BACKGROUND: The Georgian government’s strategy in South Ossetia is threefold. First, anti-contraband activities are meant to financially weaken the authorities and pro-Russian criminal figures governing South Ossetia and to provide security forces to the region. Second, Kmara and civil society activists are operating in Tskhinvali to attract revolutionary support from within the Ossetian community. Third, President Saakashvili is offering socio-economic benefits to the Georgian and Ossetian populations residing in South Ossetia, thus demonstrating his commitment to uniting both communities under the Georgian flag. Officials began setting the stage for an Ossetian revolution under the guise of an anti-corruption campaign targeting the transit of contraband from Russia, through Roki Tunnel, into Tskhinvali. Most entered the infamous Ergneti black market, where it was being sold tax-free and directed along the plethora of roads winding out of Tskhinvali into Georgian-controlled territory. Smuggling undermines the Georgian economy and forms the main source of income for the separatist Ossetian government and the criminal, pro-Russia forces supporting them. National Movement party activists began to assist the Shida Kartli authorities by physically blocking contraband roads. The campaign resulted in a failed assassination attempt against the Shida Kartli governor, Mikheil Kareli, by Ossetian police on 24 May. Two days later, the Governor returned to South Ossetia to lead Independence Day celebrations in Tamarasheni, a Georgian-controlled village just down the road from Tskhinvali. Shida Kartli officials now boast that Ergneti is now being dismantled as a result of their activities. According to civil society activists, a large segment of the Ossetian population is already fed up with their corrupt government and would welcome a revolution if given the right support. Tea Tutberidze, a Tbilisi-based Kmara leader, explained that one Ossetian group, which goes by the Ossetian word for Kmara—Fagu—has been acting undercover, in Tskhinvali, for the last month and is responsible for developing ties with other frustrated branches of the Ossetian population. Tutberidze stressed that all activists would be Ossetian, not Georgian, and that all groups should develop inside Tskhinvali lest anti-government activities would be rejected as a Georgian import. In a nationally televised address, President Saakashvili outlined a series of socio-economic incentives, including: establishing an Ossetian-language television station in Shida Kartli; providing pensions to Ossetian pensioners; reestablishing the “Tskhinvali Railway”, now defunct for 12 years; providing free ambulatory care and agricultural chemicals for Georgians and Ossetians in the region; further, the Georgians would fill their quota of 500 Peacekeepers (up from 90) to the Russian-Georgian-Ossetian Joint Peacekeeping Forces (Ossetians currently have 500). Saakashvili also noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin had no prior knowledge of threats by Russian Peacekeeping leader General Sviataslav Nabdzorov’s threats to dissolve the village contraband checkpoints bordering the Ossetian-controlled territories—prompted the Interior Ministry to dispatch troops to the region and to set up special headquarters in Tkviavi. If true, Russia might, yet again, allow another Georgian revolution to occur.

IMPLICATIONS: Numerous officials insist it is necessary for Georgia to establish territorial integrity in South Ossetia not only because it will unite the unofficially divided region of Shida Kartli—the “heart of Georgia”, but because it will allow Georgia to establish permanent customs control and border mechanisms, thus enabling economic and social development. Until then, Georgia’s heartland is divided in half, and combating the contraband entering Georgia from Tskhinvali will be impossible. This situation not only destabilizes Georgia, but perpetuates an endemic system of corruption. Confident that Russia would not interfere in a Tskhinvali revolution, experts such as Temuri Yakobashvili stress that military interference would be a political disaster for Russian authorities. If successful, Georgia would have to consider how to administer South Ossetia, officially a part of Shida Kartli, but de facto independent. Would Tskhinvali region and the neighboring Java district form a separate administrative unit with a special status, or will they be officially incorporated into Shida Kartli as districts? For the last few months, Georgian authorities have been setting up local administrative offices in the Georgian-controlled territories of Liakhvi and Proni Gorges to meet immediate social welfare, economic, and security needs. Civil society activists point to the lack of leadership that Saakashvili’s government can turn to if the time comes to form a new government, though many expect that free and fair local elections might solve this problem. If contraband continues to wither away, authorities will have to address the potential for a South Ossetian economic decline. While authorities emphasize that money earned from contraband goes straight into the pockets of “high officials’” and criminals, they realize that many Ossetians’ livelihood depends it. Georgians living in the conflict zone claim to harbor no ill-will towards the Ossetians. However, those Ossetians who harbor dark memories of atrocities committed against them during the 1990 to 1992 Georgian-Ossetian conflict will be more difficult to entice. One official, who himself claimed to have been tortured by Ossetian forces while defending his village, stressed that Georgians and Ossetians in the conflict zone commonly refer to each other as “two brothers”. He added, however, that there are Ossetians who will never accept Georgian rule. He thought some might choose to emigrate to North Ossetia or to other parts of Russia, which could pose problems for the Russian North Caucasus. Probably the most significant challenge ahead would be the rehabilitation of Ossetian youth who have been fed anti-Georgian, pro-Russian propaganda from birth. One Tskhinvali-based NGO leader described how she recently overhead one young child describing how he would take his father’s gun and kill any Georgians he found on his territory. A Kmara activist noted that these youth are the most likely to become aggressive toward Georgians. Ossetian children grew up with a memorial in the center of Tskhinvali that states, “Buried here are those killed by Georgians”. Moreover, many Ossetian children do not speak Georgian and grew up speaking Russian or Ossetian.

CONCLUSIONS: The socio-economic incentives President Saakashvili is offering the South Ossetian communities directly addresses many concerns a revolution would raise. If Georgian authorities are successful in cutting off the Ossetians from their primary source of income, smuggling, Tskhinvali authorities will face some tough decisions. Civil society activists stress that as long as President Saakashvili can deliver on economic benefits and security guarantees, Ossetians might be willing to unite peacefully with Georgia. However, considering an Ossetian fear that Georgians wish to “conquer Tskhinvali”, Saakashvili has no assurance that Tskhinvali residents will not embrace a violent response as Georgians appear to hover over Tskhinvali. Moreover, it remains unclear how Russia will respond to future events.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Theresa Freese is a graduate of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C. and is currently conducting research on Georgia’s regional reforms.