscalculations about the relationship with Washington and American policy. Turkish elites simultaneously fear that the United States is angling to create an independent Kurdish state in Iraq, yet at the same time maintain that America needs Turkey more than Turkey needs America because it has asked Ankara for help. On both counts these elites are profoundly wrong. While Washington is certainly not favoring an independent Kurdish state, it will insist on a legitimate Kurdish role in a future Iraq. Nor will it likely to be willing to accept a Turkish protectorate over Iraqi Kurdistan and special privileges for the Turcomans. Neither is Washington likely to acquiesce in policies that make it seem as if Turkey will get control over northern Iraq’s oil holdings.

IMPLICATIONS: Thus Turkish fears over Kurdistan, bordering on paranoia, lead Ankara to take excessive counsel of its fears and create threats where they do not exist. Those fears then breed misconceived policies that cause more problems among Turkey’s friends. At the same time, Turkey is profoundly mistaken if it thinks that Washington needs its support more than it needs Washington’s support. In fact in the Caucasus where equally vital Turkish interests are at stake this works exactly the other way. Without the alliance connection to the United States, Turkey’s ability to project effective power and influence is substantially reduced, even more than is Washington’s, if the alliance does indeed rupture. Reports from Azerbaijan indicate that this is already taking place. Inasmuch as Azerbaijan, the key state for Turkey and perhaps to a somewhat lesser degree America, is on the imminent verge of a regime change, harmony among the two allies is critical. Azerbaijan is already a highly stressed state with one of the greatest refugee populations in the world after the conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, a war that has no political resolution in sight. Once President Heydar Aliyev leaves the scene, the way will be open for all kinds of intrigues, not least those fomented by Moscow and its clients there, to gain control of the state and its huge energy revenues. It is very likely that Moscow already has a plan and cadres in place for this eventuality. Were there harmony among the U.S. and Turkish governments, it is probably just as likely that they could have worked out a plan for this contingency. But if the alliance is falling apart and is plagued by conflicting signals, interests, and mutual misreadings, it will be very difficult to project any sort of Western influence or power into the area, not to mention formulating and implementing an effective policy for Azerbaijan. Should this process deepen further, Turkey, more than Washington will be undermined because Azerbaijan is vital to Turkish energy and security interests and is the linchpin of its Caucasian strategy to keep Russia away from its borders and from dominating the Caucasus. If that policy fails, Turkey comes under immediate economic and strategic threat with few supporters around to help it. And it certainly will be unable to offer Georgia, the next Russian target, much assistance of any kind under those conditions.

CONCLUSIONS: It is very clear that the strength of U.S.-Turkish relations exercises a major impact on the shape of postwar Iraq and the Middle East. The same holds true for the Balkans. But it is no less the case in the former Soviet Union, especially the Caucasus, and even more particularly in Azerbaijan. A major political struggle over the succession to Aliyev is brewing there and if Turkey and America cannot coordinate their policies then they will both lose out, as will the people of the Caucasus, who will face very strong pressures for becoming Russian satellites once again. There is much more at stake in U.S.-Turkish relations than the phantoms of a Kurdish state and one can only hope that policymakers in both capitals will focus on real threats and genuinely common interests rather than on the products of long outdated fears that have no basis in reality.

AUTHOR BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not represent the views of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government.