BACKGROUND: The political opposition was eliminated in Uzbekistan shortly after Islam Karimov was elected president in 1992. The political power is centralized and free media is virtually non existent. Erk was the first political party that formed in Uzbekistan in the late days of the Soviet regime, in the late 1980s. Like other political movements at the time, Erk was banned in the early 1990s. The party’s leader, Mohammad Solih, was forced out of the country and Erk lost a significant part of its members. In June of this year Erk conducted a reunion and promised to increase its political activity. Nearly thirty people gathered in the recent protest on Tashkent’s central streets with placards expressing controversial statements about ending the persecution of dissidents and returning the party’s illegally confiscated property. After marching for three kilometers the protestors were surrounded and severely beaten by more that fifty militia men. Some leaders of the protest were detained for several hours by the militia. On October 22, a week after the demonstration, Erk held its 5th congress, in Tashkent, with 140 party members, representatives of the mass media and the international community. In his speech, Solih introduced the main principles of the party’s political program that strives for the rapid democratization of Uzbek politics. According to Solih, Erk’s activities should be characterized as attempts to build a constructive political opposition which, based on the party’s program, would be able to systematically evaluate the government policies and participate in parliamentary and presidential elections. Erk’s internal institutional structure has developed a decentralized distribution of powers and responsibilities which suggests that the Uzbek political opposition is gaining more credibility. Erk’s congress was held despite prior numerous impediments from the government side. During the congress, a group of about 25 people comprised of members of another opposition party “Birlik” and former members of Erk, broke into the room trying to disrupt the meeting. Excluded from Erk in 1996, Samad Murod was the most active among the intruders, insisting that he and not Solih was Erk’s genuine leader. This incident testified to the internal split in the party and disagreement between its major leaders, which may well have been fueled by the government. Earlier manifestations of political opposition to the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan have mainly taken a violent form. The bombings in the center of Tashkent in the winter of 1999 and the insurgency conducted by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the territories of southern Kyrgyzstan and parts of Uzbekistan in the summers of 1999-2000 are the most prominent examples. They were followed by a harsh response by authorities to any threat, and Karimov’s regime kept growing in authoritarianism. The proliferating Uzbek-American relations, especially in the areas of military assistance in the war in Afghanistan but also in terms of significant economic cooperation, now bind Karimov’s administration more tightly to its commitments to enhance the country’s human rights record. This includes commitments to reduce censorship over the activity of the mass media and other civic organizations, as well as providing the grounds for political pluralism. Nevertheless, until recently, the situation in the country with regard to liberalization of politics and economy saw little progress. IMPLICATIONS: According to assessments of international correspondents, the public perception of the Erk demonstration was marked with predominantly positive attitude in favor of the protestors. At the same time, the government’s penalty to the Erk demonstration was relatively ‘soft’ compared to the treatment served to previous gusts of opposition. The detained demonstrators were released and, what is more, the outlawed party’s congress was held with only slight interruptions by security structures. Some observers argue that such a shift in the government reaction is a direct consequence of the U.S. presence in the country. Others, however, are inclined to think that it is possibly a sign of a veiled tactics of the Uzbek government aimed at splitting the opposition into conflicting and weaker fractions. The latter opinion is based on the assumption that if Karimov is to continue his ruthless persecution of political competitors, he will further need to rely on his personal stature and his relations with Washington. But if he will show signs of gradual liberalization of his regime and comply with the American demands, he risks allowing an aggressive outbreak of the opposition that was once suffocated. This tension is especially sensitive at the threshold of the presidential elections that are expected to be held within the next few years. Similarly to the neighboring countries, the opposition in Uzbekistan is yet weak and does not have a clear strategy for promoting the principles it advances. Although the number of political parties is mushrooming before the upcoming parliamentary elections next year, these mostly face denials to legal registration by the Uzbek Ministry of Interior. However, those parties which persist, such as Erk and Birlik, require a more sophisticated response from the government. Furthermore, the reportedly declining health of the Uzbek president is an important factor of anxiety concerning internal stability in Uzbekistan. Observers have been reporting Karimov’s frequent health treatments abroad and his sporadic public speeches. Rumors have grown among the public regarding his weakening control over the state, military structures and political opposition. Along with these rumors, the public is wary of facing an aggressive breakout of underground political opposition. There is a significant public perception of the threat posed by Islamic radical movements in the country, as well as other counter-regime formations based on clan and family identities. CONCLUSIONS: The political opposition in Uzbekistan has systematically undermined or forced out of the country. However, with the increasing political and economic involvement of the United States in the region, there are signs that the secular opposition is becoming more assertive, while the government shows initial signs of gradually changing its policies. The convertibility of the Uzbek currency is one example; another is the muted reaction of the Uzbek security structures to Erk’s demonstration and congress. While these events clearly point to changing tactics on the part of Karimov’s government toward the political opposition, it remains to be seen whether it constitutes a move towards the liberalization of the politics or a move to weaken and divide the opposition. AUTHOR’S BIO: Erica Marat is a PhD Fellow at the Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Bremen, Germany.