BACKGROUND: During Georgia’s time of troubles in the early 1990s, Ajaria remained an ‘island of stability’ that was secured primarily through tough bargaining with Tbilisi. Aslan Abashidze for more than a decade had every reason to be satisfied with the deal: he traded a symbolic recognition of Tbilisi’s sovereignty for a real and virtually unlimited control over his family domain. Backing from Moscow was always an important chip in this bargaining, so while the Georgian authorities demanded the withdrawal of all Russian military bases, Batumi warmly welcomed the Russian 12th military base and encouraged local young men to enlist for service there. In order to supplement these ‘strategic’ ties, Ajaria also tried to build economic links to Russia, particularly targeting Moscow as a source of investments. Russia, however, has shown more interest in acquiring undervalued assets (primarily, energy infrastructure) in Georgia proper, seeing Ajaria as peripheral to key economic crossroads in the region. Nevertheless, befriending Moscow’s mayor Yuri Luzhkov, Abashidze felt quite safe about his reign and refrained from experiments with constructing an Ajarian ethnic identity. All these power balances and bargaining frameworks were upset in November 2003 with the meteoric rise to power of a new Georgian leader. Mikhail Saakashvili has mobilized every source of public frustration with the ‘ancient regime’ and skillfully exploited Moscow’s irritation with Eduard Shevardnadze for staging his revolution (which saw quite a few smashed noses as well as some roses). Receiving a huge but short-term political credit for revitalizing Georgia’s long-derailed state-building project, he had to deliver Ajaria – but outplaying Russia appeared to be an ambition too far.

IMPLICATIONS: Saakashvili arrived to the final showdown with Abashidze in early May by navigating through several Ajarian crises where he sought not that much to prevail as rather to demonstrate, first of all to Moscow, that his rival is a spent force. It was to Moscow that he paid his first presidential visit, conveying to Putin not only his respect for Russia’s power but also his personal admiration for Putin’s leadership style. Abashidze responded by activating his own networks – and was greatly emboldened by Luzhkov’s impromptu visit in March. In retrospect, that visit could have been quite unhelpful since Putin harbors deep suspicions about Luzhkov and has shown reluctance to embrace his initiatives. The top brass do not have much influence in the Kremlin these days, but those bureaucrats with an FSB background who do (often called siloviki) would most probably gloat at every Saakashvili failure. In early May, he appeared to walk straight into a self-made trap with only small caliber military instruments at his disposal and dire warnings from Russia and Europe against putting them to a practical use. Had he attempted a miniature ‘Shock-&-Awe’ operation, Russia quite possibly would have effectively, even if indirectly, backed Abashidze’s motley forces, as it did in Abkhazia in October 1992. Putin’s siloviki were ready to call Saakashvili’s bluff – but were not prepared for his ‘stealth attack’ with overtaking Batumi by its own citizens. This blindness to the visibly maturing outcome might appear to be a professional blunder that could have been caused only by a serious relaxation during the extended May holidays. However, a structural explanation can also be advanced: prevailing perspectives in Moscow are shaped by a firm control over political life in Russia itself, and validated by suppression of every opposition in most post-Soviet states, from Azerbaijan to Kyrgyzstan. Abashidze was expected to stay in charge and prove that he commanded loyalty that could not be corrupted by Soros’s ‘petty money’. Key figures in Putin’s court could not master enough courage to challenge their boss’ sympathy (even if lukewarm) to Saakashvili, while Putin himself was most probably preoccupied with preparations for the inauguration. Thus, Russia seems to have arrived to a balanced and constructive policy by default, and Igor Ivanov was dispatched to Batumi with his proverbial ‘kiss of death’ when forceful options were no longer available. His ‘surprise’ visit to Tbilisi on May 17 had only one aim: to discourage any further experiments with ‘exporting the revolution’, but nobody in Moscow expected him to collect any dividends for delivering Ajaria.

CONCLUSIONS: It is entirely possible that Moscow has allowed Tbilisi to re-establish control over Ajaria following its own multi-purpose strategy for the Caucasus. However, most Russian policy analysts would probably agree that the simplest explanations centered on elementary decision-making failures should be tried first and then the ‘Occam razor’ could be applied to more complicated schemes and conspiracy theories. And if indeed it was a series of miscalculations that resulted in the ‘loss’ of Ajaria, Moscow would be urgently looking for an opportunity to settle the score. Saakashvili, with his pro-Western orientation and course of sovereignty-building, remains an unacceptable figure for many if not most in Putin’s narrow circle of trusted aides. They could be growing impatient to wait for him to break his political neck in yet another reckless challenge.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a Senior Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).