BACKGROUND: On August 19, in a first offensive military operation since the resumption of fire in South Ossetia, Georgian special forces captured the strategic heights from which Georgian villages were pounded during almost two weeks. Despite popular calls for a continued offensive, Georgian authorities decided to hand over the heights to the tripartite peacekeeping troops and withdraw the police and military detachments from South Ossetia. Simultaneously, President Saakashvili called upon the international community to assist in elaborating a new format of the peace process, which would allow for international presence during the political negotiations, and for increased international military monitoring on the ground. The Georgian government has reiterated that the format of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) established in accordance with the 1992 peace accords is no longer acceptable, as it allows South Ossetia, backed by two other members – North Ossetia and Russia – to stonewall all Georgian proposals. Top Georgian officials also repeated offers of substantial autonomy for South Ossetia. Before Saakashvili’s decision became known on August 19, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said there was no need for an international conference or any new peace process in South Ossetia, as the JCC format already provided for a political mechanism. The U.S. State Department also accepted the language of using “existing political mechanisms” for defusing the crisis. However, after the decision on troop pullout, the OSCE’s ambassador to Georgia hinted optimism on a potential expansion of OSCE monitoring in South Ossetia. EU special ambassador Heikki Talvitie is visiting Georgia on August 23, OSCE Permanent Council members are invited to visit Georgia on September 5 and the president of the European Commission Romano Prodi is to visit Tbilisi in mid-September.

IMPLICATIONS: The armed clashes in August confirmed the presence of armed volunteers or mercenaries that have infiltrated South Ossetia from Russia to fight against Georgian authorities. Following the most fierce exchanges of August 17-18, independent military analysts tend to conclude that specific night vision and sniper equipment used against Georgian detachments indicates either that the Russian special forces are participating in the clashes directly, or that they have been training and equipping the Ossetian military for a substantial period of time. Saakashvili is determined to engage South Ossetian de facto authorities in a dialogue over the political status of South Ossetia. However, Russia’s military backing gives no incentive for the South Ossetian president, Eduard Kokoity, to launch such a dialogue. Simultaneously, Georgia has no confidence in a Russia-dominated JCC format. On August 18, Georgian foreign minister Salome Zourabichvili formulated the Georgian vision of the peace process at the OSCE Permanent Council session in Vienna: “demilitarization, ceasefire and direct dialogue [with South Ossetian authorities].” To achieve these aims, Georgia calls for an expanded OSCE monitoring, which should include the South Ossetian section of the Russo-Georgian border (Roki tunnel). Georgia also calls for an international conference under a OSCE/UN aegis to discuss the proposals for a political settlement. So far, the OSCE’s reaction has been cautious, and the support of the EU and the U.S. rather lukewarm. The Russian foreign ministry characterized the Georgian requests to increase the OSCE role on July 31 as “obviously unattainable” and accused OSCE monitors of siding with Georgians in South Ossetia. This is an interesting twist, as on July 8 the OSCE was accused by CIS countries (except Georgia and Azerbaijan) of focusing \"exclusively on monitoring human rights and democratic institutions\" in the CIS. The statement argued for an increased security role of the organization to “correct the imbalance.” Strengthening the security arm of the OSCE (where Russia has an effective veto right) in Europe to counterweigh NATO is a familiar goal of Russian diplomacy since the mid-1990s. Still, Russia consistently objects to even OSCE participation in South Ossetia, apparently unwilling to dilute it own direct influence even to a slight extent. Recently, some Russian politicians commented positively on using the “Minsk group” format, applied to Nagorno Karabakh conflict since 1992. The “Minsk Group” – a consultative political forum of selected members of the OSCE – has failed to deliver results in Nagorno Karabakh, not least because its mandate was blurred, its participants had no clear commitments, and the initiatives were at times blocked or ignored by Russia. Involvement of Western powers would still be a positive outcome for official Tbilisi, but a “Minsk Group” format can be one, but by no means the only new mechanism for South Ossetia. For Georgia, expanded OSCE involvement is a suboptimal option. Certainly, Tbilisi would like to see NATO or EU peacekeepers replace the Russian ones. Nonetheless, Saakashvili is pragmatic about available options. U.S. troops are tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan and Washington is consumed by the upcoming presidential elections. The EU recently took over an operation in Afghanistan and plans to do the same in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus Georgia’s requests to the international community are rather minimal: to give an international backing to the political dialogue by the means of a conference (Bulgaria already offered Sofia as a venue) and to significantly increase monitoring of South Ossetia as a confidence-building measure. The Russian-dominated multipartite peacekeeping forces are allowed to remain in South Ossetia. If Saakashvili fails to secure this minimal support, Tbilisi would not be able to restore the situation to pre-escalation status quo. This would mean a re-opening of the gushing smuggling from South Ossetia, and a major loss of face with the electorate by backtracking on key election commitments. There would be a strong public support for a military operation in South Ossetia, possibly endorsed by the security establishment in the government and the parliament. Sustained clashes will undoubtedly damage Georgia’s economic reforms that the European powers have staked on through a Euro 1 billion support package. While Saakashvili-Zhvania’s government is genuinely committed to these reforms, the issues of national security are bound to prevail. CONCLUSIONS: It would be an illusion to assume that the JCC framework is capable of addressing the current situation in South Ossetia. Georgian authorities have acted to solve the key economic (smuggling) and political (territorial integrity) issues by “de-frosting” the South Ossetian conflict and it is impossible to reset the clock to the situation of Spring 2004. Georgian authorities have indicated willingness to compromise and accept suboptimal security arrangements to the extent that they ensure minimal security of its citizens and a progress at the negotiating table. If the EU and OSCE shuttle diplomacy fails to deliver results within the coming month, resumption of hostilities could be real in mid- to late October. AUTHOR’S BIO: Jaba Devdariani is the founder of Civil Georgia (civil.ge) and a works of the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.