Wednesday, 03 December 2003

TURKMEN OPPOSITION UNITES, BUT REMAINS WEAK

Published in Analytical Articles

By Hooman Peimani (12/3/2003 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: Unlike Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan did not experience the emergence of many anti-regime political groups upon its independence in 1991. As the worsening economic situation and the lowering living standards all over Central Asia created a growing dissatisfied population in the region, the establishment of Turkmenistan’s totalitarian regime prevented in that country the translation of emerging popular dissatisfaction into an anti-regime movement capable of challenging the ruling elite. Thanks to its repressive measures, the Turkmen regime created around President Saparmurad Niyazov’s cult of personality simply removed the possibility of active and growing opposition groups inside the country.
BACKGROUND: Unlike Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan did not experience the emergence of many anti-regime political groups upon its independence in 1991. As the worsening economic situation and the lowering living standards all over Central Asia created a growing dissatisfied population in the region, the establishment of Turkmenistan’s totalitarian regime prevented in that country the translation of emerging popular dissatisfaction into an anti-regime movement capable of challenging the ruling elite. Thanks to its repressive measures, the Turkmen regime created around President Saparmurad Niyazov’s cult of personality simply removed the possibility of active and growing opposition groups inside the country. Regardless of their ideologies, objectives and types of activities, real or perceived political opponents were suppressed under different pretexts, including espionage, coup attempts, corruption and the weakening of the president or his regime. The continuation of a policy of zero-tolerance of political dissent in any form has since prevented the formation and/or survival of active political groups inside the country. The political opponents have found no choice but to leave their country for the safety of mainly Russia and European countries where their opposition to the Turkmen political system is tolerated. As a result, the active Turkmen opposition groups are foreign-based small and weak organizations formed by dissidents inside and outside of the Turkmen political system with no apparent operation in the country, while lacking any meaningful popularity among the dissatisfied Turkmens. In short, they are unable to pose a threat to President Niyazov\'s one-party political system.

IMPLICATIONS: Against this background, in late September four Turkmen exiled groups gathered in Prague to establish the UDFT. They included the Renaissance Socio-Political Movement, the Republican Party of Turkmenistan, the United Democratic Opposition of Turkmenistan (also known as ODOT) and the Watan Socio-Political Movement. The first meeting of the UDFT members is planned before the end of the current year. It is still unclear what type of organization the UDFT is, given that the statements of its officials made at the end of the Prague meeting were broad and vague. The new group describes itself as a democratic organization advocating a multiparty political system based on free democratic elections and market reforms in the Turkmen economy while being committed to the principles of democracy, human rights and freedom of the media. It also commits itself to the removal of President Niyazov from power. This objective justifies its specifying as \"top priority\" the drafting of an alternative constitution to the existing Turkmen one in preparation for the post-Niyazov era. According to its communiqué released on September 29, the UDFT therefore stands for \"the interaction and unification of the efforts of parties, movements and groups standing on a political platform, which opposes Niyazov\'s regime\". Hence, the group sees itself not just as a political party, but as a growing union of the Turkmen opposition groups, which is open \"to all supporters of democratic reforms in Turkmenistan.\" While it is too early to judge this new group, certain factors raise question about its survival, its importance and its ability to turn itself into an alternative to the existing Turkmen political system. As reported, basic organization issues, including the UDFT’s leadership structure, are yet to be settled, indicative of its uncertain future and of a hasty effort to take advantage of a changing international attitude towards the Turkmen regime. In such situation, the group could be seen as the only available organized alternative. Also, it is still unclear how the UDFT seeks to achieve its declared democratic objectives and, in particular, their prerequisite, i.e., the ousting of President Niyazov from power. On the one hand, this is due to the absence of any concrete statement by the group on such important matters. On the other, this is a result of the group\'s lack of popular support and an organization inside Turkmenistan. Moreover, the political records of at least some of its leading figures as reflected in their significant ties with the Niyazov administration cast doubt about the group\'s commitment to democracy, in general, and to its declared democratic objectives, in particular. For example, Avdi Kuliev, the ODOT head, was Turkmenistan\'s foreign minister until June 1992 when he resigned in protest. Another example is Nurmukhammet Hanamov, a co-founder of the Republican Party of Turkmenistan, who was Turkmenistan’s ambassador to Turkey and Israel before his 2002 defection.

CONCLUSIONS: Despite the expression of hope by its leading members and some Turkmen dissidents, the creation of the UDFT in itself did not begin a new era in the anti-Niyazov movement qualitatively different from the previous one. In its current format and unless it makes an effort to address its deficiencies, the group is not any different from other Turkmen opposition groups, which suffer from major handicaps, i.e., weak foreign-based organization, lack of popularity in Turkmenistan and lack of a clear and realistic plan of action to achieve their objectives. However, its emergence on the political scene has a symbolic value as it could contribute as a factor, possibly as a model, to the unity of divided Turkmen opposition, provided its forming groups hold together and expand. Yet it has no realistic chance for posing a challenge to President Niyazov\'s authority so long as it remains a foreign-based group with no relevance to the realities of Turkmenistan.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Hooman Peimani works as an independent consultant with international organizations in Geneva and does research in International Relations.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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