BACKGROUND: China gives its fight against the drug trade a high priority but its actions are overwhelmingly focussed on its borders with Myanmar. This is understandable, since until recently well over 90% of the opiates consumed in China came from the Golden Triangle. Broadly speaking, its law enforcement efforts have paid off and these have coincided with a decline in opium production in Myanmar and Laos. China’s demand for heroin has not decreased, however, which suggests that distributors will face pressures to source from other areas. With the massive harvest in Afghanistan and the probable existence of reserve stocks, the opportunity to source replacement supplies through China’s north-west is inviting. To date, the two items that have dominated China’s agenda in its relations with Central Asia have been trade expansion and cooperation against the separatist threat it perceives from Uighurs in Xinjiang. Its pursuit of these interests has largely been successful. With regard to the first item, Xinjiang’s trade with Central Asia has increased dramatically – in the first eight months of 2004, China’s overall trade with Central Asia was worth some $3.56 billion, most of it through Xinjiang, representing a 53% increase over 2003. Kazakhstan dominates the value of this trade, largely because its exports of crude oil, copper, rolled steel and iron ore are in high demand to fuel Xinjiang’s rapid development. On the second item, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have now ratified agreements signed with China on the ‘three vices’ of separatism, terrorism and extremism, which govern law enforcement and extradition cooperation on terrorist activity. Recently, Chinese government estimates have suggested that around 20% of the country’s opiate consumption comes from Afghanistan. This represents the not insubstantial amount of around 16 tons of heroin annually, which indicates that trafficking into Xinjiang is feasible and is probably already contributing to corruption there.

IMPLICATIONS: The growth in importance of Afghanistan’s northern trafficking route and in its continuing large opium production capacity more generally is significant because it ensures that substantial quantities of heroin now flow close to China’s borders. Tajikistan’s apparent dominance as the first northbound transit country for Afghan opiates is particularly problematic for Xinjiang because the 414km Tajik-Chinese border is poorly-guarded and, although it is at a high altitude, there are many usable routes apart from the single official crossing at the Kulma Pass. The poverty of the border regions and the links between communities on either side (for example, there are cross-border marriages) contribute to the feasibility of expanding trafficking along these routes. While this mode of trafficking resembles that across the Afghan-Tajik border, China’s determination to expand cross-border trade has opened the way for various methods of smuggling. All types of border crossings are increasing, from small and frequent shuttle trading to large commercial freight. With regard to the latter, it is Xinjiang’s links with Kazakhstan that are the greatest risk. For example, the Dostyk/Druzba rail crossing is expected to handle 9 million tons of cargo this year and is currently undergoing an upgrade. Meanwhile, China and Kazakhstan have agreed to create a special free-trade zone on 200 hectares of land in the vicinity of Khorgos, in which there will be zero tariffs and a free flow of goods and people. China’s willingness to open its borders is largely driven by its belief that economic development in Xinjiang will achieve the political aim of integrating and quieting the restive province. While violent protest has subsided somewhat, it has not succeeded in integrating Uighurs and the Han Chinese are enjoying a disproportionate share of Xinjiang’s economic expansion. Among other problems, the province has become one of China’s worst in terms of drug abuse and the northwest now has the fastest growing drug addict population. The overwhelming majority of these use heroin and a shift is occurring from smoking to injecting. This increase in drug addiction is a pull factor for Afghan opiates exerted independently from demand that may arise further east due to increased interdiction on the Myanmar-China border and lower production in Myanmar. Nevertheless, it can still play a facilitating role in connecting Afghanistan to distribution networks in East Asia by establishing the methods and criminal relationships for organizing imports from Central Asia and onward shipment across China. China’s current ignorance of these risks, wilful or otherwise, was highlighted in September by the secretary-general of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Zhang Deguang, who said of their priorities: “one cannot say that fighting terrorism will be the only task; we are also working on creating conditions for boosting our economies”. Although it occasionally attempts to make the link between Uighur militants and drug trafficking – for which there is currently little evidence – China does not appear to be preparing any action to pre-empt the increased flows in smuggling that will accompany Xinjiang’s opening to licit traffic. While it has pumped in large numbers of soldiers in response to the threat of separatism, counter-narcotics is not a priority and foreigners still report a surprising ease of movement in western Xinjiang. Indeed, the militarization of security in the province exacerbates the tensions between Uighurs and the government and, as experience in many other countries suggest, troops are by no means immune to drug-induced corruption.

CONCLUSIONS: With a push coming from Afghanistan’s bumper harvest and pulls coming from declining production in South-East Asia and the expansion of the consumption market in Xinjiang, China faces a high risk of an increase in its importation of Afghan opiates. Its current policies on drug abuse and its attitude and treatment of the large Uighur minority are unlikely to reduce the feasibility of drug trafficking into Xinjiang and in all likelihood will improve it. The current low profile of drug smuggling across its borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is unlikely to continue and counter-narcotics cooperation is likely to rise up China’s bilateral and multilateral agendas in Central Asia. For the three Central Asian governments, managing the issue of their role as a transit country for heroin smuggling to China will prove challenging and they are not currently equipped with the financial or human resources to assist China in trafficking prevention on their side of their borders with Xinjiang. Moreover, they have little direct incentive to do so since the heroin is heading away from them. Nevertheless, the pressure on the Central Asian republics to cooperate in any efforts China seeks to initiate will be large and growing, not least because the importance of Xinjiang as a trading partner is likely to increase.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Jacob Townsend was during Fall 2004 a Young Fellow with the Narcotics and Organized Crime Project at the Silk Road Studies Program, Uppsala University, Sweden. He authored the Report “The Risk to China from Trafficking in Afghan Opiates”, which will be published in January 2005.