BACKGROUND: The presidential elections of October 15, 2003 brought Ilham Aliyev to the presidency of Azerbaijan. Some termed it a dynastic transfer of power from father to son, while others coined it as the beginning of a new era in Azerbaijani politics. Much was expected of the young Aliyev: reforms in the political and civil society sectors, liberalization of the economic sphere from the control of the governmental officials; more rapid integration into the Western institutions and reliance on a younger cadre in the state administration. On February 9, 2004 both the ruling and the opposition parties in Baku held roundtables, evaluating Ilham Aliyev\'s 100 days in power. The evaluation, as expected, was radically polarized. The ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party (YAP) highly estimated the activity of the newly elected president. Ilham Aliyev\'s decrees on the intensification of the social and economic development of the country; a state program on economic development of regions outside of Baku for 2004-2008, and his emergency trip and rapid measures following the collapse of a residential building in Lenkoran were cited as examples of his care and attention to the social protection and economic well-being of the people. Opposition parties, on the other hand, argued that Ilham Aliyev is unable to manage the country. The detainment and harassment of opposition activists in relations to post-election violence, pressures on media and civil society, and Ilham Aliyev’s growing rapprochement with Russian President Putin were cited as evidence of the President’s failures in both domestic and foreign policy. Meanwhile, when he met with representatives of local business, Ilham Aliyev showed the first signs of pursuing his own political and economic policy. Azerbaijani entrepreneurs complained about the continuing harassment from the police and government bureaucrats, to which Ilham Aliyev immediately reacted and ordered to eradicate all barriers hindering the operation of business in the country. The President also called for the end of \"monopolized economy\" in the country. Then, Ilham Aliyev made a major cadre change, when on February 20 he appointed Ali Abbasov, a close associate of the President and rector of the Economic University, as the minister of Communications, adding the portfolio of IT to the ministry. The previous minister, Nadir Ahmedov, the subject of constant complains by foreign and local businesses, was removed from his job. A western diplomat in a private conversation said that the combination of the communications ministry with the IT sector had actually been the recommendation of international agencies, as well as to change the ministry\'s function from that of a service provider role into a regulatory role. Thus, while in some areas Ilham Aliyev is indeed continuing his father\'s policies, in others he is making slow but steady changes. Yet it is still unclear whether Ilham Aliyev will be able to succeed in his reforms.

IMPLICATIONS: While the majority of public so far has seen little changes from the Heydar Aliyev regime, many agree that Ilham Aliyev has a different tactic of governance. He is young and reform-minded, and most importantly, he is supportive of the business environment. As a high ranking YAP official said confidentially, “he is doomed to make reforms, otherwise he will fail at a President”. But at the same time, Ilham is still in need of the support of his father\'s cadre. The Azerbaijani public expected that after the elections, Ilham Aliyev would appoint new ministers. Yet, following the post-election violence and heated political tension with the opposition coupled by strong external pressure very early into his presidency, Ilham did not feel secure enough to enact drastic changes. He re-appointed all of his father\'s ministers, which shows that he is yet to form his own team, meanwhile depending on the old team. The majority of local analysts believe that the old guard will jealously watch the cadre policy of the President and prevent any attempts to replace the old team with a new one, thus indirectly benefiting from internal and external pressures on Aliyev. Over-dependency on the old team would weaken the new President’s capacity to intensify reforms in the country. Similarly, it pushes him into the hands of Russian President Putin, who has strongly endorsed Ilham Aliyev. A warm reception in Moscow given to Ilham Aliyev and regular phone conversations between the two presidents indicate Putin’s desire to use carrots in order to prevent the further integration on Azerbaijan into the West and the presence of U.S. military bases in the country. Yet on the most important issues facing Azerbaijan, including its conflict with Armenia, Putin has offered no meaningful support so far and Baku moved little beyond rhetoric in accommodating actual Russian demands. As time goes on, President Ilham Aliyev is likely to consolidate his power and gradually replace the old guard with his own people. Most probably, this will be a gradual process that will be completed by or around the time of the 2005 parliamentary elections. Only then can Ilham Aliyev strengthen his central power and pursue his own policies. Meanwhile, reforms will be gradually implemented.

CONCLUSIONS: When campaigning, Ilham Aliyev promised to create 600,000 new jobs for Azerbaijani citizens during the first term of his presidency. He was also expected to make reforms in the political and economic sectors of the country and replace the old governing team with the new one. The first 100 days of his presidency showed that although President Aliyev is determined to intensify the economic development of the country, and most importantly of the regions outside of Baku, his dependency on the old team makes him careful and gradual in his reforms. In other words, President Aliyev needs time to consolidate his power and bring his own people into the government. In the next few years, the incoming oil revenues and related economic development of the country are likely to maintain Ilham Aliyev\'s power. Should he be able to maintain the balanced foreign policy that his father started and intensify the economic development of the country, as well as to improve situation in the often ignored but crucial spheres of health care and education, his popularity rating will remain high. Should he fail to deliver on his campaign promises, the social tensions in the country are likely to increase, especially if people\'s hopes for more prosperity due to oil revenues do not materialize.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Fariz Ismailzade is a freelance writer in Baku, specializing in politics and economics of the Caucasus. He obtained his masters degree in social and economic development from Washington University in St. Louis and has been publishing with various international journals.