BACKGROUND: When Mikhail Saakashvili took office in January 2004, he appointed a cabinet of young, western-educated and reform-minded disciples to tackle Georgia’s numerous problems. However, by June 2004, Saakashvili had made his first major reshuffle. Within the security sphere, General Prosecutor Irakli Okruashvili became Interior Minister, Interior Minister Giorgi Baramidze became Defense Minister, the Head of the National Security Council (NSC) Vano Merabishvili became Security Minister, Defense Minister Gela Bezhuashvili became Head of the NSC, and Security Minister Zurab Adeishvili took over as General Prosecutor. In December 2004, it was time for the third reshuffling. As a consequence, Okruashvili became Defense Minister, Baramidze became Minister for EU integration, and Merabishvili became Minister of Police and Public Security as the Ministries of Security and Interior merged. This merger can be seen as a way of revitalizing old-style sentiments within the security apparatus as the structure reminds of the NKVD or the KGB. In addition, purges and prosecutions of high-ranking officials, allegedly for embezzlement and misappropriation within the security structures, have so far been a trademark of Saakashvili’s first year as president. Yet, unless he has a well-hidden agenda of bringing the Soviet bureaucracy back from the dead, nothing points in the direction of KGB resurrection. In fact, streamlining the security bureaucracies and ousting institutional and personnel redundancies is what Georgia needs on its way to democracy. Thus there is no need to cry ‘wolf’. At a time when the bonds between the troika consisting of Saakashvili, Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, and Chairwoman of Parliament Nino Burjanadze are dissolving, both reshuffles should be seen as a cheap way for Saakashvili to consolidate loyalty within the highest echelons of power while any emerging powerbase, created by Zhvania or Burjanadze, is contained. By January 2005, the rift took such proportions that Saakashvili felt the need to go public with his warnings to Okruashvili and Baramidze by commanding obedience. Yet, Saakashvili’s method of “divide and conquer”, under the pretext of reform, is a double-edged sword that may have far-reaching and long-term consequences that contradict his more sober undertakings. It bears both structural and policy implications.

IMPLICATIONS: Firstly, Saakashvili’s cabinet does not have any substantial experience in governing a country. Ivy League education and a good heart do only so much and youth is not a substitute for experience. As Shevardnadze’s state structures were left in tatters, the current administration, for better or worse, has no institutional base to rely on. Creation of institutional stability and competence is therefore of utmost importance if long-term stability and smooth transitions are sought after. Few things could be more counter-productive than reshuffling a cabinet several times a year. Secondly, by using cabinet posts as rewards for loyalty to the President or for thwarting other political ambitions, development of political parties are hindered. The reshuffle, therefore, runs the risk of impeding commitment to reform and results. At the same time, this issue brings along an opportunity for Saakashvili to show that his democratic agenda is genuine and secure him a place in Georgian history books. Thirdly, there are several reasons to believe that Georgia’s security policy during the last year has been formed mainly the President, Okruashvili and Merabishvili, with assistance from foreign expertise. Only recently have the two latter been given posts that reflect their actual influence and ties to the President. Merabishvili is still found at the center of gravity. The reshuffle, moreover, shows that Baramidze, who is considered to be Zhvania’s protégé, has been completely sidelined. Burjanadze, who is not part of the government, has wisely kept a distance, biding her time. Despite being competent and appreciated by the international community, Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili also remains outside the real security establishment. When it comes to foreign relations, her role is to face Europe while the inner circle takes on the Russian bear and sets out to reestablish Georgia’s territorial integrity. Finally, as analysts often point out, Okruashvili is by many seen as a hawk favoring the use of military force, making him extensively unpopular in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. His coercive manner is nonetheless admired in other parts of Georgia. According to Saakashvili, Okruashvili will stay in office until Georgia’s territorial integrity is regained. The time frame for this is said to be three years, but few things could be more unpredictable. Unfortunately, there is a risk that his trouble-shooting skills, and Saakashvili’s renowned impatience, might work against a peaceful solution of the remaining conflicts in these break-away regions. It must be recalled that Okruashvili was one of the responsible for failed raids in South Ossetia that lead to armed clashes in 2004. However, having Okruashvili as Defense Minister is a good move when it comes to boosting reform of the Armed Forces and preparing for NATO integration. Well-respected and decisive as he is, he has the ability to gain momentum and implement reform given he is provided the resources. However, there are few signs of NATO admitting Georgia by 2006, as Tbilisi wishes.

CONCLUSIONS: Three conclusions can be deduced from Georgia’s cabinet carousel. Firstly, it underscores who and what posts will be the most important in the coming year. The office of the Prosecutor General will hardly regain the status it had during the reign of Merabishvili and the future role of the NSC is yet to be determined. Secondly, it is evident that Saakashvili is confident in the success of reforms as he does not see a need of utilizing a power balancing technique within the security structures. This is a clear break with the Soviet legacy and an important step forward when it comes to preparing for Western integration. GORBI polls show that he still enjoys great support for his policies and that no one has the ability to threaten his position. Therefore, unpopular but necessary reforms, initiated under his auspices, come at a perfect time. If the economic and political reforms, and attempts to reestablish territorial integrity, are carried out in a democratic, peaceful and sustainable way, people will have patience with promised results. Finally, loyalty is Saakashvili’s beacon and the security institutions have almost been optimized in this aspect, with just a few issues within the intelligence community left to be dealt with. After Baramidze and Okruashvili started to call each other names, and Saakashvili subsequently took action, it became clear that the President fears an immanent rift within the troika of the Rose Revolution. His precautions, as outlined above, might yet impact beyond what can be seen today.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert L. Larsson is a security analyst at the Department for Security and Strategy at the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI)