BACKGROUND: Azerbaijani authorities found themselves between the pressure from NATO to allow military personnel of Armenia, which still occupies significant parts of Azerbaijan’s territory, and the rapidly growing outrage in the Azerbaijani public. In fact, when last month a judge issued sentences ranging up to five years imprisonment for activists of the “Karabakh Liberation Organization” for breaking into the a hall where a NATO pre-exercise seminar was held with the participation of two Armenian officers, the verdict was roundly condemned by virtually all political groups in Azerbaijan. This was followed by a daily campaign conducted by independent and opposition media, printing first page ads and interrupting broadcasts to call for a ban on visits by Armenian officers. Careful attempts by the authorities to balance the two pressures, most notably by trying to limit the number of the participants from Armenia and emphasizing the importance of cooperation with NATO did not prevent the mounting wave of public protests. The cancellation of the exercise marks a significant step in the Alliance’s relationship with Azerbaijan, one of the most active and advanced members of the PfP program. Similarly, Baku’s final decision to block the participation of Armenian officers was made with some pains. Pro-western oriented Azerbaijan, has over the years since PfP was established, stated its desire to integrate with NATO and has proactively participated in the Alliance’s programs. Along with Georgia, Azerbaijan has been involved in Kosovo peace operation from the early days. In addition, Azerbaijani personnel serve in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, this latest incident comes against the background of Azerbaijan’s deepening partnership with NATO and increasingly successful security cooperation with the United States. Apparently, the noisy public protests in Azerbaijan, overshadowed the crux of Baku’s position. It is not so much a rejection of visits by Armenians, but rather the presence of military officers who serve in the armed forces of Armenia which occupy Azerbaijan’s territory, some of whom reportedly participated in the conflict in the early 1990s. When similar exercises were held in Armenia, the Azerbaijani military, following the same logic, chose not to participate while Armenia’s Prime Minister Armen Darbinian took part in the TRACECA-Silk Road Summit in Baku in 1998; and other Armenian civilian figures have visited Baku on various occasions.

IMPLICATIONS: NATO’s insistence on “inclusiveness” failed to recognize the overwhelming and emotional nature of protests in Azerbaijani society frustrated with the long-lasting unresolved conflict and years of non-productive peace talks. But moreover, NATO’s criticism of Azerbaijan failed to recognize that Azerbaijan’s stance directly upheld the very values enshrined in the framework document of Partnership for Peace. The Partnership Framework Document states that in joining the Partnership, states subscribing to the document “reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means.” In the context of Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani territories, “inclusiveness” could in fact be construed as amounting to an acceptance of the violation of these values. Faced with the choice of either saying no to its favorite international alliance or inflaming the passions of virtually the entire population of the country, Azerbaijan’s leadership went along with the popular demands. This should not be surprising to careful observers of the region, since the general line taken by the authorities over the last decade has been to follow policies acceptable to the public in general. The government in this instance chose not to pursue a policy unacceptable to the wider public. In addition to possibility of certain tensions between Baku and NATO, the latest events may have other implications as well. The first and most obvious one is that the conflict with Armenia remains – and possibly strengthens – as a powerful mobilizing factor in the Azerbaijani society. It is difficult to imagine another issue, which would produce such unified, unequivocal views throughout the entire spectrum of society. Expressions of protest lead by the media and various NGOs were joined even by the generally reserved parliament with MPs appealing to NATO’s Secretary General. Arguing that the participation of Armenian officers would have had a negative impact on the talks between presidents Ilham Aliyev and Robert Kocharian, Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry hinted at the charged emotional atmosphere in the country following the protests. Contrary to the objectives of the “inclusiveness” approach, the attempts to include Armenia’s military officers in the exercise on the Azerbaijani soil may have produced the opposite effect of inflaming the population and further limiting president Aliyev’s room for maneuver at the peace talks. NATO’s decision to cancel the exercise conformed to its policies, yet in Azerbaijan it is likely to be perceived as another indication of “double standards.” For Azerbaijanis, who are mostly pro-American and pro-NATO, what they see as dismissive treatment by Western allies of its rather desperate concerns will only add to the existing disappointment. Although the incident does not help Azerbaijan’s image within the Alliance, neither does it bode well for NATO’s popularity among the population of one of its key partners. Moreover, disappointment in NATO, a popular alliance in Azerbaijan, is likely to increase general distrust to other international organizations as well. All of this is happening, of course, against the background of Moscow’s active courting of Baku and Washington’s preoccupation with the elections. As for Turkey, once Washington’s designee for regional leadership, Ankara seems fixated on its EU dimension and has not recently been actively engaged in the Caucasus.

CONCLUSIONS: Azerbaijani society emerged as more dynamic and less politically apathetic than it has appeared to outside observers. Vocal public protests and a strong NGO and media campaign energized even previously dormant political forces. Thus, if unlike other issues, the conflict with Armenia is a raw nerve in Azerbaijan, then touching it directly leads to an immediate public outcry among Azerbaijanis. And unlike NATO, the authorities in Azerbaijan cannot ignore the strong feelings of their people. For all the difficulties this may produce in Baku’s relations with its international partners, the increasing sensitivity to domestic public opinion and adjusting policies to reflect the overwhelming views of the society may be a positive thing for the Republic of Azerbaijan.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emin Alisayidov is a Baku-based freelance journalist.